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Claas Lattman, CAU Kiel, clattmann@email.uni-kiel.de 
1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “The Art of  Land-Measuring. Diagrammatical Knowledge 
Between Egypt and Greece” 
 
Thales brought geometry from Egypt to Greece. Therefore he was the first Greek 
mathematician, wasn’t he? At least some of  the ancients tell us so. 
 
The earliest authentic first-hand testimonies for Greek mathematics, however, date from the 
fourth century BCE. Our assessment of  Thales’ contribution therefore relies on relatively late 
authors – who, to be sure, were no “objective” historians, but looked back through the lens of 
the state-of- the-art of  their own times, i.e. “Euclidean” mathematics. 
 
“Euclidean” mathematics, though, was, as a modern philosophy of  science perspective can 
show, separated from its predecessor(s) by a scientific revolution that took place in the fourth 
century BCE. This in particular relates to the fact that “Euclidean” mathematics invented and 
made use of  abstract universal diagrams (“triangles” etc.), whereas before that “mathematics” 
had operated on the basis of  numerically determined, particular “diagrams” that primarily 
represent only material, physical objects (which, e.g., were triangle-shaped). In this regard, it 
was similar to oriental, especially Egyptian mathematics. 
 
Against this backdrop, this paper will reassess early Greek “mathematics,” with a focus on 
Archaic Ionia (including Thales and other Presocratics). It will be suggested that this approach – 
including the knowledge it yielded – was, despite its impressive sophistication, less theoretical 
than practical in nature. This will lead to the insight that, after all, in Archaic Greece, too, 
“geometry” was still nothing but some (even if  general) art of  “land-measuring,” pursued not by 
scientists, but by engineers and craftsmen – whose impressive achievements, nonetheless, did 
lay the foundation for the eventual invention of  abstract “Euclidean” geometry. 
 
 
Robert Hahn, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, hahnprog@gmail.com 
1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Why Thales Knew the Pythagorean Theorem” 
 
Once we accept that Thales introduced geometry into Greece, having traveled to Egypt, 
as Proclus reports on the authority of  Eudemus, who also credits Thales with a number 
of  theorems, we understand that Thales was making geometrical diagrams. From 
where did he see such diagrams? Egypt is one place, having measured the height a 
pyramid there. Diagrams that reflect measurements when the shadow was equal to its 
height, and un-equal but proportional – the doxography credits him with both techniques 
-- suggest that Thales understood similar triangles – ratios, proportions, and similarity. 
We begin with the diagrams associated with the theorems, and place them next 
to the ones that reflect the measurements of  the pyramid and distance of  a ship at sea, 
Then, we introduce, on the authority of  Aristotle, that Thales posited an archê, a 
principle, from which all things come, and back into which all things return upon 
dissolution – there is no change, only alteration – a big picture begins to form. 
Suppose, then, Thales investigated geometry as a way to solve the metaphysical 
problem of  explaining HOW this one underlying unity could appear so divergently 
modified but not changing? Geometry offered a way to find the basic figure into which 
all other figures resolve, that re-packed and re-combined, was the building block of  all 
other appearances. We might see a lost narrative of  the relation between philosophy 
and geometry. 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 3 
 
There are two proofs of  the Pythagorean theorem, not one, preserved by Euclid. 
The one we learned in school was I.47 that Proclus reports was Euclid’s own invention. 
But, the other one, in book VI.31, by similar figures, by ratios and proportions, plausibly 
points back to Thales himself, perhaps taken up and perfected in proof  by Pythagoras 
and the Pythagoreans. That proof  shows that the right triangle is the fundamental 
geometrical figure, that expands or contracts in a pattern that came to be called 
continuous proportions. The argument that Thales knew the hypotenuse theorem is 
that, surprisingly, this was what he was looking for to explain the HOW of  his 
metaphysical speculation. The plausibility rests on following the diagrams as evidence. 
  
 
Michael Weinman, Bard College, Berlin, mdweinman@gmail.com 
1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Ionia between Babylon and Philolaus: No More ‘Greek Miracle’ ” 
 
To date, most important interpretive accounts of  the work early Pythagorean Philolaus 
(including Huffman 1993, McKirahan 2011, and Graham 2015 in Huffman 2015) all leave the 
interpreter to decide between the possibility that Philolaus, as a mid-fifth century Greek 
mathematician/ cosmologist, would base a certain key finding (his “Great Year” of  729 months) 
on either (a) its fit with an overarching theoretical commitment or (b) its fit with observational 
data. This leaves aside a possibility worth serious consideration, even if  it is difficult to 
substantiate fully. Namely, is it not possible that solar year and lunar month periodicity presses 
itself  on these fifth-century Greek sources because of  the way these are determined by the 
Babylonian astronomical work of  the seventh and sixth centuries, through the mediation of 
Ionian procedural knowledge practices? After all, the entire enterprise that would lead you to 
posit a “great year”—which Huffman (1993: 276) identifies as “an attempt to harmonize two 
important ways of  measuring time, the lunar month and the solar year”—is not sui generis 
within Philolaus’s cosmology, or within Pythagoreanism. Both the observational data, and the 
values with which Philolaus and his Greek contemporaries were working came to them from 
Egypt and Mesopotamia, through the flourishing of  wisdom traditions in 6 th century Ionia. Given 
this fact, it seems well worth the effort to attempt to draw out how Philolaus might have been 
borrowing from these near Eastern precedents through the mediation of  Ionian practical and 
procedural (i.e., technical in the root sense). 
 
 
Eunsoo Lee, Stanford University, eunsoo@stanford.edu 
1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “With or Without Numbers in ancient Greek Diagrams” 
 
To modern students, geometry is reduced to calculations using the arithmetic operations 
of  addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and exponentiation. Given the 
development of  analytical geometry, elements of  geometry have been digitized or 
quantified; points are positioned by coordinates, lines are measured by length, and areas 
and volumes are represented by numbers found with arithmetic operations. This 
synchronization of  geometric elements with numbers has established an arithmetic 
framework for geometric inquiries. However, numbers are absent from ancient Greek 
geometry. Indeed, in the ancient Greek mathematical corpus, diagrams are presented 
without numbers whatsoever. In that framework, geometric inquiries are resolved only 
with diagrammatic elements such as lines, angles, and areas, not with numbers conferred 
to them. In particular, the application of  area in Euclid’s Elements, in which one figure is 
transformed into another with the same area, shows how ancient Greek mathematicians 
sought to compile their mathematical knowledge and shape its deductive structure 
without depending upon numerical calculation. 
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The absence of  numbers in the ancient Greek geometrical discourse shows a 
contrast with Greek practical mathematics. By practical mathematics, I mean any 
mathematical practices that require counting, measuring, and weighing etc. Some 
fragments from ostraka, papyri rolls and parchment codices show that numbers are 
ubiquitous in many aspects of  daily life, yet strangely silenced in theoretical geometry. 
Three questions should be raised: 1) How the use of  numbers enables folk 
mathematicians to secure an objectivity of  their practices? 2) Why were numbers 
disqualified to prove the core essence of  the geometric relationship of  figures? 3) How 
was ambivalent value conferred upon numbers in Classical Greece? 
My paper starts from comparing ancient Greek diagrams from practical fields and 
those from theoretical fields. The difference between geometrical diagrams and practical 
diagrams confirms a distinctive communicative situation in ancient Greek theoretical 
mathematics that allows only abstract diagrams, as per Aristotle’s term aphaeresis 
(‘abstraction’), referring to the isolation of  mathematical characteristics as objects of 
thought distinct from perceptible, thus measurable, objects. Next, the paper investigates 
how knowledge from practical mathematics could be applied for theoretical mathematics 
or vice versa. Diagrams in the book II of  Euclid’s Elements and Archimedes Method are 
introduced as an example to prove that the passage between practical mathematics and 
theoretical mathematics was not impassable. 
 
 
Doug Shepardson, Fordham University, Dsherpardson@fordham.edu 
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Recollection and Innatism in the Meno” 
 
One of  the most salient features of  Plato’s epistemology is his commitment to the 
doctrine of  recollection. Although voluminously discussed in the literature, it is notoriously 
difficult to ascertain precisely what Plato thinks recollection entails. One particular aporia 
relevant to this discussion is that of  Plato’s commitment to innatism, the details of  which have 
been discussed on-and- off  for the past twenty or so years by Dominic Scott and Gail Fine. The 
particular disagreement in which I am here interested concerns two questions. (1) What, if 
anything, is innate in Plato’s theory of  recollection? And (2) how, if  there is something innate, 
does it relate to Plato’s positing of  prenatal knowledge? Scott holds that Plato believes in latent 
innate knowledge, and that we have this latent innate knowledge because of  our prenatal 
knowledge: we once knew and then forgot; but in forgetting, the content of  our prenatal 
knowledge remained latent in the soul. 1 But Fine denies that Plato has any such commitment to 
innate knowledge; indeed, she argues that Plato rejects even innate true beliefs. Instead, Fine 
claims, prenatal knowledge either favorably disposes us to prefer truth to falsehood, or it has no 
function at all. As I hope to show, both Scott’s and Fine’s accounts are problematic. For Scott 
ignores several passages that speak strongly against innate knowledge, and Fine ignores several 
passages that speak strongly in favor of  innate true belief. 
 
In section 1, I review some of  the terminology used in discussing the various sorts of 
innatism in the literature. In section 2, I briefly review Scott’s and Fine’s respective accounts of 
innatism and its relation to prenatal knowledge. In section 3, I provide a close reading of  the 
recollection segment in the Meno (81a-86c), pointing out where Fine’s and Scott’s 
interpretations fail. By the end of  this section, I hope to have demonstrated, pace Fine, that Plato 
is committed to Latent Content Innatism about True Belief, and, pace Scott, that Plato is not 
committed to Latent Content Innatism about Knowledge. In section 4, I overturn Fine’s claim 
that prenatal knowledge is either purposeless or serves (merely) to dispose the soul towards 
preferring truth to falsehood. In contrast, I examine an overlooked passage in the Phaedrus that 
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might explain why Plato thinks the soul had prenatal knowledge (or something like it), 2 but only 
has innate true belief  upon birth. In concluding, I deal with some possible objections to my 
argument. 
 
 
Ian McCready-Flora, University of  Virginia, ian.flora@gmail.com 
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Knowing, Precisely: Epistemic Value in Aristotle” 
 
Concerns about precision (akrib—) shape Aristotle’s discussion of  first principles in APo 2.19 
and should therefore guide our reading. Comprehension (nous), for instance, must be how we 
grasp first principles because it is the only state more precise than understanding (epistêmê). 
Platonic nativism absurdly claims that we have this precise grasp of  principles without being 
aware of  it. Aristotle furthermore bases his own account of  how we come to first principles on 
perception (aisthêsis), because it is open to all but “not too worthy in terms of  precision.” Much 
therefore turns on precision, but it receives little attention in this context. I argue that this sense 
of  precision represents the power a state or process has to put someone safely beyond doubt about 
something. This makes it a kind of  epistemic value. I infer this account from several key passages, 
then apply it to a new reading of  APo 2.19. 
 
(1) We should not (DA 3.3) say something appears to us when we are “functioning 
precisely about the perceptible.” This differs from the accuracy of  HA 7.2. Akribeia there is 
physiological, the organ’s ability to receive stimuli. At DA 3.3 the question is whether something 
is a person, which is not a sensory quality. The functioning must therefore be cognitive or 
epistemic. Appearance-talk is inappropriate because it hedges when genuine perception puts us 
safely beyond doubt. 
 
(2) Some say, compromising with Socrates (NE 7.3) that true belief—but not 
knowledge—is vulnerable to akrasia. For this argument to work, belief  as such must be freighted 
with doubt, but some believers think they know precisely. These people feel beyond doubt, and so 
think they have a precise grasp. The compromise fails, and the way Aristotle argues that it does 
implies that precise cognition is what puts us safely beyond doubt. 
 
(3) It makes no sense to deliberate matters of  precise knowledge (NE 3.3) because we have 
no doubt about them. Cognition is therefore precise to the extent that it dispels doubt. This is 
also why Aristotle argues (NE 1.3) that ethics should not pretend to the same precision as 
geometry. Even a perfected science of  the good cannot dispel doubt about various ethically- 
relevant particulars; that is a job for perception. Grasping such a science cannot, therefore, put us 
safely beyond doubt about such cases, making it imprecise. 
 
Returning now to APo 2.19, I argue first that an initial distinction (99b35-100a3) among 
creatures with perception, memory and reason (logos) is taxonomic, not developmental. The 
account that follows (100a3-100b5) therefore applies only to rational souls, whose perceptual 
experience is structured by conceptual apparatus. It does not therefore describe how 
sophisticated cognition and/or content develops from more primitive forms thereof. The content 
pertains throughout to first principles, which means the account instead describes an epistemic 
transition from an imprecise grasp of  the principles—via perception, which has little power to 
remove doubt about such things—to a grasp that enables demonstrative understanding. 
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Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University, aashbaugh@towson.edu 
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Consuming Knowledge” 
 
A skeptic is someone courageous in inquiry and not given to easily assenting to a belief. In Plato’s 
dialogues, which I take to be skeptic exercises, two specific practices support courageous inquire and 
withholding assent: recollection and dialectic, respectively. The first ensures the possibility of  inquiry. 
The second functions as a locus for examining knowledge claims and speeches, an ἀγγεῖον wherein 
we can test beliefs and determine, before consuming them, whether they are healthy or harmful to 
the soul (Protagoras, 313d-314a). It is in this context that I’ll re-examine recollection aiming to show 
that it plays a role in Meno and Phaedo in ways not yet recognized but important for unraveling the 
knotted problem concerning how humans know. Dialectic, in turn, will be discussed particularly as 
defined and dramatized in the Republic. More specifically, I intend to re-examine its power testing a 
belief ’s ability to foster health or induce illness in the soul. This portion of  the study concludes with 
an examination of  how dialectic can be ‘container’ in the metaphorical way I recommended, and 
also ‘knowledge,’ as suggested in R 533a ff. I propose that the divided line holds the key to this 
tangle. 
 
 
Joseph Bullock, St. Edwards University and Trinity University, joseph.b.bullock@gmail.com 
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Skeptical Suspension in the Face of  Disagreement” 
 
When Sextus Empiricus distinguishes between dogmatic philosophers and skeptics in the opening 
section of  his Outlines of  Pyrrhonism (PH), he says that the dogmatist thinks he has found the answer, 
while the skeptic keeps investigating (PH I 1). A few lines later he also says that the skeptic suspends 
judgment in the face of  oppositions (PH I 8), and that the skeptic does not assent to anything 
unclear that she investigates (PH I 13). Many scholars have found these passages puzzling: How can 
you keep investigating once you have decided that the appropriate response to a disagreement is the 
suspension of  judgment? In this paper, I will explain how the skeptic's investigative activity 
harmonizes with her suspensive response due to a certain practical norm that governs the skeptic's 
reaction to disagreement, namely that the skeptic suspends judgment once she is aware of  a 
disagreement before she begins to investigate what can be said on behalf  of  either side. I claim that 
this norm marks the fundamental difference between the skeptic and the dogmatist, who will 
typically stick to his beliefs while he looks into the issue. In this paper, I discuss those places where 
Sextus suggests that he holds the norm that I claim he holds. I show how my interpretation helps to 
explain several puzzling features of  Pyrrhonian philosophy, including the idea that one could both 
suspend judgment and continue investigating. Finally, I consider and dismiss some objections to my 
view. 
 
 
J. J. Mulhern, University of  Pennsylvania, johnjm@sas.upenn.edu 
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: “A Different Politics of  Aristotle?  The Influence of  Translation on 
Interpretation” 
 
Modern English translations of  Aristotle’s Politics, going at least as far back as Gillies, whose third 
edition appeared in London in 1813, sometimes seek to render words which had multiple historical 
senses by a single word in English or by using a word or phrase which resonates with later readers 
but whose sense is not consistent with Aristotle’s language. These translations can exclude 
interpretations that are plausible and, on reflection, perhaps preferable. The former case is 
exemplified by uniform or nearly uniform translations of  politeia by ‘constitution’ even though politeia 
has four main senses in its 522 occurrences in the Politics a well as in other Greek literature and 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 7 
 
inscriptions, as I have shown in my chapter in the recent  Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide 
(Cambridge, 2015). The latter case is exemplified by the translation of  ktēma by ‘property’, though 
Aristotle typically intends what we would mean by ‘possession’ and though ‘property’ in English has 
a different sense from ‘possession’, as I showed in my 2014 NPSA paper which refers to the Penguin 
translation. Another signal case is the casual use of  “form of  government” or “form of  
constitution” in, for example, the Loeb translation, although the phrase eidos tēs politeias rarely occurs 
in the Politics and rarely if  ever means form of  government or form of  constitution. Likewise, where 
Aristotle says that he seeks the citizen haplōs, or simply [speaking], in 1275a19, the Loeb gives “in the 
absolute sense” and the Penguin “proper,” neither of  which brings out Aristotle’s logical point. In 
this paper I shall give examples in which more sensitivity to Aristotle’s language may suggest material 
changes to our understanding of  the Politics and so of  the history of  political thought overall. 
 
 
Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, cevangeliou@towson.edu 
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: “Aristotle on the Best Polity” 
 
With the exception of  the First Book, where the political community is set apart from other forms 
of  association, especially the family, the rest of  Aristotle’s Politics is devoted to the search for the 
“best polity” (ariste politeia). Following his familiar method of  inquiry, he felt compelled to criticize 
Plato’s and other theoretical conceptions of  the ideal polis, as well as actual states with a reputation 
of  being durable, with well-formed constitutions. He would do so not only in the name of  truth and 
for the benefit of  students of  political theory as he had done in the Ethics, but also for the 
practitioners of  the difficult political art.  It is my purpose in this paper to examine the results of  
Aristotle’s search for the best polity among those which he judged as good forms of  constitutions, 
as opposed to the bad or corrupt constitutions. It will be shown that his critique aimed at Plato’s 
polity as articulated in the Laws and considered as more realistic than the ideal polity as presented in 
the Republic, with its community of  women, children, and property. 
 
The main target of  Aristotle’s critique was Plato’s polity, that is, the mixed constitution that aims 
at a balanced political mesotes by ‘mixing’ different aspects of  democratic and oligarchic 
constitutions in some judicious manner. By criticizing the Platonic “second best” polity as leaning 
toward the oligarchy, Aristotle clearly suggested that his preference was for the predominance of  the 
democratic elements in the mixing of  the various constitutions in order to achieve the “ariste politeia” 
which is the most durable and just, based on a strong middle class with equitable property and 
aiming at the life of  virtue (aretê). The opposite of  it is Tyranny, on which both philosophers agreed 
that it is the most unjust and worst of  all. 
 
 
George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast, whgeorge@ius.edu 
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: “The Cosmic Purpose of  Political Life in Plato's Laws” 
 
In book X of  the Laws, the Athenian provides an argument to show that the gods care about human 
affairs. This is followed by a long speech that is intended to charm and persuade the impious who 
believe that the gods are indifferent about human affairs, in which the Athenian describes how each 
individual soul is treated according to its ethical character. That the gods’ care for the goodness of  
the whole cosmos extends to the souls of  individual human beings gives us good reason for thinking 
that it also includes much larger parts of  the universe, especially those that are a major factor in 
determining the ethical character of  individuals. Specifically, it would seem to follow from the 
Athenian’s remarks that the gods’ care for the whole cosmos includes the political communities that 
both represent significant parts of  the cosmos and play a crucial role in determining the character of  
individual souls. Of  particular relevance is the Athenian’s account in book III where he briefly 
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discusses the repeated cycle whereby civilizations come into existence and are destroyed by major 
catastrophes, as he find in these events evidence of  divine care. The cycle the Athenian describes 
here is similar to phenomena described in the Timaeus and Statesman, which suggests that Plato 
takes seriously the idea that events of  this kind are features of  the world in which we live and play an 
important role in shaping the course of  human life. What I will argue is that the details of  the 
account presented in Laws III provide evidence that these events represent a significant part of  the 
gods’ care for human affairs. The obvious impact these disasters have on human existence is the 
elimination of  political life and the prolonged periods of  primitive life that follows, but when 
considered in light of  the details found in the Athenian’s speech in book X, I will show that these 
events are also a major component of  the process whereby the rewards and punishments given to 
individual souls contribute to the good of  the cosmos. Moreover, in doing so, I will show that this 
component of  divine care is compatible with interpretations of  the cosmology and eschatology of  
Laws X that fall along more ‘scientific’ lines. Specifically, what I have in mind is best expressed in 
Trevor Saunders’ view that in the eschatology of  Laws X, we have a ‘physical, spatial, and [...] 
scientific eschatology, covered by a thinnish veneer of  mythical motifs in deference to the ostensible 
literary form.’ That the view I present here is an expansion of, and therefore consistent with, the 
scientific interpretation means that we need not rely on any of  the mythical elements that portray 
the gods as actively intervening in human affairs in order to establish that the recurring disasters 
have their origin in divine reason. 
 
 
Christopher Sauder, Collège Universitaire Dominicain, christopher.sauder@dominican.ca 
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: “Providence, Ἑιμαρμένη and Gnosticism in the Late Treatises of  
Plotinus” 
 
Plotinus’ detailed critique, in treatise 33 (II,9), does not make entirely clear exactly what ethical and 
cosmological worldview he sought to uphold against the Gnostic position. Those viewpoints are 
more concisely articulated in his final treatises, where he defends the notion of  providence and 
rejects the “hard” version of  astrological determinism. Though these late treaties (“On Providence” 
47-48 (III.2-3) and “On Whether the Stars are Causes” 52 (II.3)) emerge primarily out of  a debate 
with Stoic positions, they nevertheless contain a number of  positions with a distinctly anti-gnostic 
thrust. This is unsurprising given that, as Plotinus himself  tells us, the Gnostics reject the notion of  
Providence and that, as we know from the Nag Hammadi texts, the Gnostics held positions that 
could be characterized as astral determinism. 
 
 
Kevin Corrigan, Emory University, kcorrig@emory.edu 
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: “Plotinus and the Gnostics: The Peculiar Impact of  the Tripartite 
Tractate and Similar Works” 
 
Our paper argues that the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate had a decisive influence on the formulation 
of  some of  Plotinus’ most influential ideas and images, for example—darkness, matter, emanation 
as generative power, the nature of  God. 
 
 
John Turner, University of  Nebraska-Lincoln, jturner2@unl.edu 
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: “Plotinus and the Gnostics: The Peculiar Impact of  the Tripartite 
Tractate and Similar Works” 
 
Our paper argues that the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate had a decisive influence on the formulation 
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of  some of  Plotinus’ most influential ideas and images, for example—darkness, matter, emanation 
as generative power, the nature of  God. 
 
 
Francis Lacroix, Université Laval, Francis.lacroix.2@ulaval.ca 
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: “The Gnostic Influence in Plotinus’ Early Treatises: The Case of  
Ennead IV 8 [6]” 
 
Treatises 30-33, where Plotinus criticizes the Gnostic thesis, clearly demonstrate that he was himself  
influenced by his antagonists when he wrote that which was a single large work before Porphyry 
separated it in four parts (see John Turner, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition, 2001). The 
disciple of  Plato has certainly borrowed from Greek philosophy to elaborate his own theories, in 
which we can analyze some magnificent innovations, but the gnostic point of  view must also be 
considered, at least from Treatises 30-33 to the last ofPlotinus’ work. 
 
In this paper, we will argue that the Gnostics must also be considered in Plotinus’ early treatises. 
Ennead IV 8 [6], entitled On the Descent of  Soul into Bodies, where Plotinus presents a striking theory of  
the partial descent of  the soul, is manifestly more than just a Platonist development. Indeed, we 
cannot find any trace of  this thesis in Plato’s dialogue. It may therefore seem to be a whole ex nihilo 
creation from Plotinus. Nevertheless, he seems to address an implicit critic to the gnostic belief  that 
they are God, or at least a consubstantial part of  Him. Our conference will expose the gnostic 
background of  Plotinus’ theory of  the descent of  soul. We will argue thatsome words that he uses in 
this very dialogue are also Gnostics terms, inter alia ἐφάπτεσθαι (ch. 2, 2) and τὸ προνοοῦν (ch. 2, 
26), which we can find in Ennead II, 9 [33], but respectively in Zostrian and in the Tripartite Tractate as 
well. We will also note that Plotinus cites more than usual Greek philosophers in IV 8 in order to 
present, against the gnostic interpretation of  the Greek philosophy, the adequate comprehension of  
it. Thus, we can ponder about Plotinus’ theory of  the descent of  soul that even though the 
philosopher presents a singular theory, gnostic thinkers gravitated around him at the very beginning 
of  his writing career. 
 
 
Jean-Marc Narbonne, Université Laval, Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca 
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: “The Partly Undescended Soul in Plotinus: Again, on its Source 
and Meaning” 
 
In his typical way of  writing, Plotinus does not declare precisely who are the ‘others’ he is referring 
to when he boldly dares to state that part of  our Soul is not down here but still stayed somehow in 
the Noetic world. Who are exactly the opponents he is referring to, some Platonists? But who are 
they, characters unknown to us but yet very significant, hardly plausible? Platonists known to us? But 
then again, we know of  no well know Platonists who upheld a precise thesis in relation to this topic. 
Isn’t it then more plausible to think of  a special group of  Platonists, that is ‘Gnostic Platonists’, who 
advocated a sort of  collapse and tragic decline of  ordinary human Souls (the case of  the ‘elected’ 
being of  course different)? In light of  some recent research on this subject, I want to ascertain if  the 
suggestion I made earlier about the ‘gnostic identity of  those ‘others’ is not only defendable but still 
clearly convincing today. 
 
 
Zita Toth, Fordham University, ztoth@fordham.edu 
1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Is There a Necessary Connection Between Cause and Effect?" 
 
Many contemporary Aristotelians claim, and arguably so did Aristotle, that for a powers-based 
 2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Program, page 10 
 
 
view of  causation to be explanatorily successful, it needs to posit that causal powers and their 
manifestations are necessarily linked. This presented a special problem for the medieval Aristotelian, 
who was working in a theistic framework: there are certain stories reported in the Bible, which, if  
they are at least logically possible, seem to exclude such a necessary connection.  In short, the 
problem comes from so-called miracles against nature, where a natural thing retains its disposition 
or causal power and nevertheless does not produce its characteristic effect (or, even worse, it 
sometimes produces the opposite of  its characteristic effect) -- - the most famous example is 
perhaps Nebuchadnezzar’s fire and the three young men not burning in it. So what can the theist 
Aristotelian do with such cases? Do we need to give up the necessary connection requirement? I 
argue that depending on what general view of  divine concurrence we adopt (occasionalism, mere 
conservationism, or concurrentism), we have different resources to deal with the problem. I will 
show that although mere conservationism might be an intuitively plausible theory of  divine 
concurrence, it cannot account well for miracles against nature without giving up an important tenet 
of  divine omnipotence; concurrentism, on the other hand, can handle these cases more easily, and 
can successfullyreconcile the necessity requirement with miracles against nature. 
 
 
Machessa Samz, Fordham University, msamz@fordham.edu 
1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Aristotle and Aquinas on Singular Thought: A Unified, Non-
Descriptive Account” 
  
Most commentators acknowledge that for Aristotle and Aquinas, the paradigm of  thought is general 
thought, not singular thought. That is to say, according to them, our thoughts are primarily about 
kinds such as human beings or dogs, rather than individuals such as Socrates or Fido. This has led 
many commentators simply to neglect the question of  whether Aristotle and Aquinas have an 
account of  singular thought at all, while it has led others quickly to point out the shortcomings of  
their accounts. Nevertheless, there have been recent attempts to argue that Aristotle and Aquinas 
have successful, non-descriptivist accounts of  singular thought that can overcome the problems of  
contemporary, Neo-Fregean descriptivist accounts. 
 
But, unfortunately, these attempts have not put Aristotle and Aquinas in sufficient dialogue 
with each other. So, it has appeared that Aristotle and Aquinas offer two diverging, non-descriptivist 
accounts of  singular thought, where one is superior to the other. However, as I will show, by 
considering the texts of  Aristotle and Aquinas together, a unified, non-descriptivist account emerges 
that can address problems confronting not only Neo-Fregean descriptivist accounts, but other 
contemporary, non-descriptivist accounts. 
 
 
Shane Wilkins, Fordham University, wilkins@fordham.edu 
1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Is Existence a First-Order Property After All?” 
 
Like many medieval and modern philosophers, Aquinas held that existence is a first-order property 
of  objects. This claim underlies at least three central ideas of  Aquinas’s metaphysics: 
 
the distinction between essence and existence, 
the claim that existence is a kind of  activity, and 
the claim that existence is analogous among a variety of  senses rather than univocal. 
 
Each of  these claims has fallen in disrepute in contemporary philosophy on the grounds that it is 
not possible to construe existence as a first-order property. 
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According to the orthodox interpretation of  the birth of  analytic philosophy (recently reiterated 
in (Inwagen 2009) for instance), Russell and Quine decisively refuted the idea that existence could be 
first-order in their refutation of  Meinong. Aquinas’s fundamental position on existence is assimilated 
to Meinong and consequently the rest of  his distinctive theses about existence are dismissed out of  
hand. 
 
My goal in this paper is to show that this orthodoxy is wrong.  I will draw on some lessons about the 
construction of  such theories from (Linsky and Zalta 1994) and (Williamson 2002) to help develop 
such a non-Meinongian view. The crucial defect such theories are supposed to face is that they 
require existence to be universal, which is supposed to entail that, for instance, that the “carnivorous 
cattle do not exist” is false because there are such cattle who merely happen to be non-actual. 
 
I will argue we can avoid this consequence, by endorsing something like Adam of  Wodeham’s 
complexe significabilia as a kind of  sui generis entity like a state of  affairs. On my view, it is this state of 
affairs, rather than some existing, but non-actual cows which make “carnivorous cattle do not exist” 
true. Finally, I will argue that this is a view which Aquinas could in principle accept, despite his 
occasional hesitations about entities like complexe significabilia. 
 
Lastly, in the third section of  the paper, I will try to put my new non-Meinongian view of  existence 
to work, attempting to show how that view allows us to offer perfectly plausible construals of  the 
three central ideas of  Aquinas’s metaphysics mentioned above. I will not argue directly for the truth 
of  the three claims here; it is enough simply to show they can be coherently stated pace the 
orthodox view. 
 
 
Twyla Gibson, University of  Missouri, gibsontg@missouri.edu 
1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: “The Dark Sea and the Lake of  Heaven: Representation and 
Rhetoric in Zhaungzi, I-V, and Plato” 
 
A significant development in ancient studies has been the growing recognition that many early texts 
from different cultures are organized by way of  a rhetorical figure known as parallelism. In 
parallelism, an initial sequence of  topics a-b- c is repeated in identical order a-b- c-a- b-c. Though 
progress has been made in identifying parallellism in ancient writings, much work remains to be 
done. With respect to the Zhuangzi, traditional interpretation has focused on the content; few studies 
have looked at the text in terms of  its form. A comparative analysis of  the order and arrangement 
of  topics in the Zhuangzi I-V and the series of  topics described and explained in Plato’s Sophist 
shows that the latent order of  the topics in the narrative sequence in the inner chapters of  Zhuangzi 
corresponds point by point to the topics in the series of  definitions presented by explicit 
instructions in Plato’s Sophist. In fact, the series for the definition of  representation occurs three 
times in the opening chapters of  the Zhuangzi, making it unlikely that the series occurs by chance or 
accident. This evidence points to significant cross-cultural influence and borrowing between the 
early Greek and Chinese traditions. I end with some remarks about the implications of  these 
findings for our understanding of  the information communicated by thetext. 
 
 
Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University, hhochsmann@gmail.com 
1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: “Confucius and Leibniz on the Common Good” 
 
In Confucius’ principle of  reciprocity (‘Do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself ’) and 
in Leibniz’s conception of  the common good, individual moral life and communal life are regarded 
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as a continuum. The principle of  reciprocity, in requiring that we take into consideration our well-
being as well as that of  others, provides a practical rule and a starting point of  striving for the 
common good.  Leibniz advocates the active pursuit of  commune bonum (common good) as the 
foremost goal of  all ethical and political endeavours. 
 
Confucius and Leibniz emphasise the moral responsibility of  all to contribute to general well-being. 
Confucian political philosophy stresses the well-being of  the people as having the foremost 
importance.  The significance of  Confucius’ and Leibniz’s ethics in the areas of  moral epistemology, 
moral cognitivism, moral realism and moral universalism as well as in the application of  moral 
theory to practice can be clearly demonstrated from their philosophical writings. 
 
 
Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College, Matthew.walker@yale-nus.edu.sg 
1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: “Zhu Xi on Knowing for the Sake of  Acting” 
 
According to Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200), knowing and acting virtuously are deeply interconnected, 
even if  they are distinct activities. “Knowledge and action are normally mutually dependent,” he 
says. “It’s like this: if  a person has eyes but no legs, he cannot walk; if  he has legs but no eyes, he 
cannot see. As for their order, knowledge comes first. As for their importance, action is more 
significant” (G/148:4). 1 Elsewhere, he asks, “[I]f  you cannot see, how can you walk?” (152:14). 
Zhu Xi accounts for knowing as akin to seeing: just as one’s acting well in certain domains (e.g., 
walking) requires sight, so too acting well in general requires knowing the li理 (i.e., the pattern, 
coherence, or principle) that unifies the cosmos as a whole and which is manifest as attached to 
different clarities of  qi氣 (sometimes translated “vital energy”). 
 
According to Zhu Xi’s investigation thesis, then, virtuous agency, practically speaking, requires that 
we investigate li in things (gewu格物) (150:9). True, the sage kings, such as King Wen, may well 
have been born naturally and effortless knowing li (G/132:12). But most of  us are not natural-born 
sages. So, we should investigate the Pattern as it has been preserved in books and as it manifests 
itself  throughout nature. 
 
In upholding the investigation thesis, however, Zhu Xi faces worries. In particular, his account of  
knowing and acting might seem overly intellectualist and aside the point. On this worry, if  we want 
to act virtuously, investigating li throughout nature is useless and ultimately irrelevant. Systematic 
investigation of  li is neither necessary nor sufficient for acting well. Call this the irrelevance worry 
about Zhu Xi’s view. Instead of  investigating li in the world, we would do well to focus on ourselves 
and seek ways to make ourselves better directly, by working on ourselves. (Wang Yangming [1472-
1529] suggests the irrelevance worry about Zhu Xi’s view.) 
 
In this paper, I investigate Zhu Xi’s investigation thesis in the light of  the irrelevance worry. On 
what basis does Zhu Xi propound the investigation thesis? Does Zhu Xi have good reason to think 
that acting well requires the sort of  exhaustive investigation of  things that he proposes? And to 
what extent can Zhu Xi respond to the irrelevance worry? 
 
 
Glenn Rawson, Rhode Island College, grawson@ric.edu 
1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Heraclitus and Three Rationalisms” 
 
Heraclitus has been variously interpreted as a mystic, a relativist, an empiricist, a proto-skeptic, and 
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even a precursor to postmodernism. There is some evidence for each of  those interpretations in the 
provocative fragments that remain. But I argue that overall, Heraclitus is better understood as a 
pioneering rationalist, in each of  three increasingly specific senses. 
 
First, Heraclitus is a momentous early rationalist in the broadest sense, which distinguishes the 
beginnings of  intellectual theory from previous literature. Such “rationalists”reject traditional 
appeals to conventional authority or divine revelation, and ground claims about unseen reality in 
argument and explanation, with common human reasoning abilities. This broad sense of  rationalism 
is discussed more in disciplines outside philosophy, but it's crucial for understanding the special early 
position of  Heraclitus. He was the first to be explicit about it, with the first recorded re-purposing 
of  common words to signify a knowing mind (psyche) that can recognize something's nature (physis) 
through some universal rational language (logos). It's his particular, often puzzling uses of  those very 
terms that contain evidence for his rationalism in the more specific and controversial senses. 
 
Next, I contend that Heraclitus was also a rationalist in the somewhat general, more typically 
philosophical sense opposed to empiricism. Among the earliest philosophers, Parmenides was the 
most conspicuous to hold this kind of  position. But Heraclitus too maintained that the content of  
some knowledge cannot be derived from sense perception, and comes instead from some special 
faculty of  reason -- an interpretation I'll support with key fragments about right thinking, and about 
how sense experience can't apprehend the physis that “loves to hide” (such as DK1, 17, 34, 40, 54, 
107, and 123). 
 
Finally, I argue that Heraclitus is a philosophical rationalist in the specific version subscribing to 
knowledge that's determined innately, as contrasted with knowledge acquired by intuition and 
deduction. Parmenides is best interpreted on the model of  rational intuition; Heraclitus is best 
interpreted as an innatist, and particularly in a variety maintaining that the use or production of  
innately determined knowledge requires triggering by sense-perception. Here I'll compare fragments 
about the importance of  learning through experience, with fragments about how the logos belongs 
to the psyche and “increases itself ” (such as 35, 45, 55, 101, 107,116, 115). 
 
 
Rose Cherubin, George Mason University, rcherubi@gmu.edu 
1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Zeno's Paradoxes and Parmenides” 
 
Ancient accounts of  the relationship between Zeno’s work and Parmenides’ work conflict 
fundamentally. There was general agreement that Zeno was a student of  Parmenides and that he 
sought to support the findings of  his teacher. But did Zeno argue for the same points as 
Parmenides, argue against the opposition to Parmenides without arguing for the same points as 
Parmenides, or something else? Did Zeno argue that what is is one, that it is not many, that it is not 
one, that being one is unintelligible, or something else? Did Zeno argue that what is is at rest, that it 
does not move, or something else? On these questions, there was no ancient consensus. 
 
In addition, there is a general question about the relationship between the work of  Zeno and that of 
Parmenides: What if  any is the significance of  paradoxes as a way of  supporting Parmenides? That 
is, whatever Zeno was trying to establish, he did not simply show that the points he and/or 
Parmenides challenged led to contradictions. He showed that they led to paradoxes. 
 
I propose to show that Parmenides also developed or indicated paradoxes. These are not the same 
as the paradoxes of  Zeno, as those come down to us. The paradoxes in Parmenides are Liar-type 
paradoxes: for example, on the basis of  mortals’ opinions, and framed through mortals’ opinions, 
the goddess shows that mortals’ opinions are flawed. The paradoxes of  multiplicity attributed to 
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Zeno support this feature of  Parmenides’ work by illustrating how mortals’ opinions are flawed. 
Zeno’s paradoxes show how these flaws are central to a worldview that involves negation, 
distinction, unity, and inference. 
 
The account that I propose fits well with Plato’s portrayal of  Zeno at Parmenides 128c-d.  Time 
permitting, I will try to show as well that this account helps us make sense of  another 
aspect of  Plato’s portrayal of  the Eleatics: Plato’s Parmenides and Zeno are very interested in 
continuing inquiry. Both in antiquity and today, many commentators understand the Eleatics as 
having brought philosophical inquiry to a halt, or at least as having discovered something that 
brought their own inquiries to a halt. If  the account of  their implications that I will propose is 
correct, we will be able to see several ways in which their work supports and motivates further 
inquiry. 
 
 
Daryl Tress, Fordham University, tress@fordham.edu 
1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Early Greek Philosophy and the Missing Greek Past” 
 
I discuss some ways in which the “Dark Age” era of  Greek history (the collapse, circa 1200-950 
BCE, that followed the end of  the Bronze Age palace societies) may shed light on the beginnings of  
philosophy. 
 
 
Samuel Ortencio Flores, College of  Charleston, floresso@cofc.edu 
1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Socrates and Anaxagoras: Plato's Criticism of  Anaxagorean 
Physics”  
 
In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates famously narrates the origins of  his philosophic interests in natural 
philosophy, and his subsequent turn towards ethics (96a-100a). He was especially interested in 
Anaxagoras’ claim that nous “both orders things and is the cause of  everything” (97c, trans. Sedley 
and Long), since he believed this claim would lead to discussion of  all things in their best state. 
Despite his excitement, Socrates was quickly disappointed in Anaxagoras’ reliance upon the material 
causes of  things, rather than on further explication of  nous as the final cause (99a-b). He thus 
turned from the study of  natural philosophy to the study of  logoi (99e). In this paper, I examine 
Anaxagoras in the broader context of  Plato’s corpus. I suggest that Socrates turns away from 
Anaxagoras and natural philosophy because of  the latter’s logical and ethical inconsistencies. 
 
In the first section of  this paper, I examine the role of  Anaxagoras in the Apology. In his cross- 
examination of  Meletus, Socrates suggests that his accuser’s charges are appropriate for Anaxagoras 
rather than for himself  (26d). In this section, he does not just defer his charges onto another: he also 
establishes a link between physics and ethics. Socrates interprets the two charges of  his accusers—
(1) corrupting the youth and (2) not believing in the city’s gods, but introducing new daimonia into 
the city—as interrelated and interdependent. Socrates corrupts the youth, they claim, through 
teaching his impious theological teachings (26b). Through his response to these charges, Socrates 
shows that Anaxagoras’ godless worldview is deficient not because it is in itself  impious, but because 
it fails to develop a system of  ethics stemming from its natural explanations of  the cosmos. Socrates, 
in contrast to Anaxagoras, uses his new daimonia as a protreptic tool for a virtuous life. 
 
In the next section, I discuss Anaxagoras’ influence on Pericles in the Phaedrus. In his discussion 
of  rhetoric, Socrates links the great orator Pericles with Anaxagoras. He suggests that Pericles was 
“filled with star-gazing theorizing,” came to “understand the nature of  mind (nous) and 
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mindlessness – the very things Anaxagoras discussed at great length,” and “drew from all this 
and applied what fit to the art of  speech” (270a, trans. Scully). Socrates pairs Anaxagoras’ natural 
philosophy with Pericles’ rhetorical style, suggesting a link between physics and rhetoric. The link 
highlights the negative qualities of  both. Periclean rhetoric in the Phaedrus demonstrates the same 
logical and ethical deficiencies as Anaxagorean physics in the Phaedo: both fail to account for the 
ethical consequences of  their theories. 
 
I conclude by suggesting that Socrates opposes himself  to Anaxagoras through the common link 
he sees among natural philosophy and rhetoric, i.e. ethics. Anaxagoras made key advances in natural 
philosophy, and his student Pericles applied these advances to rhetoric. Socrates was dissatisfied with 
both, because they failed to acknowledge the impact of  their respective areas of  expertise on the 
soul and how one ought to live. Their failures thus demonstrated the need for Socrates’ philosophic 
project. 
 
 
Jisean Kim, Binghamton University, 6072223851@vzwpix.com 
1H (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 307: “The Ancient Asian Heritage of  the Korean Self-Identity and its 
Encounter with Western Modernity and the Phenomenon of  the Global Self ”         
 
This paper examines the challenges faced by integration of  the constituents of  the present complex 
Korean identity: the classical ancient Asian heritage, the contemporary nationalistic persona, the 
Western modernity, and finally the new Global Self  of  the 21st Century. 
 
 
Jesse Schupack, University of  Notre Dame, jschupack@nd.edum 
1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Justice as Psychic Dunamis in the Gorgias and Republic” 
 
In the Gorgias and Republic Socrates is challenged by interlocutors who speak disparagingly of  
conventional justice and in praise of  the life that rejects it. On at least a superficial level the answers 
Socrates gives in the dialogues are consonant: we should never be unjust but instead should 
discipline our desires and pursue wisdom: this is the path to true happiness. As many read the 
Republic, however, this apparent similarity is only superficial. On this reading, an orientation toward 
philosophy is an orientation toward the highest objects of  wisdom, to wit, the Forms, and especially 
the Form of  the Good.  One becomes a philosopher by gaining knowledge of  these Forms. Thus 
the metaphysics of  the central books is essential to filling out the defense of  justice and the ethical 
project of  the work as a whole. The Gorgias, by contrast, does not hold forth on metaphysics as 
such: there is no worked-out theory of  the soul, no clear evidence of  the theory of  Forms, and 
more generally the Socrates we find in its pages lays claim only to a basic “human” kind of  wisdom: 
knowledge of  one’s own ignorance. On these interpretations the dialogues are plainly inconsistent: 
in the Gorgias’s view one strives to obtain justice by striving to avoid injustice, and this through an 
orientation that is fundamentally Socratic, which is to say, negative. In the Republic, however, to 
supplant desire with wisdom is to orient one’s pursuits toward the study of  philosophy, achieving the 
kind of  wisdom that the Socrates of  the Apology calls divine. 
 
My aim in this paper is to call this supposed inconsistency into question. I focus, in particular, on 
both dialogues’ characterization of  justice as a kind of  psychic power (dunamis) that is intrinsically 
beneficial to the agent. My argument is that, though indisputably the Forms provide a new account 
of  the grounds of  goodness, it is not at all evident that in doing so they offer a new account of  what 
it is for a person to be good. 
 
Nowhere in the Republic is the reader straightforwardly told that virtue now requires a positive kind 
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of  knowledge that is incompatible with the Socratic ethical theory found in the Gorgias. The 
metaphysics of  the middle books, I argue, serves rather to provide an account of  what it is that 
makes a just soul good and to describe the degree of  wisdom that would be required for a 
philosopher to be justified in turning her attention to politics—and how that sort of  wisdom might 
be acquired. The dialogues are distinguished, then, not in terms of  what they say justice is—the kind 
of  power that it is in the soul of  the one who obtains it—but rather in terms of  the accounts they 
give of  the grounds of  justice. An interesting consequence of  this is that the Republic proves far 
more consistent with the ethics of  the early Socratic dialogues than is generally thought. 
 
 
Lee Franklin, Franklin & Marshall College, lee.franklin@fandm.edu 
1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Shadow Pleasures in the Republic, IX” 
 
In the “Olympian Argument,” of  Republic IX, Socrates argues that the pleasures of  the non 
intelligent are “neither entirely true or pure but like a shadow painting.” (583b). On a first reading, 
Socrates’ goes on to show that some experiences are perceived falsely to be pleasures (or pains) due 
to the contrast with prior conditions. In this paper, I argue that beyond this claim, Socrates seeks 
more broadly to reject an analysis of  pleasure as perceptual and relativistic, and for a doxastic 
account, one on which many pleasures and pains are to be understood as like judgments in their 
content and structure. 
 
For this, I offer a new reading of  the opening section of  the Olympian Argument, where Socrates 
examines the judgment of  the sick that the state of  health is most pleasant (583c-584c). Surprisingly, 
in considering this judgment, Glaucon suggests that in such moments “health comes to be pleasant 
for them…” (583d-e) As I argue, Glaucon’s suggestion is that pleasures and pains are perceptual 
becomings, entirely relative to individual perceivers at the moment of  perception. This analysis is 
incompatible, however, with the fact that such pleasures involve comparisons between one moment 
and another, so as to entail the stability, as objects of  contemplation, of  both the person pleased and 
his or her states. 
 
Put another way, the experience of  pleasure depends on the possibility of  one and the same person 
rendering an assessment of  one and the same personal condition at different times. Furthermore, 
the argument links the conditions that make such diachronic assessment possible to the conditions 
that make interpersonal communication about pleasures and pains possible as, for instance, in a 
disagreement about which experiences or lives are most pleasant. Thus, while the argument most 
overtly analyzes illusory pleasures, which involve a mistake resulting from juxtaposition, it reveals a 
broader class of  pleasures to be shadow-like in that they are doxastic images of  states and processes 
occurring within the pleased individual. 
 
Revealing the doxastic structure of  pleasure explains not just why the pleasures of  the non-
intelligent lack the hedonic value they appear to have. Moreover, it explains why the intelligent 
experience the same states and processes so differently. As I suggest in closing, the Olympian 
Argument reveals the extent to which, on Plato’s view, understanding can permeate and shape our 
felt experiencefrom moment to moment. 
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Joseph Forte, The Catholic University of  America and Northeast Catholic College, 
jforte@northeastcatholic.edu 
1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “The Psychic Influence Principle and Republic, 8-10” 
 
This paper will explore the transformations the soul undergoes in books 8-10 of  the Republic. I will 
be highlighting especially the role that external influences play on the various alterations of  the soul’s 
constitution, and I will venture the hypothesis that in these later books, Plato provides the 
framework for a “Psychic Influence Principle,” which essentially states that under certain 
circumstances, the soul may be easily transformed by outside factors. This principle gives us a 
window not only to the degradation of  the soul, but also the remedy for such degeneration. Most of  
the paper will explain this principle as it is outlined in books 8 and 9, and then the final two sections 
will examine the discussion of  art in book 10 and the remedy for soul-degradation, respectively. I 
hope to provide some detail about the degree to which the soul is sensitive to outside influences 
and, on the other hand, resilient in the face of  them, depending onvarious factors. 
 
 
Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University, moesm@gvsu.edu 
1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Not an 'Exact Grasp' but Not a 'Complete Falsehood': The Status 
and Function of  the Tripartite Model of  City and Soul in the Republic” 
 
The paper begins by summarizing some recent work on the theoretical limitations and 
deficiencies of  the Republic’s tripartite model of  city and soul, work that makes clear the 
implausibility of considering the model as an unqualified expression of  Socratic (or Platonic) 
political or psychological doctrine. Then it attempts to get clearer about what rhetorical work 
Socrates (and Plato) aims to accomplish in using such a theoretically deficient model. Along the way 
it attempts to explain, with the help of  a thesis about the compositional structure of  the Platonic 
dialogue, why Plato has Socrates introduce the tripartite model in the first place, why it disappears in 
the Republic’s digression on philosophy, and why it reappears in Books 8-9 (not to mention Book 10) 
doing several kinds of  rhetorical work. The paper argues that Plato depicts Socrates using the model 
in Book 4 as a tool for leading Glaucon and Adeimantus into a self-scrutiny capable of  leading them 
to insight into the deficiencies of their political and moral conceptions and practices (and that Plato 
authors the depiction in order to lead his audience to similar self-scrutiny and insight). It argues that 
the meaning and function of  the model shifts in Books 8-9, books that depict Socrates making a 
critical return to the model after the digression on philosophy. 
 
Finally, the paper explains, by distinguishing between an epistemic sense and an ontological sense of 
‘truth’, why the model of  the tripartite soul is true in one sense (not a “complete falsehood”) and 
false in another (not an “exact grasp”). The tripartite model has epistemic truth (is not a complete 
falsehood) insofar as it represents a set of  really existing and prevalent flawed political and moral 
practices, and represents certain forms of  psychological disorder. But the model is (ontologically) 
false in the sense that it does not adequately represent the structure of  a soul that realizes the true 
Form of  a good soul. The “more exact grasp” of  that Form, a Form defining the normative order 
of  the good human life and hence of  the good soul, is only found in the “incorporeal order that 
rules harmoniously over soul-and- body” yielded by the dialectical division of  the intermediate 
forms of  human life at Philebus 64b.  
 
 
Julie Ward, Loyola University Chicago, jward@luc.edu 
2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle’s Virtue and the Sorites Paradox” 
 
The paradox called the “Sorites,” or the “Heap,” traditionally attributed to Eubulides of  the 
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Megarian School, seems to have been posed against Aristotle’s theory of  moral virtue as a mean. 
This paper examines how the paradox might work against this account of moral virtue, and, since 
Aristotle did not specifically reply to the paradox, whether his theory has resources with which to 
combat it. 
 
 
Angela Curran, Independent Scholar, Acurran123@gmail.com 
2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotelian Catharsis: A Reconsideration of  the Purgation 
Account” 
 
This paper presents a reconsideration and defense of  a purgation account of  catharsis in 
Aristotle’s Poetics, through developing the discussion of  catharsis in Politics 8.7, where it is 
suggested that catharsis lightens or relieves the emotional state of  everyone. It is argued that a 
modified account of  dramatic catharsis as purgation can meet the objections posed to the earlier 
analysis of  dramatic catharsis as purgation of  the emotions offered by Jacob Bernays.  In particular 
the purgation account has been open to several objections. First, it seems to suggest that the 
emotions of  pity and fear are impure and dirty states that need to be purged. This conflicts with the 
way in which Aristotle thinks of  the emotions as necessary aspects of  a fully human life. Second, it 
also suggests that catharsis applies to one in need of  healing and therapy, but there is no suggestion 
in the Poetics that this is true of  the audience of  tragedy. Indeed in Poetics 26 and elsewhere in the 
Poetics Aristotle argues that tragedy is superior to tragedy because it appeals to a better audience 
((1461b25f.; Poetics 13.1453a30-36; and 6.1450b16-19). 
 
This paper works with an idea in Politics 8.7, where Aristotle discusses musical catharsis. There is 
suggested that catharsis lightens or relieves in some way the emotional state of everyone, including 
the virtuous person, whose emotions are not in excess and are felt just as they should be. 
 
I draw on Aristotle’s writings of  a healthy soul in his writings on medicine, as well as the account in 
the Poetics of  the nature of  the emotional experience of  tragedy, to show that there is a therapeutic 
aspect to dramatic catharsis, but not in the way Bernays described. It does not remove a pathological 
tendency to feel excessive emotion, though it is possible that it can help spectators who feel 
emotions excessively or incorrectly. Catharsis, nevertheless, has a therapeutic aspect, something that 
is available to all spectators, because the cognitive benefits it provides can lighten the burden of  the 
painfulness of  their experience of  pity and fear, providing a pleasurable relief. 
 
 
Susan B. Levin, Smith College, slevin@smith.edu 
2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle’s Moral Psychology v. Current Advocacy of  Cognitive 
Enhancement” 
 
If  Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane’s Principle of  Procreative Beneficence were implemented 
regarding cognitive enhancement, a primary focus of  enhancement advocates’ attention, the result 
would be highly impoverishing for future children. For, apart from being inadequate to rationality 
itself, advocates’ view of  cognitive enhancement severs reason from the input to judgments and 
decision-making provided by faculties other than reason proper. When handling desire, supporters 
of  vigorous cognitive enhancement frame conflicts between reason and the nonrational in terms of  
self-governance or akratic failure, depending on which one triumphs. Advocates also discuss the 
nonrational apropos of so-called negative emotion, and, again, what is other than reason is assumed 
to be irrational such that an alliance with reason toward shared ends is out of  the question. Far from 
seeking a fruitful balance between rational and nonrational dimensions of  us as anchoring individual 
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and communal flourishing, proponents of  cognitive enhancement valorize the ceaseless elevation of  
rational capacity per se and hint at an ideal of  self-sufficiency. Reflection on Aristotle’s handling of  
pathê and moral virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics not only reinforces and deepens an independent line 
of  critique of  current advocacy of  cognitive enhancement but helps to anchor a richer account of  
the pertinent psychic terrain. 
 
 
Max Robitzsch, Sungkyunkwan University, jmrobitzsch@gmail.com 
2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Epicurus on the Ontological Status of  Color” 
 
In this paper, I propose to examine key passages in the Epicurean corpus that deal with the 
ontological status of  color (Letter to Herodotus 68, Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II.730-841, and 
Plutarch, Against Colotes 1008f-1111d). I argue that for the Epicureans, color is best understood as a 
kind of  accidental property (sumptōma) that is predicated of compounds (sunkriseis/ sunkrimata). In 
doing so, I raise some broader issues pertaining to predication and the ontological schema in 
Epicureanism. Furthermore, I systematically engage with and ultimately reject the 
Giusanni/Conche/Morel-reading, according to which color, depending on context, is to be 
understood both as an essential property (sumbebēkos) and as an accidental property. 
 
 
Benjamin Rider, University of  Arkansas, brider@uca.edu 
2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: “The Ethical Significance of  Gratitude in Epicureanism” 
 
The idea of  gratitude (charis in Greek) appears, both explicitly and by implication, in many Epicurean 
texts (including the Letter to Menoeceus; Vatican Sayings 17, 19, 39, 55, 69, and 75; and De Rerum Natura, 
especially Book 3). On its face, it seems odd for Epicureans to place such emphasis on gratitude 
(and ingratitude) because unlike, say, a Christian, an Epicurean does not seem to have anyone to 
whom to be grateful. Epicurean gods are responsible neither for the good nor the bad in human 
lives, and while Epicureans might well be grateful to Epicurus, that does not seem to be what these 
passages mean. I propose that Epicureans think of  gratitude as a general virtue, directed toward no 
particular benefactor, but characterizing the best kind of  life. In particular, it represents the proper 
disposition or mental stance toward the goods in one’s life. As a virtue, it is a state of  character that 
one must cultivate, by daily habits of  reflection. With this virtue, one is able to maintain the proper 
attitude toward the objects of  one’s desires, thus avoiding the unnatural, empty desires that make a 
life of  ataraxia impossible. My proposed virtue of  gratitude thus illuminates the Epicurean 
taxonomy of  desires, its relation to ataraxia, and the Epicurean mindset more generally. I also 
suggest that the idea of  a virtue of  gratitude has great promise for contemporary virtue theory—it is 
valuable for us today for the same reasons it is valuable for Epicureans. 
 
 
Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University, arensonk@duq.edu 
2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Non-Cognitive Epicurean Therapies” 
 
According to Epicureans, unhappiness is caused primarily by false beliefs, especially about the gods, 
the nature of  desire, and death. For this reason, many scholars claim that Epicurean therapy is 
entirely cognitive: it employs arguments aimed at replacing false beliefs with true ones.  Although 
cognitive therapy will hopefully lead to behavioral changes, it has been argued that behavioral 
changes and other non-cognitive strategies are not in themselves Epicurean therapeutic tools. In this 
paper, I argue there is some evidence that Epicurean therapists did employ non-cognitive treatment 
techniques, which are not necessarily aimed at the removal of  false beliefs and/or do not involve the 
use of  arguments. Some of  these techniques include physically removing oneself  from the people 
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and situations that create insatiable desires, and distracting oneself  from current pain. Although we 
may suspect that such strategies would have been reserved for those who fail at cognitive therapy, 
such does not appear to be the case: there are reports that Epicurus himself  utilized distraction 
therapy on his deathbed. I consider how Epicureans could have justified on Epicurean grounds the 
use of  non-cognitive therapeutic techniques, given their claim that false beliefs are the cause of  
unhappiness. 
 
 
Kelsey Ward, Duquesne University, wardk1@duq.edu 
2C (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 506: “A Teleological Interpretation of  De Finibus, V” 
 
At De finibus v 55 Piso claims that all of  his philosophical predecessors ‘visit the cradle’ to 
determine what is natural for human beings and what constitutes good or proper human behavior. 
Featured most prominently in the cradle argument and the corresponding notion of 
oikeiosis, teleology has a strong influence in Cicero’s De finibus. Together the cradle argument 
and oikeiosis offer an ethics that depends on the unity of  telos as observed by physics and the 
telos prescribed in ethics. Stoics, Epicureans and Antiochians alike deduce the proper human 
end from the earliest observable desires and aversions, and dictate what kinds of  things ought to 
be pursued and avoided as we mature to attain that end. Thus they accept that human development 
in accord with nature is morally good. I argue that Cicero subtly resists the cradle argument and its 
theoretical attachments in De fin v. I propose that he uses the dramatic setting of  De fin v to interrupt 
the natural temporal sequence of  the text and to disrupt an expected philosophical or conceptual 
advancement. In other words, he disrupts two kinds of  telos vis-à-vis the textual progression he 
devises. I conclude that Cicero crafts the text in this way in order to resist endorsing teleology in its 
physical and ethical manifestations, and to reject the common telos in physics and ethics accepted by 
the other schools. 
 
 
Chelsea Harry, Southern Connecticut State University, Harryc1@southernct.edu 
2C (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 506: “The Role of  Phantasica in Non-Human Animal Telos” 
 
Despite that Aristotle limits phantasia to certain non-human animals, I argue that phantasia is an 
integral, indeed necessary part, of  certain non-human animal function. In short, it allows animals 
with distant perception to benefit especially from this perception, not as a means to an end, but as 
an end in itself. My proposal is that excellent non-human animal functioning, in the sense that 
teleology means not only biological development but also the proper functioning of  the developed 
form, is achieved through distant sensing, which requires an external object, helped by phantasia. 
 
 
James Ambury, King’s College (PA), jamesambury@kings.edu 
2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Allegory of  the Cave” 
 
In this essay I argue that Plato’s famous allegory of  the cave is as much about what it is to know 
oneself  as it is about knowing the objects of  philosophical cognition. I divide the paper in 
accordance with the four principal types of  self-knowledge I identify in the passage, each of  which 
corresponds to a distinct level of  the divided line. I argue that the final model of  self-knowledge is 
best understood as self-knowing, an active psychic condition in which the soul is disclosed to itself  
in the performance of  its most essential activity. I conclude with some remarks about the nature of  
philosophical education and Socrates’ insistence that the philosopher return to the cave. 
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Alan Pichanick, Villanova University, alan.pichanick@villanova.edu 
2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Eros, Soul, and Self-Knowledge in the Charmides and Symposium” 
 
In discussing sôphrosunê with Critias in the Charmides, Socrates makes objections against both the 
possibility and the benefit of  self-knowledge there presented. The objections Socrates makes are 
devastating to this account of  self-knowledge, and another approach is needed. Such an approach is 
given by Socrates is in the Symposium, through Diotima’s speech about the origin and nature of  eros, 
which elaborates Socrates’ claim to know “the erotic things” (177d8). This account of  eros is what 
underlies Socratic inquiry and lays the groundwork for distinguishing Socratic wisdom from Critias’ 
conceit of  wisdom. 
 
 
Boris Hennig, Ryerson University, hennig@ryerson.ca 
2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “On a Specifically Medieval Form of  Self-Knowledge” 
 
Aristotelians distinguish two kinds of  knowledge: theoretical and practical knowledge.  Within this 
framework, self-knowledge can be either theoretical or practical knowledge of  a special sort of  
object, namely the “self.” The question I want to raise is whether self-knowledge should be defined 
in terms of  its object, or rather as a special kind of  knowledge. 
 
When Aquinas, for instance, defines conscientia (conscious awareness / moral conscience) as the 
application of  knowledge to an action (S.Th. 79,13 c.a.), he includes (a) the knowledge of  an agent 
that they performed a certain action, (b) knowledge of  what should be done, and (c) knowledge of  
the moral value of  an action.  The third (c) is knowledge that is both theoretical and practical. In a 
different tradition, Bonaventure will describe conscientia as knowledge that informs the affective part 
of  the soul (In II Sent 39,1,1 c.a.), and this in turn goes back to Hugh of  St. Victor’s distinction of  
three faculties of  the soul: (1) sense perception, (2) the intellect, and (3) a certain capacity for 
spiritual knowledge (De Sacramentis I,10,2). This kind of  knowledge occupies a middle position 
between conscious awareness and moral conscience, and it seems to be neither theoretical nor 
practical knowledge. It is directed neither at knowing the facts nor at prescribing or evaluating 
actions.  As Hugh of  St. Victor puts it, knowledge of  the third kind aims at the restoration of  the 
soul. This kind of  knowledge is hard to make sense of  within an Aristotelian framework.  To 
mention only one challenge, it is difficult to differentiate this kind of  self-knowledge from others in 
terms of  its direction of  fit. It may seem that self-knowledge either registers or determines the state 
of  the self, and there seems to be no conceptual space for a third kind of  self-knowledge, which 
does neither of  these. I will examine Hugh’s Didascalicon and De Sacramentis in order to get a 
sufficiently clear picture of  what he has in mind. 
 
 
Ted Arnold, Columbia University, eaa2143@columbia.edu 
2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Uncertain Grounds, Certain Fruits: Tibetan Buddhist Responses 
to Fundamental Discrepancies on Human Physiology in the Guhyasamāja and Kālacakra Tantras” 
 
Here I consider qualms and responses from various Tibetan Buddhist masters of  the dGelugs order, 
from the 15th to 20th centuries, with respect to anomalous presentations of  human physiology in 
two important Unexcelled Yoga Tantra systems, Guhyasamāja and Kālacakra. According to general 
presentations of  tantra, the foundation of  existence, ordinary or enlightened, is posited as non-dual 
but conceptually distinct: the mental aspect arising from the extremely subtle mind, and the physical 
aspect arising from the extremely subtle wind, which give rise to a buddha’s wisdom body and form 
body, respectively. These would seem to be, given the natural correlation between unenlightened and 
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enlightened states of  being, basic facts of  biological existence validated by the inner science of  
tantric practice. However, Kālacakra differs significantly in its presentation of  the extremely subtle 
wind and, by extension, its transformed aspect, the product of  perfection stage meditations. These 
fundamental discrepancies raise serious implications for Unexcelled Yoga Tantra theory and practice, 
which are supposed to be naturally, biologically correlated. Is the very ground of  human physiology, 
which is the material of  tantric transformation, variable, according to these systems? Could 
perfection stage practices transform that natural physiology, in dependence on the particular 
meditative system? And are there different fruits of  these systems, i.e., two different types of  
buddhahood that result? Tracing the comments of  Gendun Gyatso in his Mañjuśrī-nāma-samgīti 
commentary, I will discuss these tantalizing possibilities. 
 
 
Marie Friquegnon, William Paterson University, FriquegnonM@wpunj.edu 
2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Reflections on Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche and Khenpo 
Tsewang Dongyal’s commentary on Santaraksita’sTattvasiddhi” 
 
Santaraksita has offered a unique and extraordinary argument for the feasibility of  the Tantra. In 
their new book, The Tattvasiddhi and the Madhyamakaalamkara with commentaries, Rinpoches’ explore 
this argument and its ramifications, which are most notably, that when understood properly, 
happiness, joy and pleasure rather than asceticism are the path to enlightenment. I will describe the 
subtleties of  this view, and open the discussion to the audience in order to glean insights and 
rebuttals. 
 
Karsten Struhl, John Jay College of  Criminal Justice, kastruhl@tiac.net 
2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Buddhist Compassion and Righteous Anger” 
 
It is generally taken as axiomatic that Buddhism sees anger as a thoroughly destructive emotion that 
needs to be extinguished. Buddhist practice has as its intention to extinguish the illusion of  the self  
and cultivate compassion for all living beings, whereas anger is generally regarded as reinforcing the 
idea of  a separate self  and an emotion which prevents compassion from arising. Furthermore, anger 
is sometimes a translation of  “dosa” which, for Buddhism, is one of  the three poisons (the other 
two being greed and delusion). While “dosa” is perhaps more often translated as “ill will” or 
“hatred,” it is still assumed that anger is always a manifestation of  hatred and tends to increase 
hatred. Finally, in theDhammapada, anger (“kodha”) is unambiguously described as a destructive and 
negative emotion which must be “conquered by love” and held in check. 
 
In my paper, I shall question these assumptions, specifically in regard to what is sometimes referred 
to as “righteous anger,” by which I mean anger against injustice, and I want to question them within 
the context of  engaged Buddhism. I shall argue that righteous anger has within it the seeds of  
insight and an energy which can be harnessed by compassion – what has been called “fierce” or 
“confrontational” compassion – to challenge systems of  injustice. To make this argument I shall 
consider Aristotle’s analysis of  the “good-tempered” man who is angry at the right thing and not led 
by vengeful passion, the use of  wrathful energy to confront oppressive social structures in behalf  of  
everyone, the difference between productive and reactive anger, and the possibility of  a selfless 
anger guided by compassion. I shall, however, also make clear that the development of  fierce 
compassion needs to reorganize and transform the energy of  anger so that it can be subordinated to 
compassion. 
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Rick Repetti, Kingsborough Community College, Rick.Repetti@kbcc.cuny.edu 
2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Applying the Tibetan Causal Criterion for Ontological 
Substantiality to the Issue of  Agency” 
 
In Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and in elements of  its precursors in Indian Buddhism, there are 
strands of  thought according to which what is real must have, or be amenable to, some sort of  
causal impact, function, or influence. This ontological criterion is explicitly employed by Nagarjuna 
and others in the refutation of  the atman as causally inert, is implicit in similar lines of  reasoning in 
the earliest Buddhist sutras, and continues into Tibetan Buddhism. In this paper, I explore the 
potential application of  this reasoning to the analysis of  agency. Although all Buddhists reject the 
ultimate reality of  the agent/self, except perhaps the Pudgalavadins, if  the above-mentioned causal-
ontological criterion is valid, then a case may be made for the claim that while there is no 
ontologically independent entity that can constitute an agent, the causal/functional processes 
exemplified in the sort of  control certain individuals apparently exert over themselves, particularly 
advanced tantrikas, then it is reasonable to conclude that such individuals nonetheless instantiate a 
highly powerful form of  agentless agency. 
 
 
Michael Boylan, Marymount University (VA), Michael.Boylan@marymount.edu 
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Blood, Nature, and Magic in Early Greek Medicine” 
 
This essay will explore early Greek scientific accounts about blood and magic regarding the nature 
of  the account and a critical appraisal of  such. The approach will combine medical history and 
philosophy of  science. It will be the contention of  this essay that in this early period there is a 
transition from explanations weighted heavily upon magic and the divine to those that are more 
materially based. The treatment of  ‘blood’ is used to observe this transition. This essay is based 
upon my recent book. 
 
 
Tiberiu Popa, Butler University, tpopa@butler.edu 
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Hippocratic Echoes in Aristotelian Biology” 
 
Aristotle’s indebtedness to early medical schools with respect to some of  his scientific theories and 
natural philosophy. The Hippocratics thought that they could explain physical constitutions and the 
onset and evolution of  diseases by relying, among other things, on their observation of  climatic and 
meteorological conditions, of  geographical features and of  the quality of  the water available to the 
inhabitants of  a certain region. They claimed that our understanding of  how the elementary 
materials making up the world interact and are altered can also help us to gain insight into our 
temperament and mental capacities, a connection invested with moral significance. Most of  the 
studies on Airs, Waters, Places – and other writings where such causal accounts are put forth – tend to 
explore their therapeutic and their ethnographic content, whereas I am more interested here in their 
methodology and in the context in which those methods were crystallized. The explanatory 
apparatus deployed there seems to share important features with several accounts offered by 
Aristotle in his biological corpus, notably in the handling of  material causation in his History of  
Animals VIII(IX) and in Generation of  Animals V. While a filiation between Aristotle’s views and 
method and early medical authors cannot be established with certainty, I would argue that certain 
types of  causal inferences which can be found in the Hippocratic texts (Airs… primarily, but not 
only) were very probably part of  a reservoir of  ideas and methods that left their imprint on 
Aristotle’s method of  inquiry. 
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Adriel Trott, Wabash College, trotta@wabash.edu 
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Is Vital Heat an Elemental Force in Aristotle's Biology?” 
 
In this paper, I investigate to what extent vital heat—the power that brings life through the semen 
into the menses—is an elemental power in Aristotle’s biology. On the one hand, it seems clear that it 
is. Vital heat warms the blood thereby concocting it to the degree where it is able to produce life. On 
the other hand, it seems that it cannot be because it is the source of  formal power and not material 
power. I argue that Aristotle’s biology hinges on this question insofar as the role of  vital heat points 
to the way that form is differentiated from matter in material, and that Aristotle needs to be able to 
describe it as formal and thus different from heat, but over and over again relies on the descriptive 
accounts of  heat to show how it works. That is to say, in the biology, the formal principle is 
differentiated from the material principle in matter through a process of  heat. How this heat 
works—whether it is formal or material—will elucidate how form originates in relation to material. I 
conclude that vital heat is an elemental power, and that this shows that the formal principle is 
distinguished from material through a material process located in heat. 
 
To make this argument, I examine how semen comes to be or fails to come to be through a process 
of  concoction with reference to passages in Generation of  Animals I.18 and II.1. Concoction occurs 
through proper or vital heat, οἰκείου θερμότης. I examine this process of  concoction in the 
Meteorology where Aristotle describes the process in terms of  the work of  elemental forces or powers, 
and the proper heat corresponds to proper matter, ἡ οἰκεία ἑκάστῳ ὕλη, of  a natural thing. In 
Generation of  Animals, the same term for heat becomes that by which semen becomes that which has 
a life-giving capacity out of  blood.  This process is based on a movement in the blood from 
something that already has this power and this movement produces the heat in the blood to produce 
soul within it. Aristotle says explicitly at GA 736b29-737a6 that this heat is not fire or any such 
force, but breath. In Parts of  Animals Aristotle speaks of: fire as the tool the soul uses, concluding 
that all animals have an amount of  this heat; breath as feeding the “internal fire,” where fire or 
cognates of  it are repeated three times in association with the breath; and natural heat that concocts 
as coming from the soul, which is “as it were, set aglow with fire” (PA 652b8-16, 473a4-9, and 
469b11-17). In this paper, I draw on these passages from Meteorology and Parts of  Animals to develop 
a coherent account between the discussion of  concoction in the Meteorology, fire and heat in Parts of  
Animals and the development and work of  semen through vital heat in Generation of  Animals. 
 
 
David Squires, University of  Notre Dame, dsquires@nd.edu 
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Organicism and Classical Hylomorphism on the Principle of  
Unity of  Organisms” 
 
In this paper I argue that the Principle of  Unity of  organisms at the heart of  van Inwagen’s 
contemporary Organicism—one which he says is “Aristotle’s picture”—is in fact significantly 
different from the Principle of  Unity of  organisms employed in Classical Hylomorphism and that it 
faces a problem that the principle employed by classical hylomorphism does not face—namely the 
Problem of  the Unity of  the Principle of  Unity. 
 
The paper has two parts. In the first part I argue that van Inwagen goes in search the “ground” of  
the unity of  organisms and answers in a way that is not plausible unless his notion of  “life” is a 
Principle of  Unity in a manner similar to Aristotle’s notion of  soul. I then raise a problem for 
organicism’s principle of  unity: since life is a complex “event” according to van Inwagen, 
organicism’s principle of  unity of  organisms is admittedly a whole of  parts. What then is its 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 25 
 
principle of  unity and should the organicist even need to answer this question? I argue that they 
should and that it will not be easy. 
 
In the second part of  the paper I argue that the soul—classical hylomorphism’s principle of  unity of  
organisms—is significantly different from van Inwagen’s notion of  “life” despite his saying 
otherwise. Though even some famous Aristotelian scholars such as David Balme have said 
otherwise, the soul is not a complex event, change, or process. I demonstrate this from Aristotelian 
texts; a look at the definition of  change in Physics Book 3 shows that form—the soul included—is 
used in the explanation of  change in a manner that precludes its being identical to change—complex 
or otherwise. I then support from Aristotelian and Thomistic texts the claim that the soul is without 
parts. Since it is without parts, it does not face the Problem of  the Unity of  the Principle of  Unity. 
Classical hylomorphism, then, fares better than organicism when it comes to explanations of  the 
unity of  complex items, since it does not have to arbitrarily cut off  inquiry into the principle of  
unity of  wholes consisting of  parts. It cuts the inquiry off  where it naturally ends—when one 
arrives at something that is without parts. 
 
 
Mohammadjafar Shokrollahzadeh, Cornell University, mjshokrollahzadeh@yahoo.com 
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Modern Translation Studies and Medieval Persian 
Literature” 
 
This presentation begins with a tripartite delineation of  methodology in Western theories of  
Translation Studies: Historical, Textual Analyses, and Comparative Studies. Next, we shall apply our 
Western framework to Medieval Persian Literature. A Particular Focus will be the Fitzgerald's 
translation of  Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat. Finally we shall discuss the pragmatic imports of  the 
comparative values for the global age and the potential value of  the study of  Persian literature: 
classic, theological, philosophical, and mystical. 
 
 
Loli Tsan, SUNY Oneonta, loli.tsan@gmail.com 
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Can a Global Vision of  a Person Lessen the Current Conflict 
Between the Muslim and French Sense of  Identity in France?” 
 
This inquiry examines how a medieval Islamic perspective of  a "religion self  in context of  a spiritual 
community," and a modern vision of  "a secular national self," clash in their encounter in the 21st 
Century globalization that include mass digressions and refugees across the contents. In addition the 
audience are invited to share reflections on the possibility of  a global self  -expressed in many 
philosophies, as well as arts -Beethoven's Ninth Symphony? 
 
 
Seokyung Han, GSP, Binghamton University, shan3@binghamton.edu 
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Buddhism, Filial Piety, and Women In-Between” 
 
This project aims to trace the unique aspects of  the Mahayana Buddhism associated with filial piety 
in East Asia. As revealed in a wide range of  source materials of  antiquity through premodern East 
Asia, the ways of  conceptualizing and concretizing this virtue serve as an underlying factor in 
diversifying yet unifying the philosophical and religious traditions and practices of  the East Asia. 
Among the sources, the filial piety-related Buddhist literature epitomizes how the virtue plays a role 
in reproducing the Buddhist sutras in a secularized and/or popularized version and circulating the 
apocryphal texts across locales and eras and, eventually, characterizing the East Asian Buddhism. 
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The project accordingly focuses on the development of  the premodern Korean Buddhist work 
Pumo Ŭnchunggyŏng (Sutra on Honoring Parental Love, circa. 10 th cen.). This Buddhist 
apocryphal text, yet appreciated as a Sutra always in Korea, has been noticed for its sole 
representation of  the child-devoted mother. Its various versions, accessible in the worldwide 
museums and libraries, support that the Korean Pumo ŭnjunggyŏng is adapted in early Koryŏ Korea 
(918-1392) the Chinese Buddhist sources that depict filial children and, during the following Chosŏn 
(1392-1910), translated from Classical Chinese into the Korean script Han’gŭl (promulgated in 1446) 
and adapted to various forms of  literature, performance, and art. The Korean versions also suggest 
that, unlike the Chinese versions, the adapted Korean versions should always pictorialize the mother. 
This pictorialization, arguably, visualized or materialized narrative, appears comparable with 
representations of  (the ideas and ideals of) women of  the filial piety-discussed Chinese Buddhist 
works, including the Fumu en nanbao jing (Sutra on the Difficulties in Repaying Parents’ Debts), the 
Yulanpen jing (Ullambana Sutra), and the Dunhuang manuscripts. At the same time, this Sutra’s way 
of  employing the specific female figure, more pointedly, the mother figure as medium to explain 
filial piety of  the most essential virtue of  the East Asia, differs from the representations of  various 
female figures in other Mahayana Buddhist sutras, including the Lotus Sutra and the Flower 
Adornment Sutra. 
 
Thus, the close examination of  the Korean Pumo ŭnjunggyŏng and its relevant Buddhist literary 
sources enables me to argue how Buddhism adopts, adapts, and even appropriates filial piety while 
its ideas and ideals are transmitted, translated, and transformed across the East Asia; how Buddhism 
interacts with the East Asian text or book culture and how the authorities of  scriptures and varied 
apocrypha as well are established; and how the Mahayana Buddhism recognizes the roles of  the 
mother, mother’s body (womb) and motherhood (reproductivity), similarly or differently from how 
Buddhism understands the roles of  the women and the ideal womanhood. 
 
 
Michael Vazquez, University of  Pennsylvania, vazm@sas.upenn.edu 
2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: “Quo warranto? Real Definition and the Euthyphro Argument” 
 
Today it is universally recognized that the argumentative structure of  the exchange at 10a-11b of  
Plato’s Euthyphro is highly sophisticated. Despite the vast literature on this topic, most commentators 
assume that Socrates’ argument is about the identity of  piety (with a few rare exceptions). Instead I 
argue that Socrates’ argument concerns what contemporary metaphysicians would call “real 
definition.” To show this I argue that most interpreters miss the point of  Socrates’ quest for 
definitions in the early dialogues, and furthermore that they overlook decisive textual evidence that 
Socrates is not interested in the identity of  piety. I then outline my own account under which the 
argument is about real definition and the metaphysical grounding relation. More specifically, I 
propose that Socrates’ crowning inference in the Euthyphro argument is not about the substitution of  
identical terms, but the substitution of  real definitional relata by means of  the principle of  the 
priority of  definiens. 
 
 
Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of  America, Ionescu@cua.edu 
2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: “Images and Paradigms in Plato's Sophist and the Statesman” 
 
At the heart of  two Platonic dialogues, one of  which is generally accepted to be the sequel of  the 
other, the Eleatic Stranger draws two related distinctions: in the Sophist 234a-d he draws a distinction 
between two types of  images (eidola): eikona (likenesses) and phantasmata (appearances), and in the 
Statesman he draws a distinction between two kinds of  paradigms (paradeigmata): perceptible 
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paradigms and verbal paradigms at 277a-c and 285d-286b. My present paper has two purposes: (1) to 
examine the relevance of  each of  these two distinctions in their respective contexts and (2) to 
suggest a way to understand the relation between them. 
 
Regarding purpose (1): As far as the distinction drawn in the Sophist is concerned, contrary to the 
superficial impression that philosophers use only likenesses, while sophists use only appearances, I 
argue that both philosophers and sophists alike use both appearances and likenesses. The difference 
between the sophist and the philosopher resides not in the fact that each one would use only one of  
the two types of  images, but rather in the specific ways in which each uses them and the differing 
motivations behind their respective uses. As far as the Statesman is concerned, I argue that the 
difference between perceptible and verbal paradigms is not that Forms can only be depicted through 
verbal paradigms, but rather that Forms are more adequately depicted through verbal paradigms, 
while both visible and verbal paradigms are helpful in education and both can depict, with different 
degrees of  accuracy, both Forms and particulars. The skilled dialectician knows when to use 
paradigms of  one sort and when of  the other sort, depending on his interlocutor’s intellectual 
astuteness and his own state of  the soul. 
 
Regarding purpose (2): I argue that Plato likely expects us to understand the continuity between the 
two distinctions, i.e. to see the two types of  paradigms in light of  the earlier distinction between 
likenesses and appearances. I argue that the Statesman takes up the distinction drawn in the Sophist 
and amplifies its account, such that, through the three paradigms used in the Statesman – the 
herdsman, the myth, and the weaver - he uses both likenesses and appearances in his dialectical 
search for the statesman. In particular, the visual paradigm of  the herdsman is based on visible 
likeness with the statesman, while the paradigms that come through the images of  the Demiurge and 
the ages of  Cronus and Zeus in the myth are based on appearance; finally, the image of  the weaver 
is a verbal paradigm based on likeness in account and not on visual resemblance with the statesman. 
 
What is at stake here is to show that Plato proposes a complex metaphysical and epistemological 
account of  images, an account that explains the possibility of  our advancement from opinions to 
knowledge. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using images and paradigms as long as we 
know the type of  images or paradigms we use them as and at what level of  understanding we use 
them. 
 
 
David Talcott, The King's College (NY), dtalcott@tkc.edu 
2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: “Metaphysical Grounding in Euthyphro, 9e-11b” 
 
Matt Evans and Fabrice Correia have recently offered analyses of  Euthyphro 9e-11b according to 
which Plato was utilizing concepts of  metaphysical ground or ontological dependence.  These 
analyses are difficult to carry out first because metaphysicians arme exploring multiple different 
concepts of  grounding and dependence, and second because the structure of  Plato’s argument itself  
is confusing. In this paper I examine and compare these analyses, assessing first how carefully they 
distinguish their conception of  ground or dependence, and second how accurately they fit Plato’s 
argument. 
 
 
Heather Reid, Morningside College and Fonte Aretusa Organization, reid@morningside.edu 
2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: “Aristotle Versus Xenophon on Kalokagathia” 
 
In his exhaustive survey of  the term kalokagathia (beautiful goodness), Felix Burriot argued that in 
the 4 th century BCE, it was primarily a social designator for a group of  non-aristocratic elites 
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seeking to establish their political position in Athens.  Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, a book about 
household management, is often used to illustrate the nature of  this ideal.  But the portrait of  
kalokagathia that emerges in Oeconomicus seems much at odds with Aristotle’s discussion of  the ideal 
in Eudemian Ethics 8.15, where kalokagathia emerges as a kind of  “perfect excellence” 
(ἀ ρετὴ τέλειος) (1249a15-17).  In this paper, I will challenge both Burriot’s narrow understanding of  
the term, and the idea that Oeconomicus represents Xenophon’s considered view of  kalokagathia.  
Drawing, instead, upon other works such as Symposium, Memorabilia, Cyropaideia and Hiero, I will argue 
for a Xenophonian view of  kalokagathia not only compatible with Aristotle’s account but achievable 
through Aristotelian education. The political point about kalokagathia is that it is the result of  
training rather than birth. The philosophical point is that it amounts to the discernment of  moral 
beauty, rather than exhibition of  physical beauty.  It is Socrates, not Ischomachus who emerges 
(perhaps ironically) as the real kaloskagathos in Xenophon’s works.  More specifically, it is Socrates’ 
erotic attraction to true beauty, his ability to discern and act in accordance with it, that constitutes his 
personal beauty.  This contrasts educationally with conventional understandings of  attractiveness 
linked to wealth, noble birth, and physical beauty—all of  which Socrates lacks. Yet the old man 
manages to attract even the beautiful athletic youth Autolykos with his “goodness.” Kalokagathia in 
Aristotle and Xenophon is more than a nickname for a social group, it is an educational ideal that 
has little to do with how one looks and much to do with what one sees. 
 
 
Nikolaos Dimitriadis, American College of  Thessaloniki, Greece, nikosdim@act.edu 
2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: “Plato and Divine Beauty: What Can One Learn?” 
 
The present proposal is part of  a larger research project which aims to Plato sees no limit to the 
power of  the ability to see and capture the ‘privilege’ of  beauty, one that is a recognized beauty of  
divine nature.  However, Plato's theory of  the beautiful (and in particular of  divine beauty) is not a 
purely moralistic theory. To some extent, beauty holds an intrinsic value on its own. A preliminary 
investigation on the topic suggests that there is a novel way of  approaching the topic that can 
further inform our understanding of  the Platonic work. Further study of  the beauty suggests that it 
is acknowledged as power and plays a crucial role in relation to the divine. It places the gods firmly 
in the physical world and it holds an ethical aspect which associates the good and the beautiful, a link 
which has recently revived the interest of  scholars around the world as special journal issues can 
show. In Phaedrus the divine is beautiful, wise and good and with these qualities it feeds the soul. 
 
Back in 1907, Arthur Fairbanks has stated that the contemporary faith has much to learn from 
ancient Greek religious views as he concludes that (119): “We may learn from Greece that 
nothing gives religion such a hold on humanity, that no single ideal is so universally and subtly 
elevating, as the beautiful.” Plato’s work with his aesthetic and moral elements suggests that 
beauty is godlike or an imitation of  an idea; it brings human and divine nature close to each other. 
Combining this with the platonic imitation of  an idea, the Genesis passage ‘Let Us make man in Our 
image, according to Our likeness’ comes to mind. But in Plato’s case one can see a reversal of  the 
passage. In Phaedrus is stated plainly that we choose our objects of  desire according to our 
preferences: “τό ν τε οὖ ν ἔ ρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸ ς τρό που ἐ κλέ γεται ἕ καστος” [Every one 
chooses his love from the ranks of  beauty according to his character], as a reflection of  who we are 
but also as an expression of  which god best fits our character. There is likeness between gods and 
humans but it is the human intellect that recognizes this likeness and in this sense, humans have 
shaped their gods according to their image. 
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Maria Kyriakidou, American College of  Thessaloniki, Greece, markyria@act.edu 
2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: “Plato and the Senses: Re-Reading Phaedrus” 
 
The present paper explores aspects of  Platonic concepts of  aesthetics and the concept of  beauty in 
different Platonic works but mainly focusing on the analysis of  Phaedrus.  Plato has often been 
considered a philosopher who overlooked the realm of  the senses in contrast to that of  abstract 
ideas, while my reading of  Phaedrus suggests that there seems to be no clear cut distinction between 
the senses and the intellect; the boundaries seem blurred and are not necessarily hierarchically set, 
despite a preference towards the intellectual mind and philosophy. 
 
The dialogue of  Phaedrus suggests an emphasis on the senses and aesthetics. It is a quite sensual 
dialogue, since many of  the senses are present in the scenic setting but one of  them, vision, 
dominates the dialogue as the most clear of  all, the one that give access to the beauty and starts the 
mania which leads to eros. In fact, senses are serving the most acute apprehension of  the world 
which can make us see through someone’s beauty of  the soul and inspire the welcomed mania and 
desire. In Plato’s work the senses are projected as tools in our stride towards high forms of  love and 
attachment. Means and end (the senses and the object) are inextricably linked and the role of  vision 
in particular, is recognized in Phaedrus as a key factor in human interaction with particular references 
to soul and love affairs. The lover is the mirror of  the beloved and they are both beautiful (or better) 
beautified by this process, as they are beautified by the loving sight and the memory of  the primeval 
divine beauty. The dialogue is quite clear as to our preferences and associated loving urges (we 
recognize beauty as we see it onto the body of  the other and we are (or rather) become beautiful as a 
result. 
 
The aforementioned process is often associated with desired goals which are linked to beauty, 
virtues and morality. In Phaedrus it is stated that we cannot use vision and the senses to 
explore wisdom (which is not instantaneously visible/evident), thus we only have beauty to guide 
us to the good. In this same dialogue, there is no limit to the power of  the ability to see and 
capture the ‘privilege’ of  beauty. As hinted in Phaedrus, we are only left with vision to see 
beauty and remember an original, primeval, situation of  the human existence. The ideas (the 
epitome of  the platonic oeuvre), in particular the idea of  good, do not necessarily outshine the 
materiality of  aesthetics, the senses, knowledge and its worth. The purpose that Plato see in the 
value of  aesthetics is closely linked to issues of  beauty as the later could not be conceptualize 
without the senses and the aesthetic world. 
 
 
Rose Cherubin, George Mason University, rcherubi@gmu.edu 
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou) 
 
 
Heather Reid, Morningside College, reid@morningside.edu 
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou) 
 
 
Linda Ardito, Independent Scholar, linda351@optonline.net 
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou) 
 
 
John Murungi, Towson University, jmurungi@towson.edu 
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou) 
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Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, cevangeliou@towson.edu 
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou) 
 
 
Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College, Matthew.walker@yale-nus.edu.sg 
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Psychic Immortality in Aristotle’s Eudemus?” 
 
According to some scholars (including Jaeger, Dancy, Gerson, and Hutchinson), fragments from, 
and testimony about, Aristotle’s lost Eudemus provide strong evidence for thinking that Aristotle, at 
least at some point, accepted the soul’s literal immortality (either in whole or in part). By the soul’s 
“literal immortality,” I mean the soul’s capacity for eternal existence as a numerically identical 
individual in separation from the body. 
 
In this paper, I examine the existing fragments from, and testimony about, the Eudemus.  On the 
basis of  the (scant) available evidence, I argue that we need not infer that Aristotle was committed in 
this work to the soul’s literal immortality. In making this claim, I pay special attention to the work’s 
dialogue format. Hence, while the evidence suggests that the Eudemus somehow addresses the soul’s 
literal immortality, it does not follow that Aristotle himself, as its author, was committed to the soul’s 
literal immortality. On the contrary, the existing evidence is consistent with the view that, as a 
dialogue, the Eudemus at best presents reputable beliefs about the soul that the De Anima addresses 
more scientifically. 
 
 
Brian Julian, Boston University, bjulian@bu.edu 
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Finding the Definition of  Soul in Aristotle’s De Anima”  
 
Early in De Anima Aristotle gives what looks like a very Aristotelian definition of  soul: soul is the 
“form of  a natural body having life potentially.” However, many commentators think that this is not 
his ultimate definition, since at the end of  the chapter he says that his presentation has been 
sketched in outline and then he starts afresh by describing the proper way to define. If  these 
commentators are correct, then Aristotle’s real definition must be found elsewhere. I argue instead 
that there is no need to search, because the initial statement that looks like a definition is in fact 
that—Aristotle’s considered definition of  soul. What is potentially misleading, and what has misled 
the majority of  commentators, is the transitional material that follows. I focus on explaining this 
transition, arguing that Aristotle does not intend by it to qualify or reject the definition he initially 
gives. Specifically, by looking at Aristotle’s use elsewhere of  ‘in outline’ (τύπῳ), I argue that he is not 
using this label to say that his initial definition is deficient. Recognizing this explains several features 
in the chapters on either side of  the transition, including how Aristotle’s initial definition fits his 
description (in both De Anima and Posterior Analytics) of  a definition that shows the cause. 
 
 
Octavian Gabor, Methodist College, ogaborus@gmail.com 
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Psyche: The Actuality of  Matter or of  a Particular Natural 
Body” 
 
In De Anima, psyche is defined as the first actuality of  a natural body. The first problem that appears 
here is the question of  whether soul is correlated with the sunolon or with matter.  This problem has 
been debated from the earliest stages of  Aristotelian commentaries. Thomas Aquinas believes that 
Aristotle considers form to be the actuality of  matter. Themistius takes the opposite view, claiming 
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that soul is the first actuality of  the composite. He says, “the soul is like a first entelechy of  
something that is already alive and that can live in this way, and this is the compound, that which is 
from both [matter and form], and this can only be the animal. For forms come to exist in matter, 
but they are not forms of  matter but of  the compound.” 
 
In his recent commentary on De Anima, Ronald Polansky sides with Aquinas, claiming that in his 
definition of  soul Aristotle “speaks of  the form of  the matter in order to prepare to understand the 
relationship of  soul and body” (155). The definition in question here is at 412a19-21: “It is 
necessary therefore that soul is substance as form of  a natural body having life in potentiality.” 
 
In this paper, I defend Themistius’ view. After I look at textual evidence, I focus on showing how 
the Thomistic interpretation leads to incongruities in Aristotle’s theory. The claim that soul is the 
form of  matter leads to the idea that soul, just like prime matter, has only conceptual existence. 
Neither Aquinas nor Polansky would be ready to accept such a claim.  The final part of  the paper 
shows that, following Themistius’ view, we can claim that potentiality and actuality both refer to a 
particular entity, the same particular entity, which is potentially and actually. The body of  Socrates is 
Socrates-being- potentially-human, while the soul of  Socrates is Socrates-being- human. Potentiality 
and actuality seem well suited as terms to designate matter and soul. They emphasize the 
unbreakable connection between these two and a particular. Both matter and soul are of  the 
particular and cannot be as such by themselves. If  we consider potentiality and actuality, one cannot 
grasp what they would be by themselves, independent of  a particular, for they are always the 
potentiality and the actuality of  some particular thing.  The view that psyche is the actuality of  a 
particular natural body emphasizes that actuality is that which can never be changed in the life of  a 
particular. Particular humans can change their aspects, can engage in moral/immoral activities, but 
they cannot do anything about what they are: human beings. 
 
 
Claudia Luchetti, Universität Tübingen, clauluch@tin.it 
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “The Divine Fire of  Prometheus (Phil., 16c), Philolaus and Plato: 
On Ideas, Soul and Principles” 
 
This paper aims at giving an account of  Philolaus’ heritage in Plato’s conception of  the primary 
realities.  At first I will try to highlight the background of  Plato’s theory of  Philosophy as “exercise 
to die” in the Phaedo (61d ff.). Plato’s understanding of  the Pythagorean askesis as liberation from 
the boundaries with the bodily “prison”, earns here the further dialectical complexity that will 
characterize his whole ontology.  Philolaus’ vision of  the Monad as Mnemosyne (A13 D.-K.), 
constitutes the foundation of  Plato’s theory of  knowledge as recollection. Reacquiring the vision of  
the Monad laying behind and beyond every ideal Unity through a non-temporal anamnestic process, 
whose proper use is only for Initiated (Phaedr. 249B-c), discloses not only the structure of  objective 
reality of  Being, but also the profound affinity existing between objective and subjective dimension 
of  knowledge (A29, Phaed. 78c ff.). 
 
From the viewpoint of  its Pythagorean background it is possible, on the one hand, to recognize in 
the Phaedo clear anticipations of  the vision both of  the Soul and of  the Ideas as realities endowed 
with an inner dialectical structure, a conception that will be characteristic for the later dialogues 
(especially the Sophist and the Timaeus), and on the other hand to grasp the coincidence existing for 
Plato between knowledge of  Ideas and Self-knowledge. 
 
Further considering the nature of  Soul as such, my attempt will be to show how completely 
misleading is interpreting the refutation of  the identity between Soul and Harmony (Phaed. 85e ff.), 
as a platonic critic against Philolaus. Seeing the ‘generation’ of  the psyche in Timaeus (35a ff.), 
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derived from a mixture of  categorial and dimensional elements, there are evidences for a complete 
assimilation of  Philolaus vision of  the psychical dimension as a harmonic principle of  mediation 
and conjunction of  the primary opposition between Limit and Unlimited (B6 D.-K.). 
 
Finally, I will examine Philolaus’ influence on Plato’s view of  the foundations of  the intelligible 
world itself: as stated in Philebus, Beings truly existing are conceived as synthesis of  Limit and 
Unlimited (16c ff., to compare with B1-4). It follows that knowledge of  Ideas equals the knowledge 
of  a determined ‘measure’ within the mixture between peras and apeiron, i.e. the knowledge of  a 
certain Number. Within this context I will propose the analysis of  a relevant passage of  Plato’s 
Parmenides (157d-158d, to compare with B7, 8, 17), which seems to provide us with a proper 
reconstruction of  the ‘creation process’ of  the intelligible kosmos as a result of  the interaction of  the 
Monad/Limit with that ‘nature other than the Idea’/Unlimited/Undetermined Duality. 
 
The usefulness of  this overview on Plato’s assimilation of  Philolaus’ thought, does not concern only 
the speculative relationship between the two philosophers, but it consists also in delivering, though 
indirectly, a further evidence for the deep interconnection and interdependence of  the different 
facets of  Pythagorean Philosophy itself. 
 
 
Hwa Yeong Wang, Binghamton University, Hwang8@binghamton.edu 
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “Metaphysics of  Korean Ritualism” 
 
Recent scholarship on Chinese philosophy has challenged the meanings of  metaphysics that have 
been defined largely by Western traditions and has attempted to redefine the meaning, focusing on 
reality, process and the connection between the realities and meanings.  Scholars like Angela Zito 
and Michel Puett stress the inseparability between the physical and the metaphysical in 
Confucianism. They also focus on the process of  ritualization and its metaphysical assumptions in 
Confucian philosophy. Their works not only challenge the western defined metaphysical claims, but 
also restore externality within Confucian philosophy by bringing ritual back into the central 
discussion, while also revealing the construction of  gender in Confucian processual ontology. Based 
the newly defined metaphysics, I will analyze the 17th century Korean neo-Confucian philosopher, 
Song Siyŏl (宋時烈, 1607-1689), and his metaphysical arguments on mourning ritual. Through the 
analysis, I will discuss why they were important for his theories of  rituals and explore the way 
humans substantialize their being and participate in the cosmos through rituals. 
 
 
Bongrae Seok, Alvernia University, Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu 
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “Xunzi’s Theory of  Mind” 
 
According to many schools of  faculty psychology (Christian von Wolff, Franz Joseph Gall, Thomas 
Reid, Jerry Fodor) the mind consists of  specialized psychological modules or faculties such as 
perception, reasoning, imagination, and memory. According to them, the mind is an ensemble of  
specialized mental functions, as the body consists of  different muscles. Ancient Chinese philosopher 
Xunzi developed a similar understanding of  the mind. According to Xunzi, different sensory organs 
serves different cognitive functions. They are faculties of  sensory perception. However, xin (心, the 
mind) plays special functions. As the eyes distinguish colors and shape, xin distinguishes reasons, 
emotions, and desires. In addition, xin regulates sensory organs and develops new knowledge. 
Interestingly, in some passages in the book of  Xunzi, xin is discussed as if  it is one of  the faculties 
of  the mind. If  xin is the mind, then how is it possible for xin to be a part (a faculty) of  itself ? This 
paper analyzes Xunzi's theory of  mind and compares it with Western theories of  faculty psychology, 
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such as Franz Joseph Gall's, Thomas Reid's, and Jerry Fodor's theories of  mental faculty. 
 
 
Suk G. Choi, Towson University, suchoi@towson.edu 
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “A Reflection on the Confucian Idea of  Cheng” 
 
Zhang Dainian once expressed that cheng is “the most unintelligible notion in Chinese philosophy.” 
On the one hand, I understand that “unintelligible” means that the notion contains various 
meanings and thus it is hard to connote the term by adopting a single English word. Contemporary 
leading commentators have rendered the word, cheng, into ‘sincerity' ‘integrity’ ‘truthfulness’ 
‘creativity’. Although each translation puts its weight on different implications of  the word, they 
seem to share the idea that cheng means more than simply a state of  being sincere. On the other 
hand, the idea of  cheng has been for a long time discussed as one of  the most important notions in 
the Confucian philosophical system like the notion of  ren. I ask how this notoriously hard notion 
has played an important role in a philosophical system and furthermore, whether it can be available 
in contemporaryphilosophical discourses. 
 
As a step toward these questions, I re-pay attention to such implications of  cheng and its significant 
role in the Confucian ethics from a contemporary and comparative perspective. In this paper I will 
note Neo-Confucian interpretations of  the word, focusing on that of  Zhu Xi who has been 
respected as a completer of  Neo-Confucianism. I will also examine critically recent researches on 
the idea of  cheng.  In doing so, I will argue that the Confucian idea of  cheng should be understood 
as a unique concept of  virtue based on a comprehensive vision of  human nature. 
 
 
L. Kelson A. Law, University of  Pittsburgh, kelsonlaw@gmail.com 
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “Gaozi’s Maxim as a Recipe for the Unwavering Heart” 
 
In Mencius 2A:2, when Meng Ke is asked for the difference between his unmoved heart-mind and 
that of  Gao’s, he quotes Gao’s maxim: ‘Not attaining in saying (yen), do not seek in the heart-mind 
(xin); not attaining in the heart-mind (xin), do not seek in qi (a Chinese notion usually understood to 
mean something like vital energies).’ Meng then approves of  the latter half  but rejects the former 
half. The obscurity of  what Meng goes on to say, the scarcity of  what we know about Gao’s 
thought, and the terse formula of  the maxim itself  invite many interpretations of  this maxim. Points 
of  controversy include (a) what goals are implicitly referenced by each occurrence of  ‘attain’ and 
‘seek’ and (b) what the syntax (that I translate as) ‘attaining in x’, ‘seek in x’ signify in each clause. 
 
Many of  the existing readings either take the heart-mind and qi mentioned in the maxim to be those 
of  someone else’s (e.g. Zhao Qi), interpret ‘attaining in the heart-mind’ as satisfaction in the heart-
mind (e.g. Zhu Xi), or read ‘seek in qi’ as seeking satisfaction in one’s qi (e.g. D. C. Lau). As Kwong-
loi Shun points out, these readings are unsatisfactory in two ways. First, they fail (i) to show the 
connection between Meng’s rejection of  the maxim’s first half  and his apparently related criticism of  
Gao – that he takes propriety (yi) as external – which would soon come in the same conversation. 
Second, they do not (ii) make good sense of  how Meng’s immediate elaboration on the relationship 
between aim (zhi) and qi is supposed to explain his approval of  the second half  of  the maxim. 
 
On these two counts, an alternative existing interpretation (e.g. by Huang Zhongxi), to which Shun 
himself  is inclined, fares much better: ‘not obtaining propriety from doctrines, do not seek it from 
one’s heart-mind; not obtaining it from one’s heart-mind, do not seek it from one’s qi’.  However, 
this approach gives up on one important thing the other approaches manage to do, namely, (iii) 
making good sense of  each half  of  the maxim as itself  a recipe for an unmoved heart-mind. 
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My goal in this essay is to discern what the `unmoved heart-mind’ is about and, on this basis, 
reconstruct what Meng understands to be Gao’s maxim that satisfies all the criteria aforementioned: 
(i), (ii), and (iii). 
 
 
Jessica Deal, The Catholic University of  America, 12dal@cua.edu 
3D (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 508: “Letters and Music in the Philebus: Paradigms of  the Philosopher’s 
Due Measure in Dialectic” 
 
This paper is a close examination of  the paradigms of  letters and music in Plato’s Philebus. 
Presuming these paradigms are not chosen at random, the author reflects on each explicit mention 
of  these arts in the dialogue, with the eventual aim of  demonstrating how the examples of  music 
and letters show what is meant by the proper use of  and due measure in dialectic. The first 
appearance of  music and letters occurs after the introduction of  the divine method at 16c–19a—
uncovering the ontological underpinnings of  these two arts serves as Socrates’ model of  dialectical 
investigation. At the end of  the dialogue, music and letters make curious re-appearances in the 
forms of  harmonics, flute-playing, the art of  persuasion, and dialectic at 25e–26a, 51d–e, 56a–c, 
55e–57b, and 58a–b respectively. These re-appearances consider music and letters as arts in 
themselves and in comparison with other arts rather than their ontological “roots.” The author 
argues that these parallel examples of  music and letters at the beginning and end of  the Philebus 
manifest the greater and lesser degrees of  measurement present in the arts; furthermore, the 
measurement present in each art is determined by whether the art is ordered more towards pure 
intelligibility or pure sensibility. The latter point is especially clear when Socrates sets up the 
hierarchy of  the less and more precise arts and kinds of  knowledge, for the hierarchy is determined 
by how well each art participates in intelligibility and measurement (55c–58d). Finally, the author 
concludes that the reappearances of  music and letters show a progression in the Philebus towards the 
harmonization of  the lesser and higher arts through the art of  dialectic. That is, the paradigms of  
music and letters foreshadow and show the very possibility of  the philosopher’s “letting in,” with 
due measure, both the less precise and more precise arts, those governed by sensibility and those 
governed by intelligibility, into the good philosophical life. Such a close examination of  music and 
letters thus yields the following Socratic insight (at least in the context of  the Philebus): as long as 
each art form depends on and is ordered towards the most pure and precise art of  dialectic, the arts 
beneath dialectic can be judiciously admitted into the good philosophical life and are even necessary 
for attaining it (62c–d). 
 
 
William Evans, Saint Peter’s University, wevans@saintpeters.edu 
3D (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 508: “On Teaching Plato on Music in the Republic” 
 
In this paper I explore how to incorporate Socrates’ examination of  music in Book III of  the 
Republic into the teaching of  the central topics in the dialogue. When I teach the Republic, and as we 
begin to examine the topic of  music Book III, I ask students what sort of  music they like and why 
they like it. On reflection they are quite aware that music does profoundly affect their passions, 
emotions, moods, and ideals; indeed, that is why they like what they like. But Socrates links music 
with the formation of  character in children and argues that some music, because of  its powerful 
effect on the emotions of  children before they can think and reason, harms the souls of  children 
and promotes vices such as disrespect, insolence, greed, and irresponsible freedom. Socrates divides 
music into that which is beautiful and promotes virtue love of  learning, and that which is ugly and 
promotes vice. I then invite students to begin to examine whether this is true, and what 
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consequences this might have on what music young children should hear.  The question then is, how 
to link what Socrates says about music, beauty, and virtue, on the one hand, and music, ugliness and 
vice, on the other, with what he says about key topics later (and here I draw upon recent work by 
Stephen Halliwell, Sophie Bourgault, and Malcolm Schofield): the nature of  the soul in Book IV; the 
lovers of  sights and sounds, and of  spectacles, in Book V (music is one of  our favorite spectacles), 
and how the lovers of  spectacles (and we, too) differ from those Socrates calls philosophers; 
Socrates’ discussion in Book VI on why the nature of  smart young people is corrupted by the 
overwhelmingly noisy praise and blame in assemblies, courts, and theaters (and here is a connection 
with our obvious contemporary fascination with rock stars as some sort of  ideal); and the allegory 
of  the prisoners in the cave in Book VII, where the shadows cast on the wall of  the cave, and the 
sounds resounding from the wall – the prisoners’ sights and sounds -- are made up by the creators 
of  the most popular and dominant images in the culture, and here there is a key link with music as 
part of  our popular cultural images. For Socrates, philosophers, because they understand the nature 
of  those images, very much including music, and their effects on the soul, are immune to their 
harmful effects and so are free to pursue the truth by turning their souls away from what would 
harm them toward a better reality. In the end I ask students to evaluate what truth there might be in 
Allan Bloom’s claim that contemporary music is “junk food for the soul.” 
 
 
Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University, eperl@lmu.edu 
3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: “Notes Toward a New Translation of  Proclus' Elements of  
Theology” 
 
The Oxford translation of  Proclus’ Elements of  Theology by E. R. Dodds (Clarendon Press, 1933, 2 nd 
ed. 1963) is a classic of  Neoplatonic scholarship, but the time has come for a new translation, 
serving somewhat different purposes. Dodds’ work has the defects of  its merits: as a facing-page 
translation of  the critical Greek text with an elaborate commentary (and therefore prohibitively 
expensive), it is ill-suited for use in classroom instruction. There have been tremendous advances in 
the understanding of  Neoplatonism in general, and Proclus in particular, since 1963 (to say nothing 
of  1933), in part as a result of  Dodds’ own work as well as that of  many others. The commentary, 
while often helpful, is marred by a steady undercurrent of  disparaging remarks: Dodds manifestly 
despises his subject even while being fascinated by it.  Most importantly, the translation itself  is open 
to correction at a number of  significant points. These include among others Dodds’ translation of  
agathotes, with reference to the henads, as ‘excellence’ rather than ‘goodness,’ and his translation of  
holikoteron/merikoteron as ‘more universal/more specific,’ which both reflects and supports his 
(mis)interpretation of  terms such as being and life as hypostatized Aristotelian abstractions. 
 
Increasing recognition of  both the intrinsic value of  Proclus’ thought and his prominent place in the 
history of  philosophy demands that he be more fully incorporated into the “canon” of  major 
philosophers. The Elements of  Theology is bound to remain, for most students, the principal 
introduction to his system and to Athenian Neoplatonism in general. An up-to- date, affordable, 
philosophically informed but more “user-friendly” translation will promote more widespread study 
and teaching of  this vital moment in the history of  philosophy. 
 
 
Dmitry Biriukov, National Research University Higher School of  Economics (Russia); Padova 
University (Italy), dbirjuk@gmail.com 
3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: “Neoplatonism of  Arius: New Findings” 
 
In my report I want to continue a discussion which there was a while ago about Neoplatonism of  
Arius, who was leader of  Arian movement in Christianity in the early 4 th c. AD. Rowan Williams in 
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his studies (R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of  Arianism; R. WILLIAMS, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, London 
1987, p. 31 etc.) already attempted to find Neoplatonic ground for the formulas used by Arius. 
These attempts were criticized in the article by Christopher Stead (C. STEAD, Was Arius a 
Neoplatonist?, “Studia Patristica”, 32 (1997), pp. 39–51). I will offer my own arguments for 
Neoplatonic background of  Arius’ teaching. 
 
According to Arius, the Son was not “begotten” by God, but was created by His volition, as well as 
all created beings “from nothing.” In order to emphasize the created nature of  the Son, the Son was 
described as participating in the divinity of  the Father which was understood in the sense that the 
Son did not possess divinity according to His nature. In order to emphasize this account, Arius 
claimed that the Son does not participate in any way in the Father. Arius stated that God, on the one 
hand, is non-participated, but, on the other hand, He is participated in through His own Power, 
Logos and Wisdom. 
 
The emergence of  the concept of  non-participatedness in the Arian doctrine make it possible to 
discern the Neoplatonic triad of  participation, the participating – the participated – the non-
participated. The participated principles in the Godhead (Power, Wisdom, and Logos), which Arius 
taught about, can be associated with the participated henads in the philosophical system of  
Iamblichus. In addition, there is also a similarity in terms of  specific ways of  apophatic description 
of  the highest principle in Iamblichus and Arius. 
 
The concept of  non-participation was introduced in the philosophical language by Iamblichus. 
Accordingly, Iamblichus is the leading figure in the formation of  the participation triad in the 
philosophical thought of  the Late Antiquity and the likely author of  the doctrine of  henads, later 
elaborated in detail by the Neoplatonists Syrianus and Proclus.  I can summarize my arguments in 
the following way: 1) Iamblichus introduced the concept of  non- participation as applied to the 
highest principle into the philosophical language. This concept with connotations similar to those 
used in Platonism (impossibility to correlate the cause with the caused) appears in the doctrine of  
Arius. 2) The introduction of  this concept by Iamblichus triggered the emergence of  the 
participation triad: participating–participated–non-participated in the later Platonism; accordingly, 
this triad can also be found in Arius. 3) The subject of  participation in the doctrine of  Iamblichus 
was associated with his concept of  the participated henads which were the causes of  various realms 
of  beings. The theological system of  Arius also reveals the entities similar to the Neoplatonic 
henads. 4) There is also a similarity in terms of  specific ways of  apophatic description of  the highest 
principle in Iamblichus and Arius. 
 
If  we keep in mind all the above as well as the fact that Iamblichus (ca. 240–ca. 325 A.D.) was an 
older contemporary of  Arius (256–336 A.D.) we may suggest that Iamblichus might have had an 
impact on the philosophical and theological language of  the Arian doctrine. 
 
 
Deepa Majumdar, Purdue Northwest, North Central Campus, dmajumda@pnw.edu 
3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: “Plotinus’ Mysticism and Advaita Vedanta—Universality Amidst 
Particularity” 
 
In this paper I explore some concrete aspects of  Plotinus’ rendering of  mystical union with the 
One, in the Enneads – his paths of  ascent, the nature of  the unio, and Plotinus’ own experience. I 
compare these with concrete aspects of  mystical experience in two texts from Advaita Vedanta. In 
this comparison, I focus on basic paradigmatic differences (the conception of  the Divine, the 
structure of  the human person, degrees of  monism, etc.) between the two, even as I point to the 
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universal character of  each. When it comes to Plotinus, I conclude more in favor of  direct 
inspiration than historical influence. 
 
 
Abraham Jacob Greenstine, Duquesne University and Universität Kassel, ajacobgg@gmail.com 
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Not-Being and the Most General Principles in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Γ” 
 
Although there cannot be any Aristotelian science of  what is not, we still might wonder about the 
concept and status of  not-being in Aristotle’s philosophy. Indeed, since not-being was a contentious 
problem for his predecessors – Parmenides, Democritus, Gorgias, and Plato all engage with the 
topic – we would expect Aristotle to have some theory as well.  We can find the rudiments of  an 
Aristotelian theory of  not-being in the discussion of  the “principles of  demonstration” (Γ.3 
1005b6) in Metaphysics Γ, as well as the complementary discussions found in De interpretatione. These 
two principles – non-contradiction and excluded middle – belong to all beings (1005a22), and touch 
upon the question of  how being and not-being are to be distributed among the things that are. The 
first and most certain of  all axioms, the principle of  non-contradiction, primarily concerns the 
necessary exclusivity of  being and not-being, such that either one eliminates the possibility of  its 
corresponding other: “it is impossible at the same time to be and not be” (Γ.4 1006a3-4). 
 
Further, the principle of  excluded middle requires that, of  being and not-being, one of  these must 
be distributed, or else there would be “something besides being and not-being.”  This paper thus has 
three aims: (1) to investigate how Aristotle utilizes a conception of  not-being in constructing and 
defending the principles of  demonstration both in Metaphysics Γ and De interpretatione, (2) to examine 
the consequences we can take from these principles for a theory of  not-being, and (3) to consider 
some possible exceptions to these principles. We can further subdivide the pursuit of  the first goal 
into two separate sections, one dealing with the principle of  non-contradiction and the other with 
the principle of  excluded middle. Hence I begin (1a) by focusing on not-being in the articulation and 
defense of  non-contradiction, considering especially how not-being relates to the topics of  
contradictories, affirmation &amp; denial, and necessity. I then (1b) turn to the principle of  
excluded middle, paying particular attention to the problems of  truth &amp; falsity, articulated in 
Γ.7 in terms of  being and not-being. In the subsequent section (2) I consider how these two 
principles restrict the role that not-being can have, to the point where we might wonder whether and 
how we can admit of  any not-being at all (as Aristotle in fact does, e.g. at Γ.1). Finally, (3) I conclude 
by exploring a possible exceptions Aristotle makes to these two principles: (a) what Aristotle labels 
as the indeterminate, or potentiality, (in Γ.4-5 and De interpretatione 13) and (b) following from this, 
the failure of  the bivalence in future-tense propositions (De interpretatione 9). 
 
 
Riin Sirkel, University of  Vermont, Riin.sirkel@gmail.com 
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Question of  Fit: Aristotle's Metaphysics and Gender” 
 
Aristotle’s metaphysics has recently received considerable attention in contemporary metaphysics. 
Questions concerning ontological dependence, priority, and essence have become hotly discussed 
issues in metaphysics, and this shift of  interest has been characterized as ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Neo-
Aristotelian’. Further, in recent years, there has been a surge of  interest in feminist metaphysics, and 
Aristotle’s metaphysical views can be shown to have considerable bearing on the issues of  interest to 
feminist philosophers. But how does the use of  Aristotle’s metaphysics in feminist philosophy fit 
with his reputation of  having views that are “antifeminist to the core” 1 ? My aim is to address this 
question by exploring whether Aristotle’s metaphysical views are compatible with his claims in 
Politics I. More specifically, I will focus on his views on ontological hierarchy and essentialism, as 
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they emerge from Categories and Topics (and leave the discussion of  his hylomorphism, and its 
connection to the above-mentioned views for another occasion). 
 
In Categories, Aristotle speaks of  particular things like humans and horses as “primary substances”, 
and argues that they are primary because all other things depend on them (by being “in” or “said 
of ” them as subjects), while they do not depend upon anything. I will show that his discussion 
assumes that there could not be further dependence relations among primary substances, and that 
one primary substance could not be more of  a substance than another (Cat. 3b33-4a10). Further, I 
will show that Aristotle’s essentialism commits him to the view that humans are essentially the same. 
His essentialism implies that the members of  the same species share the same essence, i.e. there are 
no essential differences between members of  the same species, but only between different species. 
All humans are of  the same species, and so there are no essential differences among them. In sum, 
his metaphysical views commit Aristotle to holding what Julie Ward has terms “metaphysical 
equality” among humans as members of  the same species: are humans are equally “primary 
substances” and all are essentially the same. 
 
I will argue that these views do not fit with Aristotle’s claims in Politics I, where he privileges men 
over women, and associates their different place in a social hierarchy with a difference in essence or 
nature. Specifically, I suggest that in Politics I 12-13 he revises his view that all humans are essentially 
the same by holding that their different degrees of  rationality make them essentially different. 
 
However, the most interesting result of  comparing his metaphysical views with views expressed in 
Politics I is that there are several structural similarities between them, and they invoke similar 
questions. Let’s take one example. Aristotle wants to paint a hierarchical picture of  both reality, as 
well as of  a household. Although he clearly intends to ascribe to particular things priority over other 
types of  things, it is far from obvious what notion of  priority would make this priority claim on 
behalf  of  particulars plausible. Likewise, although he wants to privilege men over women by 
insisting that the relation between men and women is that of  a ruler to the ruled (1254b13–14), it is 
not clear which account of  relation delivers the desired result. 
 
 
Mina Fei-Ting Chen, National Tsing Hua University, ftchen@mx.nthu.edu.tw 
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Presence of  the Thing: On Aristotle's Metaphysics, IX.6” 
 
In Metaphysics IX Aristotle considers two kinds of  δύ ναμις (translated as power, capacity, or 
potentiality): the capacity for change (κί νησις), which is most proper to the word δύ ναμις, and the 
potentiality for actuality (ἐ νέ ργεια) that goes beyond change. While Aristotle gives a clear account 
of  the former in IX.1-5, he reminds us that we ought not to seek a definition (ὅ ρον, IX.6, 1048a36) 
in every case and comprehend the latter through the analogy. Michael Frede (1994) and Stephen 
Makin (2006) suggest that Aristotle has been pessimistic about discovering one unifying account of  
actuality and potentiality that go beyond change. 
In this paper I argue that the passage at IX.6, 1048a31-35 comes closest to the definition of  actuality 
and potentiality: actuality should be construed as τὸ  ὑ πάρχειν τὸ  πρᾶ γμα (the presence of  the 
thing), in which τὸ  πρᾶ γμα refers to a class of  things that covers actions and states, in particular, 
those in their own right; and ὑ πάρχειν refers to the presence or manifestation of  such a state or an 
action. The instances mentioned in the passage, i.e., the herm in the wood and the half-line in the 
whole line, suggest that the notion of  actuality involves the principle of  separation, which also 
works for the case of  contemplating. This line of  interpretation explains why the passage at 
1048a31-35 offers only one criterion, not two. More importantly, it helps reshape the current 
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interpretations of  the five analogies (1048a37-1048b4) and the whole IX.6-9: instead of  a 
juxtaposition of  the change-capacity relation and the substance-matter relation (the Frede-Makin 
juxtaposition view), the five analogies suggest a unifying story for actuality and potentiality that 
concerns the presence of  states and actions (the unity view). Accordingly, Aristotle’s discussion of  
herm, half-line, and contemplating at 1048a31-35 and his discussion of  the five analogies at 
1048a37-b4 should be read as a whole: the former offers a general account for the latter, while the 
latter serves as instances for the former. 
In the second half  of  this paper, I examine the common assumption that underlies the juxtaposition 
view: some of  the five analogies are brought up to illustrate the change-capacity relation and others 
the substance-matter relation. It follows that the change-capacity relation is seen as one instantiation 
and the substance matter relation as another instantiation of  the actuality-potentiality relation. I 
argue that the analogies that involve the substance-matter relation illustrate the presence of  states 
rather than the substance-matter relation and the analogies that involve the change-capacity relation 
illustrate the presence of  actions rather than the change-capacity relation. I also argue that 
Metaphysics IX.8 suggests how the actuality-potentiality is in relation to the change-capacity relation 
and the substance-matter: the latter requires the former. While x’s being entitled to be called 
substance requires x’s being in a state in which its matter is in the form (i.e., substance requires 
state), and x’s producing a change requires x’s exercising his own apparatus (i.e., changerequires 
actuality). 
 
Allan Bäck, Kutztown University, back@kutztown.edu 
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “A Simple Interpretation of  Aristotle's Syllogistic” 
 
It is hard to find a way to reconstruct Aristotle’s syllogistic, especially so as to justify such claims as 
that a necessary conclusion can follow from a necessary and an assertoric premise. Some 
interpretations today just discard some of  Aristotle’s claims as hopeless. Other, more sympathetic 
interpretations attempt to save the phenomena, the claims that Aristotle makes about valid and 
invalid syllogistic forms, by distinguishing types of  terms, based upon importing Aristotle’s theory 
of  the predicables and the categories, and/or by distinguishing different types of  predication, like 
the essential and the accidental. 
 
The problem is that Aristotle offers no such doctrines in his syllogistic for having different copulae 
or predication relations, or for having the validity of  the inference depend upon the material content 
of  the terms. Perhaps we can indeed do no better than to supplement his explicit doctrine by 
importing other of  his doctrines, which he would be assuming implicitly. But, ceteris paribus, an 
interpretation that gets Aristotle’s results by using only his explicit doctrines would be preferable. 
 
So here I begin to offer such a simple approach for understanding Aristotle’s claims about 
categorical and modal syllogisms. This approach assumes that Aristotle has an aspect theory of  
predication, unlike the other interpretations that assume, wrongly I think, that Aristotle has a copula 
theory. My goal is to have the syllogisms follow that Aristotle says follow, and combinations of  
premises that Aristotle says do not yield valid syllogisms do not, by using only the doctrines that he 
states explicitly. I shall illustrate the approach with a few major examples. 
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Parviz Morewedge, Global Scholarly Publications/SUNY Old Westbury,  pmorewed@gmail.com 
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Is the Plotinus-ibn Sina- Tusi- Leibniz System Logically 
Compatible with Monotheistic Theology?” 
 
This study depicts sharp logical differences between two cosmogonies: the standard monotheistic 
view of  a transcendent deity with the ibn Sinan, on the one hand, and the Necessary Existent (al-
wajib al-wujud) and its variation of  some of  its features in theologies of  Plotinus, Leibniz, and N. 
Tusi., on the other hand. The four foci include: the ritualistic ontology of  creation vs. the monism 
of  emanation, the total dependence of  love for human salvation vs. pre-destination, the possibility 
of  a mystic union in sense of  "no-otherness" vs. the transcedent nature of  a monotheistic deity, and 
the meaningless of  "free will" in the ibn Sinan system vs, the divine omnipotence in creation 
cosmogonies. It is proffered- contrary to the views of  a majority of  scholars in Islamic studies -that 
ibn Sina's system is not compatible with the religious orthodoxy. 
 
 
Ruziev Bunyodjon, Academy of  Science of  the Republic of  Tajikistan, Khmr01@mail.ru 
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Problems of  science and cognition in Sufism” 
 
SUFISM - one of  the five main areas of  classical Arab-Muslim philosophy, which took shape after 
the others. It gets the mature form the works of  al-Muhui Dina Ibn ̒Arabi (1165-1240). Sufism as a 
philosophical trend is rethinking the basic approaches to the solution of  the central problems of  the 
classical Arab-Muslim philosophy, using the experience of  mystical revelation. In a broader sense, 
Sufism (tasavvuf) represents a mystical branch of  Islam. The term “Sufi” derives perhaps from suf  – 
“wool” because of  the wool produced sackcloth for ascetics, although this is not the only hypothesis 
as to its etymology. Sufism originated in the 8th century. Mystical experiences are gradually starting 
to get the theoretical understanding by al-al- Hasana Basri, Zu n Nuna al-Misri (8-9 in.), Al-Harra ̄za 
(d. 899), trace the philosophical ideas in Abu Yazida al-Bista ̄mi ( d. 875), al-Abu Mansura Halla ̄dzha 
(d. 922), al-Abӯ  Ka ̄sima al-Kushayri (986-1072), and others. 
 
The discussion will include the following topics as well: Principles of  dual unity and other things, 
Eternity and time, Casuality, Methodology of  cognition, Ethical teachings. 
 
 
Rustamjon Abdullaev, Academy of  Science of  the Republic of  Tajikistan, Khmr01@mail.ru 
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Problems of  Cognition in Natural Philosophy of  Abu Ali Ibn 
Sino (Avicenna)” 
 
The natural philosophy in Ibn Sina is physics - the science of  inorganic and organic world, which 
includes the totality of  natural science, known in the first third of  the XI century. Therefore, in Ibn 
Sina’s concept should distinguish broad and narrow understanding of  natural philosophy. In the 
broad sense of  the word natural philosophy at the Avicenna is the study of  animate and inanimate 
nature of  the materials world, plants, animals, including humans. In a narrow sense, the natural 
philosophy of  Ibn Sina can be interpreted as a philosophical propaedeutic of  natural science as a 
philosophical doctrine on the general principles of  nature and its knowledge. The general 
ontological principles of  natural philosophy, which is a reflection of  the most common properties 
of  natural existence and condition of  all scientific knowledge, Ibn Sina attributed the doctrine of  
the substantiality of  bodies of  movement, space and time, causality, the eternity of  the world, 
finitude and infinity, the relationship between body and soul and et al. Analysis of  the principles of  
natural philosophy of  Ibn Sina is important to establish the nature of  his world view and determine 
the scientific value of  the points of  view of  that thinker ontology, in contrast to his epistemology is 
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clearly idealistic, that prince of  philosophers replaced by flexible, lively, sometimes naive, approach 
depending on the individual processes in the whole world dogmatized teleological and theological 
view. 
 
 
Naomi Reshotko, University of  Denver, nreshotk@du.edu 
4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “Between Knowledge and Ignorance: Doxa, Reason, and Truth in 
the Meno and Symposium” 
 
I argue that, through the interaction between Socrates and Diotima in the Symposium, Plato shows 
that Socrates’ epistemic states are complex networks of  diverse beliefs that vary with respect to 
quality as understood with respect to the criteria (reason and truth) for belief  evaluation that are 
given to us in the Meno and Symposium. Meno 98-100, appears to provide a rubric for ranking beliefs 
with respect to these criteria. However, the discussion of  doxa at Symposium 200-212 makes it look 
impossible to actually perform such a ranking on individual, isolated, propositional beliefs, let alone 
on complex doxastic networks. This leads me to conclude that Plato actually thinks our epistemic 
states are always in between ignorance and knowledge and always fall short enough of  knowledge 
that no one should be considered significantly wiser than anyone else—or at least that no one 
should be assumed to know anything. I will further suggest that Republic 475-480 and 508-511 (the 
divided line) confirm this suspicion. 
 
 
Matthew Evans, University of  Texas at Austin, evansmatt@austin.utexas.edu 
4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “Rational Causes in the Phaedo” 
 
Nearly all of  us accept that at least some of  our thoughts —such as our desires, beliefs, and 
intentions —can be causally responsible for certain movements in our bodies. Starting in antiquity, 
and especially since Descartes, this has been used as the pivotal premise in an increasingly popular 
line of  argument against dualism. For if  the psychological domain and the material domain are as 
fundamentally distinct from each other as the dualist thinks they are, then it is mysterious how 
thoughts can interact with bodies in the way we all seem to think they can. This is why it would be 
interesting, and perhaps also instructive, to find a great philosopher who draws from the 
phenomenon of  psychological causation a lesson precisely opposed to the one typically drawn 
today. That philosopher, I believe, is Plato. If  my reading of  the Phaedo is right, then in this dialogue 
Plato gives us a surprisingly powerful two-part argument to the effect that, because there is 
psychological causation, dualism —indeed, a fairly robust version of  dualism — is true. This paper 
is an attempt to spell out that argument, and to gauge its importance for our understanding and 
assessment of  Plato’s broader dualist commitments. 
 
 
Scott Berman, Saint Louis University, contingently@gmail.com 
4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “A Scientific Basis for Socrates’ Ethical Truths” 
 
Socrates’ ethical theory, as we see it in the early dialogues of  Plato and especially in the Gorgias, 
requires that ethical truths are objective. The fundamental objection to there being objective ethical 
truths, I argue, is that ethical facts are not observable in the way that scientific facts are. I shall use 
results from the burgeoning field of  complexity science to show how the ethical facts are in fact 
observable in exactly the same way as scientific facts are and hence that the ethical truths argued for 
by Socrates are more defensible than previously thought possible. 
 
 
 2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Program, page 42 
 
 
Charlene Elsby, Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne, celsby@gmail.com 
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Aristotle’s Physiognomy and the Virtuous Mean of  Materiality” 
 
The pseudo-Aristotelian text Physiognomonica is often cited as the origin of  and ancient precursor to 
later works on the often disparaged art or science of  physiognomy. It remains part of  the corpus 
despite a general consensus that it was written by an Aristotelian in the 3 rd century B.C. Still, 
Aristotle gives physiognomonical theories also in the History of  Animals, Parts of  Animals, Generation 
of  Animals, De Anima and the Prior Analytics, where he writes at 70b: “It is possible to infer character 
from physical features, if  it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural 
affections.” In this paper I suggest an Aristotelian physiognomy that accurately represents the 
hylomorphic structure of  the organism. An Aristotelian physiognomy should not so much dictate 
what feature corresponds to what character trait as it should describe the materiality of  an organism 
as an aspect of  its hylomorphic structure. The material aspect, as the embodiment of  the character 
trait, should serve as an indication of  the character trait; however, it cannot be formalized as any 
kind of  science dictating a one-to- one correspondence between a character trait and a physical 
feature. Rather, the virtuous material mean, as the embodiment of  the virtuous mean about which 
we are used to speaking relative to the soul, is just as subjective; i.e., just as Aristotle claims that the 
mean between an excess and a deficiency must be calculated relative to the particular individual (Nic. 
Eth. 1106b), so is a physical mean relative to a particular individual. I conclude that while a kind of  
physiognomy seems necessary, given Aristotle’s conception of  the organism as the hylomorphic 
structure constituted of  body and soul, it is impossible to formalize the ideal material virtuous 
mean—to be properly Aristotelian, we must accept that the same character trait may inform various 
material embodiments. 
 
 
Victor Saenz, Rice University, victor.saenz@gmail.com 
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Non-Rational Desire in EN, IV.3: Re-Thinking Megalopsuchia” 
 
Despite the attention modern scholars have devoted to the Ethica Nicomachea in the last several 
decades, relatively little sustained attention has been given to his specific accounts of  the moral 
virtues or ethical excellences (ethikê aretê). Moreover, fundamental questions about the nature of  the 
moral virtues remain unaddressed. I here want to focus on one. 
 
Aristotle writes that moral virtues—as opposed to intellectual virtues—are virtues of  the non-
rational (alogon) parts of  the soul (EN I.13). Training in the moral virtues is training in getting these 
non-rational desires to accord with right reason. But how do each of  the different moral virtues—10 
or so of  them—relate to Aristotle’s two main sources of  rational desire, thumos (often translated 
‘spirit’) and epithumia (often translated ‘appetite’)? How are the moral virtues precisely excellences of  
these parts? I want to begin to answer this question by looking at the case of  megalopsuchia (often 
translated ‘magnanimity’). 
 
My purpose in this paper is two-fold. (1) I argue that the main source of  non-rational motivation in 
megalopsuchia is thumos, so that megalopsuchia is a distinctive excellence of  thumos. (2) I show that a 
recent, largely critical account of  megalopsuchia by Howard Curzer in his Aristotle and the Virtues (OUP, 
2012) is importantly mistaken, and mistaken precisely because it neglects the role of  non-rational 
desire—as do several other interpreters. 
 
First I present Curzer’s two main criticisms: (i.) that megalopsuchia does not have the necessary 
conditions for moral virtue; and (ii.) that the main aspects of  megalopsuchia—a certain self-knowledge, 
the practice of  the virtues at the grand scale, and a certain self-sufficiency—are not united in any 
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principled way. Second, after sketching Aristotle’s thumos, I will how this account responds to the 
claim that megalopsuchia does not have the necessary conditions for moral virtue. Third, I argue that 
thumos elucidates the kind of  self-knowledge that megalopsuchia presupposes. Fourth and finally, I 
show that thumos also helps us understand the megalopsuchos’ relation to the practice of  the virtues on 
the grand scale and ultimately the unity of  the different, seemingly disparate components of  this 
virtue. This account of  thumos and megalopsuchia not only begins to clarify Aristotle’s thesis that the 
moral virtues are the virtues of  the non-rational parts of  the soul, it also helps us to see megalopsuchia 
in a fresh light. 
 
 
Dana Munteanu, Ohio State University, munteanu.3@osu.edu 
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Ethical Complications: Tragic Exempla” 
 
Defining the superiority of  the noble characters of  tragedy, the spoudaioi, has remained a notoriously 
difficult subject, because of  the concision of  the statements in the Poetics. My paper proposes to 
examine examples that appear to refer to tragedies in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian 
Ethics, in order to shed a new light on the moral implications of  the agents involved in tragic action. 
Not knowing the universals means not knowing what one must (dei) do or avoid, and every bad 
person is ignorant of  that (Nicomachean Ethics 3.1110b 28-9). Conversely, not knowing the particulars 
regards various details (of  who or how or with what consequence), so it is possible for a person hit 
to be your father but that you know only that he is a man (Nicomachean Ethics 5.1135a24-30). This 
example surely brings to our mind king Oedipus, although no tragedy is mentioned by name. In the 
Poetics, Aristotle gives a list of  actions found in tragedies and the degrees of  ignorance of  the 
characters performing them (14.1453b39-1454a9). Of  these, the recognition-reversal in Euripides’ 
Chresphontes is mentioned, in which Merope is about to kill her son but comes to recognize him 
(14.1454a5-6). The same example is given in the Nicomachean Ethics among involuntary actions 
(Nicomachean Ethics 3.1111a10-11: “one might take one’s son for the enemy, as Merope did”). An 
illustration of  not knowing particulars is also linked to tragic myths in the Eudemian Ethics (2.1225b2-
5), referring to the daughters of  Pelias (possibly from a lost tragedy by Euripides) who thought they 
were giving their father a good potion when in fact it was hellebore.  Generally, tragic characters in 
Aristotle’s view have to know the universals (what one must do and avoid), which perhaps ought to 
be qualified as better than most of  us. Yet, they may act because of  ignorance (not knowing the 
particulars), for which it is both pity and excuse (Nicomachean Ethics 3.1111a2). But complications do 
occur. Orestes, for example, in Greek tragedies knows exactly what he is doing when he decides to 
kill his mother. However, overall, Aristotle chooses not to treat such complicated examples in the 
Poetics. He does however bring up some difficult cases in the Nicomachean Ethics: Alcmaeon (in the a 
Euripidean play) gives reasons for killing his mother that appear to be ridiculous (3.1110a24-9; 
5.1136a13). The excuse in such cases may come from the heroic code: not killing one’s kin would 
cause greater harm to the family or community. Yet, not all these tragic actions seem justifiable to 
Aristotle (Echeñique 2012, 147). An analysis of  the complexity of  the idea of  voluntary action in 
Aristotle’s ethical treatises (Charles 2012) indicates that a coerced action may, in a sense, be 
considered not voluntary, even if  the agent knows what he is doing. In this sense, we could argue 
that an Orestes is compelled by circumstances, fate, and Apollo to commit matricide. 
 
 
Silvia Carli, Skidmore College, scarli@skidmore.edu 
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Completing Activities” 
 
In Aristotle’s philosophy, complete activities (teleiai energeiai) are “doings” that realize their telos in 
their exercise. Seeing and theorizing, for instance, are their own end. As such, they are distinguished 
from incomplete activities (ateleis energeiai), whose goal is other than, and beyond, their exercise. The 
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goal of  housebuilding, for instance, is not the building process but the finished house, which is 
realized only when the activity of  the craftsman has ceased.  In Nicomachean Ethics 10.4.1175b14-31, 
however, Aristotle specifies the conditions under which a teleia energeia is most complete (teleiotatē). 
The implication appears to be that there are circumstances in which teleiai energeiai are less complete 
and are thus lacking in something or, in some sense, incomplete. 
 
Some scholars (e.g., David Bostock and Christine Olfert) argue that this implication is problematic 
for Aristotle’s conceptual scheme and does not necessarily follow from the Ethics’ passage. They 
offer interpretations of  it that are compatible with the notion that there is a single state of  
completeness, which does not admit of  degrees. 
 
This paper rejects these proposals and suggests that teleiai energeiai can indeed be more or less 
complete in the sense of  being more or less successful in attaining their ends in their exercise. It 
further argues that the concept of  degrees of  completeness plays an important role in explaining 
some of  Aristotle’s characterizations of  teleiai energeiai, with particular emphasis on the exercise of  
theoretical wisdom (sophia). 
 
 
Joshua Blander, The King’s College, jblander@tkc.edu 
4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: “Dependence, Grounding, and Fundamentality: A Medieval 
Proposal” 
 
Questions about the nature of  dependence have gained traction in recent work in metaphysics.  For 
example, Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, and Kathrin Koslicki have all authored important work on the topic 
of  metaphysical dependence. These authors, along with others – including Jonathan Schaffer and 
Fabrice Correia – have examined the connections between dependence and cognate notions such as 
grounding and fundamentality. These authors rely not merely on contemporary work for their 
inspiration; they find insight in reflection on Aristotle and Aristotelian ideas. This emphasis yields 
helpful criteria for whether something is dependent or independent, often derived from Aristotle’s 
account of  the categories. Primary substances, which are the independent entities, would presumably 
be fundamental; while qualities and quantities would be dependent entities and non-fundamental. 
 
The work being done on dependence, grounding, and fundamentality reflects the natural outlook 
that dominates both contemporary and Aristotelian metaphysics, focusing on dependence and 
grounding relations in the natural world. By contrast, many medieval Aristotelians developed theistic 
conceptions of  dependence that capture both natural and non-natural dependence relations; as a 
result, they examine both the fact that and the way in which everything depends on God, enabling us 
to discover ways of  thinking about grounding relations that are notably absent from current 
discussion. Understanding these relations can help us make sense of  what difference it makes to the 
world when we answer the question of  what in the world, if  anything, depends on God. 
 
In this paper, I develop William Ockham’s account of  dependence and priority in order to evaluate 
its implications for the contemporary discussion. In a variety of  writings, Ockham discusses these 
notions, and similar ones, in order to make sense of  the ways in which one thing depends on 
another. Ockham discusses two primary notions of  dependence – existential and essential 
dependence.  Briefly, existential dependence involves an account of  what is required for a thing to 
be or continue in existence; while essential dependence explains what is needed for the thing to be 
the thing that it is, or its identity conditions. Though some philosophers think there is an important 
difference between existential and essential dependence, there are many philosophers who think 
there is no sharp distinction between them. I believe that Ockham falls in the latter group. At the 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 45 
 
very least, he thinks that essential dependence is one kind of  existential dependence, or entails 
existential dependence (even if  not vice versa). 
 
Perhaps more significantly, Ockham carefully examines the ways in which the world (and everything 
in it) depends on and is grounded in God. For Ockham, this seems to entail that God is what (alone) 
is fundamental. By contrast with the contemporary discussion, then, if  the world depends on God, 
no facts or features about the world would be metaphysically fundamental – not even the world 
itself, contra Jonathan Schaffer’s holism. Like Schaffer, however, Ockham seems interested in 
affirming a sparse basis for the fundamental. Regardless of  the similarities with particular 
contemporary theories we might find in Ockham, the value of  examining his proposals stems 
primarily from his ability to expose us to ways of  thinking about dependence in ways that are not 
under consideration in current discussion. 
 
 
Milo Crimi, UCLA, mcrimi@humnet.ucla.edu 
4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: “Demonstratives and Signs of  Materiality in Late Medieval 
Supposition Theory” 
 
From the late twelfth through the sixteenth centuries, medieval logicians developed sophisticated 
semantic theories under the heading of  the ``properties of  terms.&#39;&#39; One such property a 
term could exhibit was material supposition. This occurs, roughly put, when a term is used in a 
proposition to stand for itself, as `hircus' might in `Hircus est nomen'. In the late fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries, theories of  material supposition began to incorporate linguistic devices such as 
demonstrative pronouns and the Old French article `li' (or `ly') as so-called ``signs of  materiality” to 
indicate when terms exhibit material supposition. Here I explore this practice. Although signs of  
materiality share some common features with some modern uses of  quotation marks to indicate 
mention, I will show that they also have many differences. I will argue in particular that Marsilius of  
Inghen uses demonstratives metalinguistically, and I will consider whether a similar practice can be 
ascribed to Paul of  Venice and Paul of  Pergula. 
 
 
Bernd Goehring, Medieval Institute, University of  Notre Dame, bernd.goehring@gmail.com 
4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: “Truth as Rightness in Anselm of  Canterbury and Henry of  
Ghent” 
 
In this paper I examine how the thirteenth-century Parisian master Henry of  Ghent (†1293) 
integrates Anselm’s notion of  truth as rightness (rectitudo) into his comprehensive account of 
truth in God and creatures. In his magisterial Summa or Quaestiones ordinariae Henry explores whether 
and how there is truth in God. In the first question of  article 34, Henry refers to the complex 
account of  truth in Anselm’s De veritate, which he understands as distinguishing the truth of  a thing 
from the truth of  a sign, and as subdividing the latter into the truth of  speech, of  thought, of  the 
will and of  action (ed. R. Macken, Leuven 1991, p. 164). Henry explicates what he takes to be 
Anselm’s basic, twofold distinction in the following way: “For just as the truth of  a sign (veritas signi) 
obtains when a sign does what it ought to do, or what its nature requires it to do, namely that it does 
everything that pertains to its signification, i.e. that it indicates its significate according to what is in 
the external thing, similarly the truth of  a thing (veritas rei) ought to be what is, when a thing exists in 
such a way its nature requires that it be, namely that it contains in itself  everything that belongs to its 
nature and essence” (ibid.). After establishing that God meets this definition to the highest degree 
because he is maximally what his divine nature requires him to be, Henry moves on to distinguish in 
the second question a twofold being of  truth – in the thing and in an intellect that is conceiving it, 
thus capturing Anselm’s definition of  truth as a rightness perceptible only to the mind (veritas est 
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rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis). I will show how Henry incorporates Anselm’s notion of  the truth of  
essences and its relation to a mind into his own account of  God’s conceiving ideal exemplars of  all 
essences, from which creatures derive their actual 
existence and indeed their truth. 
 
 
Cristóbal Zarzar, University of  Cambridge, cristobalzarzar@gmail.com 
4D (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 508: “Epicurus’ Theory of  Perception and the Problem of  Conflicting 
Appearances” 
 
The Epicurean dictum ‘all phantasiai are true’ has struck ancient and modern philosophers as 
strongly counterintuitive. Consider the following case: the tower looks round (to some perceiver, 
when seen from afar) and square (to some perceiver, when seen from close up). The tower, we 
assume, cannot have at the same time opposite properties such as ‘round’ and ‘square’. Given 
Epicurus’ epistemological position, it seems that the only options available to him are (a) to embrace 
the apparent contradiction, or (b) to endorse perceptual relativism. But surely, Epicurus does not 
hold that the tower is actually round and square (simpliciter), nor he does away with objective reality. 
What does he mean, then, when he affirms that all phantasiai are true? In this paper I will address 
the question of  how this epistemological claim should be understood within the framework of  
Epicurus’ theory of  visual perception. After motivating the problem, I will present an interpretation 
of  the claim that all phantasiai are true which allows Epicurus to (dis)solve the problem of  
conflicting appearances without committing himself  to (a) or (b). On this reading, all phantasiai are 
true in the sense that they infallibly report the nature of  their respective immediate causes, that is, of  
the films or images (eidōla) emanating from the solid bodies and resembling their shape. However, 
the Epicureans also claim that we perceive the solid bodies via the eidōla they cast off. In the 
remainder of  this paper I will show that this is an unstable position: on the one hand, if  we are only 
directly perceiving some intermediary eidōla, we have no way to confirm whether those eidōla do 
indeed correspond in a robust way with how the source-object (i.e. the solid body) is. On the other 
hand, as I will explain, if  we are actually perceiving not merely the eidōla but the solid body via the 
eidōla, then positing the eidōla as intermediate entities does not suffice to (dis)solve the problem of  
conflicting appearances. Finally, I will introduce some proposals to dissipate this tension. 
 
 
Michael Fournier, Dalhousie University, michael.fournier@dal.ca 
4D (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 508: “Epicurus and Aristotle on Contemplation” 
 
In this paper I consider Epicurus’ continuous contemplation of  the principles of  nature for the 
purpose of  achieving tranquility as an attempt to replicate the Aristotelian idea that happiness must 
be some form of  contemplation. In the relation between being and thinking that is at the center of  
his philosophy Epicurus reproduces a version of  the Aristotelian idea that the intellect becomes 
each thing that it understands, that actual knowledge is the same as its object. 
 
 
Abdulbasit Abdulhameed, Defense Language Institute-DOD-CA-USA, Socialleader@gmail.com 
4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: “AlGhazali's Dual Approach to the Dilemma of  Causality 
Between Metaphysics and Science” 
 
The purpose of  this paper is to analyze the historical development of  causality as understood by the 
falāsifa and Al-Ghazālī and to demonstrate it using linear-regression analysis, aided by an application 
and graphs. The primary source for this research is a section on causality in The Incoherence of  the 
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Philosophers, in which Al-Ghazālī debates the falāsifa by presenting two opposing views of  causation 
(illustrated in Figure 1.3) that are important to study for their implications today. 
 
 
Janne Mattila, University of  Helsinki, janne.mattila@helsinki.fi 
4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: “Ethical Progression of  the Philosopher in Avicenna” 
 
While Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) is undoubtedly the most influential figure in the history of  Arabic 
philosophy, he is not known as an important moral philosopher. In fact, his writings seem to convey 
a relative lack of  interest in practical philosophy in general. Against this background, it is perhaps 
not very surprising that Avicenna’s ethical thought has received very little attention from scholars. 
Still, while Avicenna offers little explicit discussions of  ethics, his philosophy as a whole is ethically 
oriented. Given Avicenna’s unrivalled position in the history of  Islamic philosophy, his ethical 
thought should therefore be studied.  While refusing to accord ethics an independent place within 
his philosophical summas, Avicenna discusses ethical themes, such as virtue and happiness, in the 
psychological and metaphysical parts of  Al-Shifāʼ  and Al-Ishārāt wa-l- tanbīhāt in particular. In 
addition, Avicenna wrote various smaller treatises on ethical themes, although their authenticity is 
not certain. The different treatments of  ethics, however, appear to convey a certain tension as to 
man’s ethical goal.  Whereas in the Shifāʼ  Avicenna draws from Plato and Galen in defining virtue 
as a psychical disposition in which reason controls the lower faculties, in the last sections of  the 
Ishārāt 
Avicenna dispenses of  the notion of  moral virtue to present the philosopher’s ethical goal as purely 
contemplative. 
 
I will argue that the tension is resolved when Avicenna’s ethical thought is interpreted as a gradual 
progression towards the philosopher’s ultimately contemplative goal. Whereas the Shifāʼ  account 
represents the general ideal of  virtue relative to all human kind, the last part of  Ishārāt addresses the 
ethical and intellectual progression of  the philosopher. For the latter, the ultimate ethical goal is not 
only rational control of  affections, but a disposition of  apathetic ambivalence regarding them. 
 
 
Shalahudin Kafrawi, Hobart College and Smith College, skafrawi@gmail.com 
4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: “New Perspectives on Ethics of  Self-Realization and the Practice 
of  Islamic Hermeneutics” 
 
It has been observed that a main vehicle of  Qu'anic agenda concerns text refers to hermetic ways 
(logoi) such as witnessing in one's heart, reading -reflecting the intentional significance of  Qur'anic 
rich symbolism.  This study proffers a basic set of  principles for an hermetic path-Dao-logos to 
experience the potentials of  Qur`nic reading for the believers. 
 
 
Jeffrey Gower, Wabash College, gowerj@wabash.edu 
4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “On Poets and Pigs: Exile and Normalization in Plato's Republic” 
 
Since its inception in Plato’s thought, Western metaphysics has defined itself  and demarcated the 
field of  investigation proper to it vis-à- vis a series of  other discourses or vocations. Philosophy is 
not rhetoric, sophistry, politics or poetry. Plato’s strategy of  defining philosophical thinking, a 
thinking rooted in reason or logos, vis-à- vis other discourses seems to culminate in the exile of  
poetry from the ideal city in Book X of  the Republic (606e-607c). Plato exiles the poets from the city 
because poetry liberates dangerous affects that threaten to usurp the sovereignty of  reason. In Book 
IV of  the Republic, Socrates and his interlocutors establish that in a well-ordered city just as in a well-
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ordered soul, reason allied with spirit should govern appetite or desire, which are closely associated 
with our embodied condition. If  Homer and the other tragedians are allowed to retain their pride of  
place as the educators of  Greece, then the affects will depose the sovereignty of  law (nomos) and 
reason (logos) and “pleasure and pain will jointly be kings” in the city. The tragic poets must therefore 
be exiled, and may only return when and if  they learn how to behave by organizing their lives 
according to the dictates of  nomos and logos. 
 
The poets must be exiled to assure that the ideal city (kallipolis) will be governed according the rule 
of  reason. While Plato excludes other discourses like rhetoric and sophistry from the proper field of 
philosophical investigation, this essay contends that the exclusion of  the poets from the ideal city 
has a certain priority among these other exclusions. This priority comes to light when we consider 
how Plato’s exclusion of  the poets parallels another exclusion that seems equally foundational for 
the Platonic inception of  Western metaphysics, namely, the exclusion of  animality from the 
kallipolis. In the midst of  the first attempt to discover justice by constructing a city in thought, in 
Book II of  the Republic, Glaucon accuses Socrates of  proposing a city fit only for pigs. Glaucon’s 
rebuke occasions a transition from the city of  pigs (or the healthy city) to the city of  luxury (or the 
city with a fever), the latter of  which is made possible by unleashing excessive desire. While excessive 
desire allows for a specifically human city to emerge, according to Glaucon, it also introduces new 
problems like war over neighboring territory. On the terms established by Glaucon, the properly 
human city must both transcend animal life – thus risking martial violence – and somehow capture 
and normalize the excessive desire that makes such transcendence possible. Capturing and 
normalizing excessive desire occasions the first systematic treatment of  poetry in the Republic. 
Through an exploration of  the structural parallel of  the exile of  the poets and the exile of  the 
animal from the city, this essay argues that the initial disciplining of  poetry and the eventual exile of  
the poets is rooted in Glaucon’s skepticism about non-human animal life. 
 
 
Coleen Zoller, Susquehanna University, zoller@susqu..edu 
4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “Rejecting the Logic of  Domination: Plato on Justice, Leadership, 
and Peace” 
 
Feminist Wendy Brown (1994, 177-8) criticizes Plato, claiming that he “could not imagine power that 
was not domination but only the dominance of  the powerful or collective powerlessness.” Often 
Plato is accused of  beginning the philosophical tradition advocating a logic of  domination. Here I 
will argue against this interpretation of  Plato’s view of  justice. In particular, I will examine both 
Plato’s and Eco-Feminists’ attitude toward the logic of  domination, which always involves the 
acceptance of  and expectation of  dominance and subjugation. It comes in various forms, such as 
the expectation that men should dominate women, that white people should dominate people of  
color, that people with more resources should dominate those with less, that human civilization 
should dominate over the natural environment and the other animals, and so on. Eco-Feminists 
reject the logic of  domination writ large, arguing that peace is impossible while any logic of  
domination is allowed to remain in operation. Plato does not consistently reject the logic of  
domination; in some moments he uncritically accepts it as we see with his repeated casual mention 
of  slavery. Nevertheless his theory of  justice and peace rejects the logic of  domination and is 
offered on more than one occasion in order to stand in opposition to interlocutors who endorse the 
logic of  domination, such as Thrasymachus and Callicles, as conducive to their goal of  satisfying 
immoderate desires. Plato’s point of  view is rather paradoxical. On one hand, he has Socrates reject 
the logic of  domination when interlocutors like Thrasymachus or Callicles assert that might makes 
right, trying to convince them instead that just people do not want to “outdo” other just people (R. 
349b-c) because they realize that we achieve more together by being just with each other rather than 
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by being agonistic (R. 351b-d). On the other hand, he simultaneously has a theory of  justice that 
consists of  a hierarchical account of  the power dynamics both within an individual soul and within a 
political community (R. 441d-444a). This follows from his view that parts of  souls and kinds of  
souls have different natures, some fit to rule. However, in spite of  his hierarchical attitude toward 
the nature of  the soul and of  the polis, I disagree with the presumption of  Plato’s use of  the logic 
of  domination. I will demonstrate that Plato’s hierarchy among unequals ultimately is not predicated 
upon the logic of  domination. Rather, Plato’s model for peace is one of  cooperative harmony 
instead of  domination. We see this especially in the Republic, Gorgias, and Phaedrus. In order to 
understand Plato’s philosophy of  peace we must understand the nuances of  the power dynamic he 
recommends in key passages in these dialogues. This project will demonstrate that Plato offers a 
conception of  peace—both personal and political—that entails an approach to leadership focused 
on harmonious cooperation rather than domination. On my interpretation, Ecofeminists have a little 
less about which to disagree with Plato. 
 
 
Catherine McKeen, Southern Vermont College, cmckeen@svc.edu 
4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “What is a City? And Why is the Kallipolis a Happy One?” 
 
Socrates stresses that a main goal of  the Republic’s enterprise is to theoretically construct a “happy 
city” (420b6-8 and 420c1-4). The prime example of  a happy city in the Republic is, of  course, the 
kallipolis.  Commentators have differed strongly on what the happiness of  the kallipolis, or any city, 
involves in the Republic. So-called “individualists” or “reductionists” such as Gregory Vlastos, Julia 
Annas and Jerome Neu have held that the happiness of  a city simply consists in all or most of  the 
city’s inhabitants being happy. The ontology underlying this view is one on which the city is identical 
to the aggregate of  all or most of  its citizens. In contrast, so-called “organicists” or “holists” such as 
Benjamin Grote, R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, and Karl Popper have held that the city is an entity 
that is non-identical to the aggregate of  citizens. On this view, the city is a distinct entity and thus 
may have properties and states that are independent of  those possessed by the aggregate of  citizens. 
A city, on the organicist interpretation, may be happy independently of  whether all or most of  its 
inhabitants are happy. 
 
Curiously, both the individualists and the organicists rely on the same Republic texts in the attempt to 
support their radically divergent views. In my paper, I demonstrate that the oft-cited texts fail to 
support either the strong individualist or the strong organicist interpretations. I argue that there are 
also good philosophical reasons for rejecting both the strong individualist and the strong organicist 
positions. 
 
I argue for a modified organicist interpretation. I argue that, in the Republic, a city is a distinct entity 
from the aggregate of  its citizens. A city, then, may have properties and states that are different from 
those possessed by the aggregate of  its inhabitants. However, I also show that, in the Republic, the 
states and properties of  cities strongly depend on states and properties possessed by that city’s 
inhabitants. Contrary to the strong organicist view, the city’s happiness strongly depends on the 
happiness of  the city’s inhabitants. Contrary to the strong individualist view, the city’s happiness is 
not identical to the happiness of  the city’s inhabitants. 
 
Finally, I suggest an answer to the question of  what makes a city happy, according to the Republic’s 
account. For any entity to be happy, that entity must realize its proper function in an excellent and 
consistent way. The proper function of  a city is to enable its citizens to achieve lives of  virtue, to the 
extent to which they are capable of  living such lives. The kallipolis enables its inhabitants to achieve 
lives of  virtue, and does so in the most excellent way possible. It is appropriate, then, to call the 
kallipolis a “happy” city. Furthermore, the kallipolis’ happiness and the happiness of  its inhabitants, 
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while distinct, are strongly linked in the Republic. Among other things, this link helps to justify 
Socrates use of  the city- soul analogy in the Republic. 
 
 
Etienne Helmer, University of  Puerto Rico, etiennehelmer@hotmail.fr 
4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “To Be a Stranger in Plato’s Laws” 
 
It is probably in Plato’s works that we find the most extensive ancient philosophical meditation on 
what it means to be a stranger in a city. But this topic has not been studied so far with the close 
attention it deserves. What are the main reasons for that? 
 
First, most of  the scholars who have dealt with the topic of  “being a stranger in Plato’s works” have 
focused on the main speakers. Their concern was to understand why Plato made a stranger lead the 
conversation in those dialogues, instead of  the more familiar Socrates. The main reason they give for 
this change has to do with a shift in the way of  asking and answering, that is in how Plato considers 
a dialogue and dialectics should be. This aspect of  the topic of  the strangers in Plato’s works 
nonetheless leaves aside the political aspect of  the issue, which remains to be studied. 
 
Second, the topic of  being a stranger has been overlooked probably because the Kallipolis of  the 
Republic and the city of  Magnesia in the Laws have often been considered paradigms of  close 
societies, as Sir K. Popper called them in the first volume of  The Open Society and Its Enemies. Such a 
reading amounts to saying that the topic is in itself  irrelevant and, above all, inexistent, as there 
cannot be strangers in Plato’s best cities. 
 
This interpretation, however, does not resist the teaching of  Henri Joly in his short book Platon et la 
question des étrangers (Paris: Vrin, 1992). According to him, Plato’s political statements on the strangers 
fall into three categories: descriptive statements, based on the prejudice that most Athenians had 
against specific foreigners, and that Plato and Socrates do not necessarily share; critical or reflexive 
statements on the alleged differences between the Athenians and the rest of  the Greeks and the 
Barbarians, as it is the case in the Statesman and the Menexenus; and prescriptive statements, mostly to 
be found in the Laws. 
 
It is on this last category and last dialogue I want to focus on. Relying on a close study of  the four 
groups of  strangers Plato presents in Laws XII, 952d-953e, and specifically on the economic role he 
gives to one of  these groups in Laws VIII, 848a-850c, my claim is the following: the strangers are 
kept at the border of  the political body of  the best city, being accepted only for very limited and 
specific missions; but at the same time the lawgiver of  Magnesia needs the inhabitants of  foreign 
cities to serve as a mirror of  the perfect virtue of  the inhabitants of  Magnesia, a mirror without 
which Magnesia itself  seems unable to have a reflexive idea of  itself. 
 
 
Joyce Mullan, Stevens Institute of  Technology, jmullan@stevens.edu 
4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “The Women Speak Up: Speaking Truth to Power Through 
Aristophanes” 
 
As is well known, Aristophanes wrote three antiwar plays during the Peloponnesian War and three 
plays where women figure prominently challenging the existing male status quo. At the intersection 
of  the two is Lysistrata, where women take over the treasury on the Acropolis and go on a sex strike 
so as to ‘starve’ men of  their desire to continue the Peloponnesian War and cut off  their supply of  
new recruits. Much has been fruitfully written about Women as female intruders in the Public 
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Sphere (see Shaw and Foley’s rebuttal), on Women as defenders of  more traditional forms of  justice 
and virtue (see, for example, Justina Gregory on Hecuba). In this paper, I am more interested in 
women’s defense of  their right to participate in collective decision-making based on their equal 
contributions to the Polis. They contribute the sons and husbands that go to war, but often never 
get a good return on their ‘investment’. They have been silent up to now, obeying their husbands 
and steering clear. But, matters have gone way too far, it is time for peace. 
 
 
Anthony Preus, Binghamton University, apreus@binghamton.edu 
4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “Philosophy and Rhetoric in Western Greece: Focus on 
Empedocles and Gorgias” 
 
Ancient sources tell us that Empedocles of  Acragas was the first to promote the study of  rhetoric, 
though the first textbooks on rhetoric were supposedly written by Corax and Tisias of  Syracuse, but 
they were followed by Gorgias of  Leontini, who is reputed to have been a student of  Empedocles. 
We don’t have significant text by Corax or Tisias, but we do have many fragments of  Empedocles’ 
poetry, and we have significant rhetorical pieces by Gorgias, as well as an extended report of  his 
spoof  on Eleatic philosophy. Aristotle takes Empedocles very seriously as a philosopher, but has 
little to say about his contributions to rhetoric; Plato represents Gorgias as so completely dedicated 
to the art of  rhetoric that he has no inclination (any more?) to engage in philosophical discussion. 
We read Empedocles as a gifted in natural speculation and passionate for a Pythagorean religious 
vision; the Gorgias that we see has little to say about natural science and appears to be at most 
skeptical about religion. How can we bracket these two so-disparate individuals together? What are 
the philosophical and rhetorical ties between Empedocles and Gorgias? My objective here is to look 
for some connections in the literary remains of  these two giants of  Sicilian philosophy. 
 
 
Zoli Filotas, University of  South Dakota, zoli.filotas@usd.edu 
4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “Xenophon on Subordination, Trust, and the Art of  Rule” 
 
Xenophon’s Oeconomicus suggests that the head of  a household ought not to rely just on command 
and punishment to direct the behavior of  his subordinates but instead to use honours and 
persuasion (timai and logoi) to win loyalty and to persuade them of  the value of  doing good work. It 
argues, moreover, that the craft of  the ruler—an art of  rule that Socrates says pointedly is the same 
as the art of  kings and generals—sometimes involves training subordinates in that very technê, so 
that, for example, a slave foreman will learn the royal art allowing him to rule over other slaves. Thus 
the Oeconomicus departs from the common sense of  fifth- and fourth-century Athens in depicting the 
cooperation and interaction of  householders with their wives and slaves in terms of  education, trust, 
delegation, and cooperation. Many scholars have thought this makes it clear that Xenophon is taking 
steps, however faltering, toward the view that all rational beings have a fundamental moral equality 
that ought to structure their interactions. 
 
I argue for a different interpretation, reading the Oeconomicus in light of  the repeated discussions of  
the art of  rule in the Memorabilia. I argue that one important resource in his discussion of  education 
in both works is the science of  animal training. Xenophon’s argument is that the usual levers of  
animal behaviour—pleasure and pain—ought to be supplemented with honors and persuasive 
arguments when they are adapted for use on human beings. And this innovation contributes to a 
larger Athenian rethinking of  the role of  logos in cooperation, in a way that leaves room for a 
gentleman (kalos kagathos) to give his subordinates lots of  room for deliberation, thereby increasing 
their usefulness to him without undermining his special station. Xenophon’s position, I argue, yields 
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a troubling account of  human interaction of  considerable historical significance: it is a tradition that 
would reach one high water mark in Aristotle’s doctrine of  the master-architect—architektonikos—
who imposes a telos on the deliberative capacities of  his inferiors without thereby restricting them. 
 
 
Sviatoslav Dmitriev, Ball State University, dmitriev@bsu.edu 
4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “A Ruler as 'Animated Law' in Antiquity and Early Byzantium” 
 
While both the ancient Greeks and the Romans developed the idea of  the ruler as “animated law,” 
they presented it in the form of  two vastly different theories. The first was a philosophical view, 
developed by Plato and followed by Anaximenes, Diotogenes, Dio, Plutarch, and Aristides, among 
others, in which the ruler was the source of  law because his virtues enriched him with philosophical 
knowledge about how to rule himself  and others, and how to organize his state in the likeness of  
the divine model. This ruler was a philosopher, whose knowledge and virtue molded his conduct 
and turned him into “animated law” for his subjects, who followed his way of  life. Cicero, the 
younger Seneca, Musonius Rufus and other Romans who were versed in Greek philosophy also 
shared this perspective. 
 
The other theory, which we only see in Roman works, held the ruler as a living law because he was 
the sole source of  all laws. My presentation explores the idea that the Roman theory of  the ruler as 
“animated law” existed in two forms. One was the senatorial stance that, although the source of  all 
laws, the emperor should also be bound by them like any other citizen (Tacitus, the younger Pliny, 
 
Cassius Dio). The other, which was promoted in Roman legislation, including the Digesta and 
imperial constitutions, held the emperor to be exempt from the force of  laws. According to the 
latter view, the emperor was both the source of  laws, and separate and independent from laws. 
Although offering directly opposite views, both sides argued for them along the same lines: they 
rationalized the ruler’s legal status in purely legal terms, ignoring his philosophical and moral 
qualities. 
 
Both theories survived into the Byzantine Empire. Byzantine legal texts, like the Novellae, Institutes, 
and Codex of  Justinian I in the sixth century, as well as subsequent Byzantine legislation, proclaimed 
the emperor as the only source of  law and exempted him from the force of  law. However, evidence 
from the early Byzantine period shows that the intellectual and imperial elite of  the Byzantine 
Empire departed from the Roman senatorial stance that held the emperor as the only author of  all 
laws and expected him to be bound by them. The works by Themistius, Synesius, Lydus, Damascius 
Diadochus, and Paul Silentiarius displayed neoplatonic views when they supported the theory that 
rationalized the legal status of  the emperor in philosophical terms. In their opinion, the ruler was 
the ultimate source of  law by virtue of  his knowledge of  philosophy and exemplary morality. His 
wisdom and moral qualities aligned his behavior with divine providence, thus turning the ruler into 
“animated law” for his subjects.  This philosophical rationalization of  the ruler’s legal status by the 
Byzantine cultural and imperial elite marked both a departure from the traditional Roman senatorial 
view and the emergence of  a separate identity for the Byzantine Empire. 
 
 
Ignacio De Ribera-Martin, The Catholic University of  America, deriberamartin@cua.edu 
4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “Incomplete Being and Degrees of  Dunamis in Aristotle's 
Generation of  Animals” 
 
When it comes to identifying the different kinds of  potentiality and actuality, readers of  Aristotle 
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usually have in mind the standard modes of  being distinguished in the De anima and in the 
Metaphysics. In De anima II.1 and II.5 Aristotle distinguishes two different kinds of  actuality and two 
different kinds of  potentiality. Two Aristotelian terms correspond to the two kinds of  actuality: 
entelecheia (having, but not exercising; “actuality”) and energeia (having and exercising; “activity”), but 
we only have one Aristotelian term for the two corresponding modes of  potentiality (dunamis), 
namely, potentiality to become (“potentiality”) and potentiality to exercise (“capacity”). In the De 
anima, the category of  “having” is the key notion articulating those distinctions, and as a result 
entelecheia becomes the main term unifying actualities and activities. On the other hand, in the 
Metaphysics Aristotle focuses on “being,” rather than on “having,” distinguishing between “being in 
dunamis” and “being in energeia” and giving the primacy to energeia as the notion unifying all modes of  
being. These two approaches to potentiality and actuality (i.e. the perspective of  “having” and the 
perspective of  “being”) are consistent with one another and can be correlated into one unified 
picture that disclose three different modes of  being: (1) Mode of  potentiality (not having, but being 
capable of  having) and incapacity (not yet being in dunamis), (2) Mode of  actuality (having, but not 
exercising, i.e. entelecheia) and capacity (being in dunamis), and (3) Mode of  activity (having and 
exercising; being in energeia). In this paper I will show that this picture is not complete: there are 
more ways in which Aristotle approaches potentiality and actuality that disclose other modes of  
being that are not apparent in this picture. In order to do so, I will consider some passages from the 
Generation of  animals where Aristotle uses the expressions “having in dunamis” and “being nearer or 
farther away in dunamis,” expressions that refer to incomplete modes of  being and to degrees of  
dunamis. In a similar way, Aristotle’s qualification in defining change in the Physics (cf. “in so far as it is 
in dunamis”) also points to incomplete and gradual modes of  being. While in the De anima and in the 
Metaphysics Aristotle uses the expressions “(not) having X” and “being X in dunamis,” nowhere in 
these treatises does he use the phrase “having X in dunamis” or consider a mode of  being in between 
“having” and “not having;” nor does he suggest that there are different degrees of  “being X in 
dunamis:” either something “has X” or it “does not have X;” either something “is X in dunamis” or it 
“is not X in dunamis.” In contrast, the expressions used by Aristotle in the Generation of  animals 
suggest otherwise: there seems to be a mode of  being between “having X” and “not having X,” as 
well as degrees of  “being X in dunamis.” The paper explores what those modes of  being are. 
 
 
Alireza Saati, Saati.philosophy@gmail.com 
4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “Aristotle's Mathematical Ontology and Merging the Two 
Discussions of  Matter” 
 
Aristotle’s intriguing discussion of  “matter” in the Physics on the one hand, and his completely 
different discussion of  the same subject, namely “matter”, in the Metaphysics on the other hand 
always play an elusive role in Aristotelicus Corpus. In this paper, I should like to discuss these two 
concepts of  “matter” and by presenting my supposition in follow; after giving some comments over 
Aristotle’s commitment on dimensions matter have, I wish to argue how the root idea of  these two 
discussions might be surveyed in Aristotle’s Mathematical Ontology. 
 
The texts would be discussed: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z (3) – Physics Book 1 (7) The very first account 
of  matter in Aristotle could be followed up in the argument Aristotle establishes in his theory of  
substantial change. A series of  paragraphs in Physics presents this: in190 a31 – b9, for example, 
Aristotle talks about becoming and example of  “things which turn in respect of  their matter’. As an 
upshot coming after number of  premises Aristotle concludes that “It is plain that these are all cases 
of  coming to be from some underlying thing”, in addition, “from what has been said, whatever 
comes to be is always complex”. Here there is quite apparent evidence that supports the idea that 
through any complexity and change something should always persists. The levels of  Aristotle’s 
argument through these certain passages involve the fact which has always been the core 
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of  Aristotle’s metaphysics. A scrutiny look into the complex form of  change mentioned above 
shows that the relation between substance and what underlies change is still unanswered! 
 
The most related discussion that substantial change sets forth here is the relation which exists 
between mater and substance. Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1049 b9 – 11 tells us what underlies a change is 
the matter of  that change. This is the very dark obscure account of  matter we can have 
metaphysically! But some fix specific passages of  Metaphysics Z can lead us towards concluding 
considerations. In the book three of  Metaphysics Z when Aristotle speaks about substance and its 
applications, four main subjects are recognized as if  not senses but schemes through which at least 
we can survey what substance is. Some implications of  this question outline the nature of  substance 
as the compounding of  the matter and form, and in continue in describing what matter is – after 
giving some examples – Aristotle states that “By matter I mean that which in itself  is neither a 
particular thing nor of  a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of  the categories by which being 
is determined. Such a determination makes us to conclude that Aristotelian concept of  matter 
basically concerns a notion which is entirely non – corporeal. Hereafter we should looking for a 
realm in which matter could be surveyed. The realm of  geometry, I believe, could be the first 
supposition that supports the only direction through which we can trace to find what Aristotle 
thinks about matter. The rest of  my paper concerns some critics Aristotle envisages and then I will 
expand my idea on Aristotle’s mathematical ontology. In my opinion, Aristotle’s justifications on 
matter in Physics are chiefly rest on mathematical concepts enrooted in ontological contexts in 
Metaphysics. 
 
 
Andrea Tschemplik, American University, atschem@american.edu 
4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “In Defense of  Teleology” 
 
Aristotle famously opens his Metaphysics with the claim that “all human beings by nature desire to be 
in the know (πάντες ἄ νθρωποι τοῦ  εἰ δέναι ὀ ρέγονται φύσει 980a).” It is entirely appropriate that 
this announcement should occur in the Metaphysics, because the ensuing pages provide ample 
proof  of  the claim. What better proof  than the pursuit of  the science of  being, which can in no way 
ease the burden of  everyday life, but is sought merely for the sake of  knowledge. The fact that we 
delight (ἀ γάπησις) in having “disinterested” perceptions and knowledge is indicative of  a certain 
kind of  freedom. 
 
In this paper I will examine the desire to know and explain how it fuels both our attempt to gain a 
theoretical understanding of  the cosmos as a whole, to think architectonically, as Aristotle puts it, 
and make possible our pursuit of  eudaimonia, a way of  living that is the result of  choices we make. 
The desire to know is the source of  intelligibility and freedom, allowing us to construct a meaningful 
world and life. Aristotle indicates as much when he writes that the goal of  the desire to know is to 
be able to articulate the purpose of  each thing/event/practice, to arrive at an understanding of  the 
highest good (ὅ λως δὲ  τὸ  ἄ ριστον ἐ ν τῇ  φύσει πάσῃ ) (982b5). The desire to know demands 
teleological explanations and cannot be satisfied by mere mechanical elaborations. 
 
 
Syeda Komal Gilani, University of  Texas at Austin, komal.gilani@utexas.edu 
4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “Ethical Realism in the Philosophy of  Sri Aurobindo” 
 
In several of  his writings, Sri Aurobindo expresses skepticism toward ethical principles and theories. 
For example, in The Synthesis of  Yoga (1955/1999) he states that they are always formulated by the 
'inferior powers' of  the lower nature, that is, the parts of  the nature that are in the Ignorance or 
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Avidyā. He characterizes ethical theories and principles as 'blind and gross formulations' and efforts 
to formulate them as 'faltering steps' (p. 202), and makes it clear that an advanced Yogi does not aim 
to live an ethical life. Additionally, he offers a teleological evolutionary account of  the origin of  
moral intuitions, claiming that they emerged to fulfill a certain function, but will lose their utility as 
the evolutionary process advances. For example in The Life Divine (1949/2005) he describes ethical 
practice as a means of  rising above the animal nature, but one that is temporary and destined to end 
when its goals have been attained (e.g. p. 105). 
 
In this paper I make some progress toward addressing the question of  whether Sri Aurobindo's 
remarks support ethical irrealism. In the first part of  the paper I offer an explication of  some of  Sri 
Aurobindo's relevant metaphysical and meta-ethical views, with a focus on his evolutionary 
explanation for the origin of  ethical practice and his claim that spiritual advancement involves a loss 
of  the will to be ethical. Then I consider two ways in which such views may be taken to support 
irrealism: first, by an interpretation of  his evolutionary explanation as challenging the reliability of  
ethical intuitions, that is, by an interpretation of  his position as a type of  evolutionary debunking 
argument. Second, by an inference from the negative correlation between evolutionary and 
individual advancement and deliberate engagement in ethical practice to the conclusion that ethical 
practice is misguided. On this interpretation, the fact that the advanced Yogi – a being with greater 
knowledge and who is evaluated by Sri Aurobindo as superior in some respects – is supra-ethical 
implies that ethical principles lack objectivity. Finally, I give reasons for rejecting both challenges: for 
the first, that Sri Aurobindo's theistic teleological conception of  evolution does not justify the 
debunking interpretation of  his evolutionary explanation. As evolution is a purposive and guided 
process for Sri Aurobindo, that something evolved to further that process is not evidence against its 
objectivity. For the second, that the advanced Yogi's being supra-ethical can be explained better by 
their lack of  need for ethical deliberation to engage in right action, and by the possibility of  ethical 
normativity being superceded by a higher form of  normativity, than by the wrongness of  ethical 
principles. I suggest an interpretation of  Sri Aurobindo's meta-ethical views on which his challenge 
is not to the truth of  ethical principles, but to their ultimateness. On this interpretation his 
conclusion is that ethical principles and judgements partially express higher and more total truths – 
from which they derive their authority and by which they can sometimes be superceded – than that 
they lack objectivity altogether. 
 
 
Elyor Makhmudov, Institute of  Oriental Studies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, emakhmudov@gmail.com 
4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “The East Asian Heritage of  Ancient and Medieval Central Asia” 
 
The interactions between Central Asians and the Chinese has has a long history as well as the rich 
potentials in the present. This research depicts a few of  the key elements of  this link in light of  
thehistoricalstudy of  the silk road. In addition, we proffer new approach of  linguistic studies of  the 
syntax of  Chinese, Uzbek and a few Turkic languages. 
 
 
Abrigul Abrigul Lutfalieva, Global Scholarly Publications, Independent Scholar, 
alutfalieva@gmail.com 
4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “Some Ancient Sources of  Present Central Asian Philosophies of  
Ecology” 
 
The present inquiry depicts the differences between the Medieval Islamic view of  nature than 
embedded ecology and the 21st Century environmental studies. For the Islamic perspective- norms 
were necessary dimension of  experience -analogous to the views of  Plato, Spinoza, Whitehead and 
Heidegger. In contrast, contemporary perspectives presuppose  a fact-value dualism that prevent a 
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cognitive account of  ecology. Finally, our paper applies the theoretical issue to the present case of  
"water for life" problem at the UN and Central Asian nations. 
 
 
Annie Corbitt, Northwestern University, anncorbitt2020@northwestern.edu 
5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “The Absurdity of  the Body-Lover’s Virtue in the Phaedo” 
 
In his defense speech in the Phaedo, Socrates distinguishes between the genuine virtue of  the lovers 
of  wisdom and the apparent virtue of  the body-lovers. He says that temperance and courage are 
appropriately attributed to philosophers, who in their love and pursuit of  wisdom, disregard bodily 
delights in favor of  those of  the soul, and have no fear of  death. But the story is different for 
ordinary people, the non-philosophers, who pursue not wisdom, but the delights of  the body, and 
who resent harm that should come to the body. When we consider their temperance and courage, 
we should find these to be ἄ τοπος - strange, or absurd - and even illusory, containing “nothing 
sound or true.” Socrates explains this strangeness as the fact that it is by fear that a body-lover is 
courageous, and it is by intemperance that a body-lover is temperate. The argument appears to be 
that the body-lover may bravely face death, but she does so for fear of  losing something else that 
she holds dear to her bodily existence. And a body-lover may abstain from one set of  bodily 
pleasures, but he does so only because he places greater value on some other set of  claims his body 
makes on him. 
 
But what exactly is so absurd or objectionable about being made courageous by fear, or temperate 
by intemperance? How does a body-lover’s being courageous through fear or temperate through 
intemperance make that courage or temperance any less real than the courage and temperance of  
the philosopher? In this paper, I argue that, while the absurdity of  the body-lover’s virtue has been 
traditionally understood in light of  Plato’s thesis that opposites cannot cause opposites, I think the 
absurdity is simpler and more clear than that. It is that the body-lover’s virtue is simultaneously vice. 
I argue that this interpretation is supported by the reasoning provided later in the dialogue that 
opposite properties cannot be characterized by opposite properties, and I connect this feature of  the 
body-lover’s illusory virtue to the notion in the Phaedo that one’s virtue is true only if  the act is done 
in the pursuit of  wisdom, as opposed to bodily concerns. 
 
 
Sean Driscoll, Boston College, driscose@bc.edu 
5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “The Methodological Function of  Memory in Plato’s Phaedo” 
 
In the Phaedo, Plato’s Socrates guides his interlocutors through an assortment of  approaches to the 
question of  the immortality of  the soul, and readers are left to understand this shifting of  
methodological ground. Do the various methods that Socrates discusses conflict with each other or 
are they united? Which methods, if  any, are to be taken seriously? Does the dialogue as a whole 
follow any of  them? Does it follow all of  them? Despite the resulting sophisticated discussions of  
dialectic, hypothesis, logoi, and second sailing in the Phaedo, there is widespread disagreement 
concerning these questions. 
 
The search for a unifying methodology, especially in this dialogue, has so far failed to simultaneously 
accomplish two things: (1) to explain how the various “methods” discussed by Socrates are or are 
not played out in the dialogue in a way that makes sense of  the dialogue’s narrative and mythological 
dimensions, and (2) to explain the function (and conclusions!) of  the immortality arguments in light 
of  the dialogue’s method. I argue that this inability results from an underlying commitment to a 
narrow version of  dialectic as Plato’s method.  Indeed, the assumption that dialectic is simply the 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 57 
 
way Plato delivers his form of  logical argument (διαλεκτική διαλγεσθαι λέγω λoγος) contradicts what 
is actually at work in the dialogue. Whatever λό γος is in the Phaedo, it must be understood more 
broadly. 
 
This point is perhaps rather well known. But to recover what is really at work in the λό γοι of  the 
Phaedo, I will introduce a new methodological player—one that will unite the dialogue’s arguments 
with its complex use of  myth and drama: ἀ νάμνησις (memory). That is, I will show how the 
dialogue’s procedure is less suited to the presentation of  arguments, strictly speaking, and more 
suited to a movement proper to ἀ νάμνησις—looking through something to something else. 
 
In this way, I will show how what is usually considered an epistemological point in the overall 
argument is actually the methodological key to understanding how to interpret the immortality 
arguments. Hence, the method of  the Phaedo works like a metaphor, by presenting one thing as a 
means to encourage the vision of  another. By linking the λό γοι with the μῦ θοι in this way, Plato 
brings his readers to know philosophical truth, κατὰ  τοῦ τον τὸ ν τρόπον τῆ ς μεθόδου (97b). 
 
 
Michael Wiitala, Cleveland State University, mwiitala@gmail.com 
5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Forms, Causes, and Why-Questions in the Phaedo” 
 
In the Phaedo, Socrates relates how his search for why things are the way they are eventually led him 
to posit the forms as causes (aitiai). The sense in which the forms are causes, however, is not 
obvious. Building on the recent work of  David Sedley and Fiona Leigh, I will argue in this paper 
that forms are causes in the sense that they structure their participants.  In particular, I will show 
that if  forms are understood as structuring-causes, their four-fold status (1) as that at which why-
questions aim, (2) as distinct from their participants, (3) as repeatable in their participants, and (4) as 
normative for their participants becomes clear. 
 
Consider some specific way, F, that some object, x, is. “Why is x F?” is Socrates’ question concerning 
the way x is F. He claims that the “safe answer” to questions of  this sort is that x is F because it 
participates in F. Say x is something beautiful, for example. Socrates’ question is “why is x 
beautiful?” He argues that the safe answer to this question is that x is beautiful because it participates 
in the form beautiful (100c3-e3). Given Socrates’ claim that x is F because it participates in F, what 
must a form be on his account and what kind of  causality does it exercise? My proposal is that a 
form is that which structures its participants. Form F is a cause, I will argue, in the sense that it is the 
structure in terms of  which x is structured insofar as x is F. 
 
Sensible objects are structured in various ways. Each property that a sensible object possesses is an 
instance of  some particular structure. Justice, for example, is, on Plato’s view, a certain harmonious 
arrangement of  the parts of  a soul, a city, or whatever else is just. Every just thing is just insofar as it 
is an instance of  the structure that simply is justice itself—the form justice. The same applies to 
beauty and to any other property. Consider a rather simple property, like being ten-fingered. Any 
entity, insofar as it has ten-fingers, is an instance of  the structure “ten-fingered entity.” The structure 
ten-fingered entity, however, is distinct from all the various entities that have ten-fingers, and would 
be intelligible even if  none of  those entities happened to exist. This holds for any structure. 
Structure F is distinct from instances of  structure F. Likewise, structure F is repeatable, whereas any 
particular instance of  structure F is not. After all, structure F is that according to which instances of  
structure F are structured. Moreover, structure F is normative for its instances. By asking why x is F, 
Socrates was searching for the norm according to which x, insofar as it is an F thing, is structured. 
That norm simply is structure F—that is, form F. 
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Edith Nally, University of  Missouri, Kansas City, nally3@umkc.edu 
5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Socrates' Wager: The Otherworldly Rewards Premise in Plato's 
Phaedo” 
 
In the final moments of  his life, Socrates does something quite unexpected: he delivers a myth.  At 
the end of  the Phaedo, he weaves a tale, describing the route that different souls take into the afterlife 
and the rewards and punishments that await them (113d-114b). Socrates’ mode of  discourse is 
extremely puzzling: why should he, of  all people, in his last conversation on earth, tell a tale ripe 
with religious and scientific claims about the soul and its journey into the next world? We would 
expect a defender of  philosophy to prefer a different mode––we would expect him to deliver an 
argument. 
 
This puzzle is made stronger by the fact that, immediately following the myth, Socrates claims that a 
man “possessing reason” ought not to affirm what he has just said, but that he might nevertheless 
coax himself  into believing it (114d1-6): It is not fitting for a man possessing reason to confidently 
assert these things are just so, as I have described them: but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the 
belief––for the risk is a noble one––that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their 
dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself  as if  it 
were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale. 
 
Why does Socrates think “it is not fitting for a man possessing reason to confidently assert” what  
he has said? (114d1-2) What exactly causes his hesitation, and what ought we to take away from his 
tale? Moreover, why does Socrates think it is fitting to “risk” a belief  in what he has said, repeating it 
like an “incantation” or “charm” (114d6)? 
 
This paper examines the function of  the Phaedo myth and the disclaimer that follows it.  Socrates 
introduces the myth, I argue, because he is aware of  having overlooked a key premise in his 
argument against fearing death. Having dwelt on the immortality of  the soul, the myth is the first 
discussion of  what I call the “otherworldly rewards premise” (ORP). The ORP establishes that, in 
the afterlife, souls are rewarded according to their earthly character; good souls fare well, whereas 
bad souls fare poorly. The argument against fearing death, it turns out, relies just as much on the 
ORP as on the immortality of  the soul. If  good souls were not treated in a way befitting of  their 
character––if  the afterlife were bad or unpredictable––then one would have every reason to remain 
fearful. 
 
The Phaedo myth describes what the afterlife would be like if  the Otherworldly Rewards Premise 
were true, yet it does not prove that the ORP is true. This is why, I argue, Socrates ends with a 
disclaimer: it is still an open question whether the soul of  the philosopher––whether his own soul––
goes to a fate befitting its earthly merits. For all we know, for all Socrates knows, even the best souls 
survive death only to be cast into the depths of  Tartarus. This is why it is fitting to repeat Socrates’ 
tale as if  it were an “incantation” (114d5-6). In order to achieve tranquility in the face of  death, one 
must convince oneself  that the afterlife is governed by just principles, rewarding the good and 
punishing the wicked. 
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John Fredrick Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, 
jfhumphr@ncat.edu 
5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Did Socrates Have to Die?” 
 
This paper focuses on the question: Did Socrates have to die? In Plato’s Crito, Crito arrives early in 
the day at the prison in which the philosopher has been confined to announce that the ship 
returning from Delos has been sighted at Sunium and should arrive in Athens on that day. When the 
ship returns, Socrates is to die [Cr. 43 c-d]. Crito explains that he has come to the prison to 
encourage Socrates to flee. He argues that had he and Socrates’ friends acted properly, Socrates’ case 
would not even have come to trial. However, since Socrates was tried and convicted, Crito argues, 
the philosopher should now allow him (Crito) and Socrates’ friends to bribe the guards and arrange 
for his escape from the prison to another city. Although Crito gives several reasons that Socrates 
should allow Crito and Socrates’ friends to orchestrate his escape, these reasons can be categorized 
under to broad headings: 1) Crito’s concern for Socrates and his family (at least his sons) and 2) 
Crito’s concern for his own and Socrates’ friends’ reputations because they have let their friend go to 
court, be found guilty, be sentenced to death, be imprisoned, and now be only a day before his 
execution. 
 
In the course of  the dialogue, however, Socrates appeals to what Stephen Nathanson has called 
“super patriotism” and argues that if  he were to violate the sentence determined by his jurors and 
the court by escaping he would be harming his fellow citizens, the city, and the laws.  Since, Socrates 
argues, it is always wrong to harm others even if  one received harm, he ought not to follow Crito’s 
advice to escape to another city; rather, he should stay and accept his punishment whether just or 
not. While this argument may seem cogent at first glance, indeed, it appears to be a defense of  the 
social contract, on examination the argument is weak. Does Socrates actually wish to claim that one 
should always follow orders regardless of  the consequences? Does a citizen not have the right, even 
the obligation, to challenge and disobey unethical, authoritarian regimes? 
 
In this paper, then, I will argue that while Socrates does make the argument that a number of  
readers have attributed to him, namely, that he is obligated to accept the punishment mandated by 
the court, there is another more important reason for Socrates’ choosing to suffer the penalty of  
death. I will argue that had Socrates acceded to Crito’s arguments and fled the city, his pursuit of  
philosophy, indeed, his life would be meaningless and instead of  his name being associated with the 
love of  wisdom, he would only be remembered, if  at all, as someone who had been tried in Athens 
in 399 B.C.E. and was sentenced to death; hence, I will argue, Socrates had to die for his principles 
so that his life would have meaning. It is only by choosing death that Socrates can achieve a kind of  
immortality for himself  and his way of  doing philosophy while at the same time challenging the 
citizens, the laws, the constitution, and the city. 
 
 
Toomas Lott, New York University/University of  Tartu, tl1972@nyu.edu 
5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Is Socratic Epistêmê Knowledge or Understanding?” 
 
Is epistêmê for Socrates, in Plato’s early dialogues, knowledge or understanding? I will argue that 
epistêmê has features of  both knowledge and understanding and that that explains certain features 
of  Socratic epistemology. 
 
Knowledge, understanding, and Socrates.  In contemporary epistemology it is often argued that 
knowledge and understanding are distinct mental states. This is what I will also be assuming. 
Knowledge (i) involves being justified in believing that p; (ii) is transmitted via testimony; (iii) is the 
aim of  belief/norm of  assertion/reason for action. Understanding: (i) involves grasping explanatory 
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relations as to why p is true, (ii) can’t be transmitted via testimony. 
 
I’ll argue that Socratic epistêmê has features of  both understanding and knowledge: epistêmê: (A) 
involves explanation; (B) requires justification; (C) can’t be transmitted via testimony; (D) is the aim 
of  belief/norm of  assertion/reason for action. 
 
What this means for Socratic epistemology.  Since Socrates does not distinguish between knowledge 
and understanding, he tends to treat explanation as justification. For Socrates, a true belief  that x is 
F becomes epistêmê by adding a grasp of  x’s explanatory relation F-ness (Meno 97E-98A, Euth. 6D). 
However, Socrates also treats grasping F-ness as the only acceptable justification for believing that x 
is F. (e.g. Hip. Maj. 304E). Thus, the Socratic ‘priority of  the definition’ is the result of  Socrates 
confusing explanation with justification.  Moreover, Socrates assumes that all facts of  the form ‘x is 
F’ have a single explanation (i.e. x’s relation to F-ness). Consequently, Socrates thinks that if  a person 
grasps the explanation for some x’s being F, then the person grasps the explanation of  any x’s being 
F. Since Socrates takes explanation and justification to coincide, grasping the single explanation for 
x’s being F yields justification for S’s all other beliefs about things that are F. This means that S can’t 
be justified in thinking that this x is F unless S is justified in all her other beliefs about F things. For 
example, S can’t be justified in believing that Socrates is brave, unless S is justified in believing, e.g. 
that Laches is brave and that Nicias is not brave (as long as S has holds the relevant beliefs). Since 
Socrates takes epistêmê to involve justification, this turns epistêmê into an implausibly demanding 
cognitive state. 
 
Thus, Socrates is, on the one hand, pushed towards skepticism (since it is unclear how a human 
being could reach this highly demanding cognitive state). On the other hand, since Socrates, by (D), 
takes epistêmê to be necessary for action and belief  guidance, he is forced to seek to achieve this 
cognitive state. 
 
Later developments. Plato and Aristotle react to this tension between understanding and knowledge 
in Socratic philosophy in different ways. Plato restricts epistêmê to the non-empirical domain (e.g. 
Rep. 529A-C) since, e.g. in mathematics, explanation and justification coincide. Aristotle distinguishes 
clearly between knowing that something is so and understanding why it is so (e.g. Met. 981A, An. 
Post. 89) resolving the Socratic tension in a different manner. 
 
 
Tylor Cunningham, University of  Tennessee, Knoxville, Cunningham14@gmail.com 
5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: “In Dialogue with Dialogues: Are Plato's Aporetic Dialogues 
Actually Unsuccessful?” 
 
Often, a philosophical text explicitly claims to speak some truth to the reader through its thesis and 
carefully crafted arguments. By working through this argumentation, the text reaches a concluding 
point that can be interpreted and understood. While many authors break this mold through their use 
of  aphorisms or other means, such as Heraclitus and Nietzsche, Plato’s aporetic dialogues stand 
apart by asking a question and leaving that question completely unanswered by the end. In this 
paper, I argue that the lack of  success for the conversations between interlocutors within the texts 
does not translate to a lack of  success for the dialogues as a whole. 
 
Since the dialogues are both conversations and texts, I begin by exploring why the conversations that 
happen within the dialogues are unsuccessful according to Hans-Georg Gadamer in Plato’s Dialectical 
Ethics (PDE). I then turn to the Phaedrus and analyze the complications of  a written text. Namely, a 
written text cannot be engaged with because it can only speak one way for eternity, unable to 
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respond to interpretations or questions. However, since Plato’s aporetic dialogues are both, at one 
and the same time, a conversation and a text, I argue that they are a strange medium of  
understanding that find their place somewhere between simple conversations among individuals and 
philosophical treatises to be interpreted. 
 
This leads to a complication of  differing goals within the dialogues. On the one hand, there is the 
goal of  the conversation within the dialogue: to determine the nature of  whatever virtue is being 
discussed. On the other hand, there is the goal of  the dialogue as a text, which A.K. Cotton argues 
for in Platonic Dialogue and the Education of  the Reader: to promote philosophical inquiry beyond the 
bounds of  the dialogue itself. This second goal, that of  the text, is necessitated by the aporia that 
arises when the first goal, that of  the conversation, is not achieved. 
 
In order to reach both of  the goals present within an aporetic dialogue, an elevated hermeneutic 
standpoint is needed. This standpoint requires the readers to become full participants in the dialogue 
by understanding their own historical standpoint and the ‘moods’ of  the text. Moods, in PDE, are 
non-verbal cues used in conversation that are necessary to forming appropriate interpretations. I 
argue that ‘moods’ in the dialogues include the aspects of  character, time, and place employed by 
Plato. These tools allow the reader to interpret the conversations within the dialogues in a way that 
the characters themselves cannot. The reader can ask new questions and raise new objections that 
are not present in the conversation as it is written. This paper explores how the reader is to traverse 
this new hermeneutic standpoint, exploring the dangers of  proper interpretive distancing that 
Cotton talks about and the fusion of  horizons that Gadamer advocates for in Truth and Method. The 
result is that the dialogues are successful in both of  their goals, allowing for continued conversations 
that lead to ideas of  the original topics explored. 
 
 
Jay Bregman, University of  Maine, Jay_Bregman@umit.maine.edu 
5C (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 506: “Body, Soul, Cosmos in Synesius of  Cyrene” 
 
Synesius is included in the Patristic corpus because he became a bishop. But his thought remained 
that of  a Hellenic Neoplatonist. Synesius of  Cyrene: Body, Soul, Cosmos.  Synesius is included in 
the Patristic corpus, because he was a bishop. But his thought remained that of  a Hellenic 
Neoplatonist. Few Patristic authors who make use of  Hellenic philosophy follow his line of  thought. 
His stance, like that of  Dodds’ Plotinus, is one of  maintaining a late Platonic form of  Hellenic 
rationalism, in an age of  extreme asceticism and ‘irrationalism’. This attitude is best represented in 
the Dion (4.5; 5.1). 
 
Descending from nous, souls are refreshed by letters, rather than descending further into matter. 
Synesius juxtaposes his balanced spiritual ideals and love of  literature against those who oppose his 
eloquence: He opposes both contemporary Greek as well as Christian ascetics, who...think it ﬁtting 
that the philosopher…concern himself  exclusively with divine matters’ (Ep. 154.301). 
 
Literature adorns the spiritual eye within us, and rouses it little by little until it is accustomed to its 
[proper] objects of  vision, that it may ‘...contemplate a higher object, and not blink...looking intently 
upon the sun’ (8.3). The Hellenic upward path is ordered, the barbarian way is ‘like a Bacchic frenzy 
...an irrational motion to the realm beyond reason’ (8.5). The active life concerned with paideia and 
civic virtue is to be combined with the contemplative. He contrasts philosophy and monasticism 
(8.2), rather than turning monasticism into philosophy (as does Evagrius of  Pontus.) Thus the 
philosopher-bishop’s approach was unique and reflected a late Classical sensibility in an era which 
had already witnessed the transformation of  + the old Greek and Roman outlook under a new 
dispensation. 
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Bjorn Wastvedt, University of  Arizona, wastvedt@email.arizona.edu 
5C (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 506: “The Punishment of  the Descending Soul in Plotinus' Enneads” 
 
This paper addresses the coherence of  metaphysical and ethical ideas throughout Plotinus’ works 
and their inheritance from Plato. The argument focuses on the descent of  the individual soul in 
Plotinus’ Enneads: with respect to the descent, Plotinus’ metaphysics and his theory of  justice cannot 
be reconciled in several respects. After an explanation of  the metaphysical and historical context of  
the soul’s descent, it is argued that the ontological progression of  the descent leaves much less 
responsibility to the soul than Plotinus admits. A comprehensive treatment of  Plotinus’ writing on 
the descent follows, concluding that the moral character of  the descent limits the soul’s culpability 
for its actions in the descent itself. Several standard objections and possible solutions to the 
problems raised are then explained; discussion of  these ideas covers related issues in Plotinus’ 
corpus concerning the justice of  the soul’s responsibility for its descent. A concluding section 
determines that the considerations offered show that Plotinus cannot accommodate the punishment 
of  the descending soul without either compromising fundamental metaphysical principles or 
revising his theory of  justice. Arguments are made with reference across the Enneads and to 
Plotinus’ sources in Plato. 
 
 
William Wians, Merrimack College and Boston College, wiansw@merrimack.edu 
5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “Making the Ei Esti Clear in Posterior Analytics, II.8” 
 
According to Posterior Analytics B.1-2, the ei esti is the third of  the four things we seek, with the ti esti 
as the fourth. These two are contrasted with the other two things we seek, the hoti and the dioti—the 
fact and the reason why. The hoti and dioti have to do with predications, with one thing being said of  
another. The ei esti and ti esti, by contrast, carry metaphysical or ontological implications, having to 
do with the subject of  the predication (the hupokeimenon): the moon or the earth, or the sun, a 
centaur, a god. Does such a thing exist? If  so, what is it? The issue in B8 is crucial to the possibility 
of  any scientific knowledge because, as Aristotle says often (most immediately in B7), one cannot 
have scientific knowledge of  something that does not exist.  I shall take as my entry the brief  but 
dense passage at B8, 93a3-6. This passage makes a series of  distinctions relevant to stating 
something’s aition. I shall argue that it identifies three possibilities arising from a series of  two 
mutually exhaustive dichotomous divisions: 
 
That which is the explanation (to aition) of  the fact that something is (tou ei esti), is either: 
 
A. the same thing (to auto) or      B. something else (allo). 
 
When to aition is the same thing:     When to aition is something else, then  
       either: 
 
It is immediate and a principle.     It is demonstrable or It is   
       indemonstrable 
 
     (=the conclusion of  a demo) (=an immediate definition). 
 
The chart makes clear that there are three ways in which the existence of  a scientific subject can be 
established or made clear. In doing so, it clarifies the purpose and structure of  the preceding 
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dialectical chapters. To know the ti esti presupposes knowing the ei esti. But this is precisely where 
“current methods of  definition” (92b19-20) fail: quasi-mathematical convertible axioms (B4), 
division (B5), and a method of  hypothesis (B6). None of  these—as the mock handwringing at the 
start of  B7 tells us—proves the ei estin. It is this failure that motivates Aristotle’s positive account of  
definition in B8-10. 
 
Unpacking the passage in B8 will reveal how the positive account in B.8-10 relates not just to the 
puzzles developed in B.3-7 but to the distinction between the ei esti and the ti esti announced in B.1-
2, and will allow a more complete understanding of  Aristotle’s different types of  definition and the 
nature of  the unfolding exposition by which Aristotle develops and reveals his own position. 
 
 
L. Kelson Law, University of  Pittsburgh, kelsonlaw@gmail.com 
5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “How are Causes Shown Through the Middle Term?” 
 
Aristotle thinks that we understand (epistesthai) something when we know its cause (aitia) as its cause. 
He also thinks that we understand things by possessing demonstrations (apodeixeis) at least when the 
things to be understood are demonstrable.  Presumably, then, in possessing demonstrations, 
syllogisms of  a prestigious kind, we know causes of  things. But what is special about a 
demonstration that makes possessing it amount to knowing a certain cause? Causes of  all four kinds 
‘are all shown through the middle term’, states A. in II.11 of  the Posterior Analytics. What does this 
thesis mean? For three of  the four kinds of  causes, A. presents syllogisms to illustrate the thesis. But 
it is far from transparent what substantial idea they are meant to illustrate and if  they can even 
illustrate any same one. Sir David Ross considers this chapter ‘one of  the most difficult in A.’ For 
one, while in two of  the syllogisms the middle term clearly picks out cause of  the kind in question, 
in the third example what is clearly cause of  the kind in question – health, as an end of  walking 
about after dinner – figures as an extreme term rather than the middle term. Thus these examples – 
especially the last one – appear to many to have failed to illustrate, if  not contradict, A.’s own thesis. 
They see A. as being sloppy here; some try to help him fix the third example. E.g. Ross says of  this 
chapter that ‘its doctrine is unsatisfactory, and its form betrays clearly that it has not been carefully 
worked over by A...’ 
 
While I am not the only one who disagrees with the above assessment and attempts to interpret the 
examples as they are (rather than fixing them), I find the existing attempts either problematic (e.g. 
Mariska Leunissen) or incomplete (e.g. Monte Ransome Johnson). My goal in this paper is to give a 
substantial, satisfactory reading of  the thesis and show how the final-causal example illustrates it. 
This chapter makes sense, I argue, given A's own understanding of  causality. It is no news that his 
concpetion of  cause is quite different from our modern ones, but its interrelation with his epistemic 
syllogistics may not have been appreciated enough. Thus, this paper will also gesture at the relevant 
aspects of  what I take to be A.’s notion of  cause. It is the beginning, I hope, of  an helpful and 
authentically Aristotelian account of  the relationships between cause, the explanans, that for which 
the cause is a cause, and the explanandum. 
 
 
Adam Woodcox, University of  Western Ontario, awoodcox@uwo.ca 
5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “The Hunt for Definitions: Posterior Analytics, B 13” 
 
This paper focuses on two questions that arise from Aristotle's account of  division in the Posterior 
Analytics. First, what place does division occupy in Aristotle's account of  scientific inquiry? Second, 
how does division relate (if  at all) to the picture of  cognitive development presented in B 19? I argue 
that Aristotle sees division as part of  a formal method for generating definitions of  the natural kinds 
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of  a given domain of  knowledge. It thus occupies a preliminary stage in his account of  scientific 
inquiry, since demonstration - by which we arrive at scientific knowledge - must proceed from 
definitions. As to the second question, I argue that the process of  cognitive development described 
in B 19 - the ascent from perception to experience - secures the species and genera required to get 
the method of  division going. 
 
In his critique of  division in APo. B 5, Aristotle questions the resources of  division to ensure that 
we arrive at a real definition without positing additional non-essential predicates or omitting 
predicates that are essential. This problem motivates Aristotle to formalize division – a task that he 
carries out in B13. I argue that this chapter is not simply a catalogue or list of  the different and 
unrelated ways that division can be used in scientific inquiry. Rather, it articulates a single continuous 
method for generating real definitions of  natural kinds. In this chapter, Aristotle develops a number 
of  formal rules to ensure that division will include all and only predicates that are essential to the 
subject in question. The divider first locates a cluster of  predicates that belongs uniquely to the 
species under consideration. Division then acts as a correctional procedure that we perform on this 
cluster to ensure that essential predicates are properly ordered so that we arrive at a real definition. 
The rest of  B 13 expands on this method and discusses the divisional safeguards used to prevent the 
errors that the traditional Platonic method of  division is prone to make. Accordingly, division is not 
merely a pedagogical device used to present the results of  an inquiry into the essence of  a kind, as 
some scholars have argued. Aristotle is interested in division not merely as a tool for classification 
and taxonomy, but as a method that will actually assist us in the search for definitions. 
 
 
Cecilia Li, University of  Western Ontario, Cecilia.z.li@gmail.com 
5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Aristotle on Desire and Phantasia in Animal Locomotion” 
 
The purpose of  this paper is to examine the role of  phantasia in Aristotle’s account of  animal 
locomotion (kinēsis kata topon).The question regarding the role of  phantasia in animal locomotion has 
received considerable scholarly attention for a number of  reasons. First, there is a lack of  scholarly 
consensus on Aristotle’s general account of  phantasia. Difficulties on this topic range anywhere from 
its proper translation, the precise role it plays in animal life, and whether there is a unified account 
of  phantasia in Aristotle. As a result, the discussions of  phantasia in respect to animal locomotion are 
often complicated by different underlying understandings of  phantasia in general. Second, Aristotle 
emphasizes in many places that phantasia plays a necessary role in the explanation of  animal 
movement, often claiming that animals are not capable of  desire without phantasia and vice versa (De 
Anima, 433b28-29, 433a22-23).  However, it is not immediately clear why phantasia is needed and 
what it uniquely contributes to locomotion that is not supplied by perception itself. Third, it is 
unclear what role phantasia plays in respect to the object of  desire. In particular, is phantasia necessary 
to represents omething as pleasant or good to us in stimulating locomotion? 
 
In this paper, I will begin with a brief  discussion of  some of  the standard and important literature 
on this topic. I will argue that in Aristotle’s account of  animal locomotion, phantasia does not supply 
the ‘content’ lacking in perception nor does it exclusively represent an object as pleasant or painful 
as argued by Nussbaum (1978) and Modrak (1987) respectively. In section II, I will offer an account 
of  Aristotle’s model of  animal locomotion. I argue that desire, considered on its own, is insufficient 
for movement because it needs some further ‘preparation’ from the animal’s cognitive faculty 
(perception, phantasia, or thought) to determine its object. In section III, I argue that phantasia is 
needed in two cases: when the object of  desire is not present and when the perceptual faculty lacks 
sufficient information for determining the object. 
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J. Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College, hubler@lvc.edu 
5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Neither a Spiritualist Nor a Literalist Be: Physical Reduction in 
Aristotle's Theory of  Perception” 
 
Sense perception presents a special problem for Aristotle. On the one hand, he confronts well 
respected and nearly universal claims among the wise that sense perception is a kind of  motion. At 
the same time he is aware of  Plato’s devastating critique of  sense perception as motion in the  
Theaetetus.  Aristotle very much wants to restore sense perception as the basis for empirical science 
but knows the limitations of  the earlier theories of  sense perception as motion.  The modern 
interpreter faces an analogous problem. Well-known and respected commentators, beginning with 
Sorabji and Burnyeat but extending much further, disagree about the nature of  sense perception in 
Aristotle. For Sorabji, sense perception occurs through a qualitative change in the sense organ by 
which the eye becomes literally colored. Burnyeat denies that there is any qualitative change involved 
in sense perception. Instead, perception is an “extraordinary change” that is not the result of  any 
processes, but is instead an awareness based upon “standing material conditions.” 
 
Sorabji is correct that physiological changes are necessary for sense perception; however, Burnyeat is 
correct that sense perception does not involve a qualitative change whereby the eye becomes colored 
or the ear rings. The changes are subtle heating and cooling in the innate spirit surrounding the heart 
that account for all forms of  sense perception. The heating and cooling fall short of  alteration 
because the nature of  the innate spirit is not changed, nevertheless, they are genuine physical 
changes in the form of  expansions and contractions. 
 
The difficulty for commentators is that Aristotle never sets out the function of  the innate spirit in 
sense perception in great detail in the extant corpus. However, he does explain its role in animal 
movement and draw a parallel to sense perception so there is indirect evidence for the mechanics of  
perception in the innate spirit. In addition, there are numerous other references to the innate spirit’s 
role, as well as references to the operations of  heat and cold in perception.  Perhaps more 
importantly, examining sense perception in the light of  Aristotle’s physics reveals an overall 
continuity to his thought. He does not see biology and physics are radically distinct, but intimately 
interconnected.  Both Burnyeat and Sorabji, as well as many others, assert that Aristotle takes color, 
sounds, and smells to be irreducibly real. They are not. Aristotle is explicit that on the side of  the 
object, each can be reduced to the operations of  hot and cold and on the side of  the percipient, 
each functions by heating or cooling the innate spirit. 
 
None of  which is to say that Aristotle is a simple materialist. Aristotle also rejects the view that 
sense is a form of  motion because it takes place through an immaterial soul. Instead, sens 
perception is an immaterial reception of  a sensible form. Neither the sensible form in the object nor 
the perceived form in the soul are in motion. Instead, each is an unmoved principle of  motion 
thereby overcoming the objections raised by Plato in the Theaetetus. 
 
 
Evan Strevell, Duquesne University, strevelle@gmail.com 
5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “What Happens When Aristotle Remembers His Prior Seeing of  
Coriscos?” 
 
In De memoria (DM), Aristotle defends a view of  memory as indirect perception, where 
remembrance of  prior cognition is the awareness of  a phantasma that functions as a copy of  the 
prior cognition. The commitment to indirect perception gives rise to an impasse: why should the 
remembering animal perceive its phantasma to be a representation of  its past rather than a thing 
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presently imagined? 
 
According to the now-predominate view first advanced by Richard Sorabji (1972), Aristotle’s 
solution is that because the memory phantasma is a veridical copy of  prior cognition, the soul is able 
to consider the phantasma as of  past cognition. If  Aristotle’s solution is merely that the soul can and 
sometimes does perceive the memory phantasma as a copy, then we are left wondering why the soul 
ever does. The prevailing reading has Aristotle punt on the wanted explanation. 
 
Tony Roark (2011) does better, arguing that memory phantasmata are assertoric due to their 
derivation from sensation that is also assertoric in character. When an animal becomes aware of  a 
memory phantasma, the assertoric character of  the memory phantasma collides with the assertoric 
character of  concurrent sensation. The sense power judges that only sensation is the case now so 
that the memory phantasma must pertain to the past. Here too questions arise. Roark posits as the 
cause of  a sense of  past time the assertoric character of  memory phantasmata, but Aristotle asserts 
that memory phantasmata may occur separately from a sense of  past time. The assertoric character of  
memory phantasmata does not guarantee an additional perception of  past aspect. Roark carves out a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for remembering. 
 
I show that DM satisfactorily explains why an animal is moved to perceive its present memory 
phantasma as a representation of  its past. I argue that remembering is analogous to sensation. The 
memory phantasma is a compound motion that contains a likeness to prior cognition and a motion 
proportionate to some length of  time prior to now. When the phantasma acts on the sense power, the 
sense power takes on the activity of  the phantasma such that it perceives the phantasma as a likeness 
of  prior cognition. In contrast to Roark, I argue that the assertoric character of  memory phantasmata 
is caused by the temporal character of  the memory phantasma acting on the sense power; without the 
character of  past aspect, the phantasma is perceived as fictional rather than assertoric. The assertoric 
character of  the memory phantasma and sense of  past time are co-implicatory. 
 
My reading corrects the prevailing consensus and explains why an animal perceives its phantasma as 
representing an animal’s past. The strength of  my account is confirmed by its ability to explain 
additionally why some phantasmata have an assertoric character, but others do not, and why false 
remembering occurs. 
 
 
Allison Murphy, Notre Dame, amurphy@nd.edu 
5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: “There is No View from Nowhere: Plato's Defense of  Philosophy 
in the Gorgias” 
 
My paper will suggest that in the dialogue Gorgias Plato focuses on a question at the intersection of  
ethics and epistemological worries about skepticism: if  we are incapable of  transcending the 
particular context that we inhabit, to what extent are we able to adjudicate between competing 
claims about the good life? 
 
The possibility of  adjudicating between different positions presupposes, of  course, that one can 
maintain a distinction between the different positions and their respective grounds. Yet it is precisely 
this point that the Gorgias calls into question. Callicles is an interlocutor whom Socrates is repeatedly 
at pains to distinguish from himself; at a key moment in the dialogue, however, Plato has Socrates 
and Callicles adopt the roles of  Amphion and Zetheus, two protagonists from Euripides’ lost play 
Antiope, protagonists whom an ancient audience would have immediately recognized as twins. This is 
no accidental reference, I argue, but signifies a theme that runs throughout the dialogue: that of  
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Socrates’ deep similarity to those to whom he is diametrically opposed. 
 
The Gorgias explores this theme in three ways. First, Socrates’ interlocutors repeatedly accuse 
Socrates of  being no different from themselves, and further insist that philosophy has no more hold 
on the truth of  things than their own rhetorical presentations. Second, the theme emerges in the 
form of  what I call a logos reductionism: while Socrates presents himself  as an advocate of  the life 
marked by a robust form of  justice and temperance, the only view of  the human good that his 
argument actually commits one to is minimally robust, requiring a certain degree of  consistency and 
order but nothing that would require one to abandon the life of  tyranny. Finally the theme emerges 
at the level of  the dramatic interplay between Socrates and his opponents. Socrates distinguishes 
himself  from his interlocutors on the grounds that he neither argues to be competitive nor seeks to 
persuade by means of  pandering to the prejudices of  his auditors. And yet, in spite of  this 
insistence, he himself  appears to engage in precisely these forms of  behavior. 
 
The striking similarity between Socrates and his opponents raises the question of  whether or not 
Socrates himself  engages in the very sort of  rhetoric he condemns and, if  so, to what extent we can 
ultimately distinguish him from someone like Callicles. I argue that the dialogue forces the reader to  
confront the possibility that one may not be able to transcend the particular perspective of  a given 
speaker in order to attain some neutral vantage point. In light of  such a prospect Plato invites us, I 
suggest, to consider the possibility that philosophy is not exhausted at the level of  objective 
argument geared towards a neutral auditor, but that its efficacy presupposes in its listeners some 
degree of  prior orientation towards the good. 
 
 
Geoffrey Batchelder, Montgomery College, gmbatch@verizon.net 
5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: “Plato's Phaedrus and the Fate of  the Humanities” 
 
The Phaedrus anticipates contemporary debates over the role and value of  the humanities in higher 
education. Of  course, even in translation Plato’s terms differ from our own, so the point bears 
explaining. This paper examines key passages to support a holistic reading of  the dialogue as an 
expression of  Plato’s firm convictions about the social utility of  philosophically grounded education 
in the humanities. 
 
 
Christopher Roser, Humboldt University of  Berlin, Christopher.n.roser@googlemail.com 
5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: “Gorgias and Plato on the Distinction Between Being Rational and 
Being Irrational” 
 
In this paper I consider Gorgias’ conception of  rational and irrational states and Plato’s reception of  
it in the Gorgias.  First, I argue that Gorgias puts forward certain rational states as a solution to 
problems and shortcomings of  human life. This means, he develops the idea of  such rational states 
in contrast to problems and shortcomings of  most humans. To develop this novel interpretation, I 
criticize the still dominant interpretation of  Gorgias that Gorgias is an anti-intellectual and anti-
rational. (Untersteiner 1954, Guthier 1971, Gronbeck 1972, Wardy 1998, Gagarin 2001, Higgins 
2008). 
 
In particular, I argue that Gorgias conceives of  two kinds of  problems or shortcomings. First, he 
faces the problem of  doxa, i.e. the problem that doxa are instable, unreliable, untrustworthy and 
therefore unsuitable means to reach the truth. Second, he faces the problem of  heteronomy, i.e. the 
problem that many actions of  humans are governed and caused by something external to them. I 
argue, that as solution to the first problem Gorgias develops a conception of  stable and reliably 
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intellectual state and process, namely knowledge and reasoning. Furthermore, I argue that Gorgias 
indicates that this state is reachable.  Thereby, I explore in detail which way Gorgias describes the 
stable and reliable state and how he differentiates it from the unreliable state of  doxa. In particular, I 
argue that Gorgias conceives of  a logos and a logismos as being based on doxa and as being 
epistemically shortcoming. As a solution to the second problem, I argue, Gorgias invokes an 
intellectual account of  autonomy. According to which deliberation and art (technê) enable one to act 
autonomously. My interpretation primarily concerns Gorgias’ Encomium of  Helen and the Defence of  
Palamedes. 
 
Second, I consider how this novel interpretation of  Gorgias leads to a revision of  how Plato’s 
reception of  Gorgias. In particular I consider how Plato receives the two problems, the problem of  
doxa and the problem of  heteronomy, in the Gorgias. First, I argue, that Plato overtakes Gorgias’ 
description of  doxa.  However, he evaluates the epistemic significance of  logoi differently. To do that 
he differentiates between two kinds of  logoi in his argumentation: logoi which are merely persuasive 
and logoi which are necessary for knowledge and art. Thereby, he directly critics Gorgias, who 
merely conceived of  logoi as being persuasive. This differentiation allows Plato to conceive of  logos 
as something which is not based on doxa and which is the mark of  knowledge. Second, I argue that 
Plato overtakes decisive elements of  Gorgias intellectual account of  autonomy in his account of  
power (dunamis). In particular, he overtakes the principle that an intellectual ability is a prerequisite 
of  acting powerfully or autonomously. However, he differs in which power it is: according to Plato it 
is the knowledge of  the good, according to Gorgias it is the art of  speaking. 
 
 
David J. Murphy, david.murphy20@verizon.net 
5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: “Aeschines of  Sphettus and Ps. Andocides, Orat., IV” 
 
In the fourth century B.C.E., one figure who straddled the border between philosophy and rhetoric 
was Aeschines ofSphettus, writer of  both Socratic dialogues and speeches. In this paper I refine the 
hypothesis of  Paolo Cobetto Ghiggia that Aeschines wrote [Andocides] Orat.4, Against Alcibiades. 
The speech purports to address the Athenian Assembly, which is to vote on candidates for 
ostracism. The speaker describes the career of  Alcibiades as so fraudulent and tyrannical that 
Alcibiades should be the one ostracized. 
 
Inaccuracies, coupled with veiled vaticinia ex eventu,rule out the ostensible date, c. 415 B.C.E., as the 
date of  composition. The nature of  the errors and the speech’s style point away from Andocides as 
author. Against the dominant view that the speech is a political pamphlet of  the 390s: 1) the 
speaker’s self-description matches the career of  the statesman, Phaeax, of  the420s-410s, but we have 
no hint that Phaeax’s memory had political impact in the390s; 2) Alcibiades’ career after 416 is not 
described, while silence about the disasters he brought to Athens would be incongruous in a later 
political pamphlet. On the other hand, Plutarch tells us that many people wrote about Alcibiades. 
The best explanation is that the speech is a declamation written later,when Alcibiades’ memory 
elicited reactions from intellectuals. 
 
Diogenes Laertius reports that Aeschines of  Sphettus wrote a “defense of  the father of  
Phaeax”(2.63). This sounds like garbled reference to our speech. If  not, it must referto some other 
declamation set in the past, for Aeschines lived too late to have written for Phaeax’s father. Diogenes 
says that Aeschines returned from Syracuse to take up speech writing in Athens (2.62). That return 
occurred between380 and 357. The hypothesis that Aeschines sought to advertise his skills by 
writing one or more display pieces covers the bases better than does its rivals.  A way to test it would 
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be to compare our speech’s style to that of  Aeschines’ known fragments. Because those are 
dialogues, however, genre differences will qualify the applicability of  results. 
 
Our speech exemplifies a fourth-century phenomenon: representation of  Alcibiades by Socratic 
writers. Polycrates’ Accusation had charged Socrates with corrupting that young man. Focusing on 
Alcibiades’ early career, our speech depicts him asvicious from the beginning. Thus, Socrates was not 
to blame. A cryptic allusion late in the speech (Andoc. 4.38) to citizens whom the city unjustly put to 
death recalls Socrates and contrasts his character implicitly to Alcibiades’. Aeschines had portrayed 
Alcibiades in poor light in his dialogues as well. 
 
This speech,however, is not a philosophical production. Aeschines, if  he wrote it, is diverging from 
those Socratics who formed philosophical schools. Going back to his initial calling to rhetoric (D.L. 
2.20), but sprinkling a hint of  Socrates’ memory onto this speech, Aeschines, like Isocrates, shows us 
a speech writer reacting to Socrates’ complex literary portrait a generation later. 
 
 
Dmitry Biriukov, National Resarch University Higher School of  Economics, Russia; Padova 
University (Italy), dbirjuk@gmail.com 
5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: “The Hypotheses of  Plato's Parmenides in Clement of  Alexandria” 
 
The report focuses on Clement of  Alexandria’s usage of  the hypotheses of  Plato’s “Parmenides” 
and analysis of  how the lines of  Plato&#39;s “Parmenides” were refracted Clement’s discourse of  
ascent.  In his Stromates Clement of  Alexandria sometime uses the hypotheses of  Plato’s 
Parmenides. He uses the first hypothesis of  Parmenides, when he describes God as One, nameless, 
and limitless in Stromateis 5 XII 81.6 in the sense that God has no beginning nor end, and similarly 
to Plato states that the One is not the whole; It is formless, and we cannot say that It has parts. This 
passage is probably the earliest evidence of  the theological interpretation of  the Parmenides’ first 
hypothesis, which was based on the application of  the notion of  limitlessness (ἄ πειρον) to God. 
From the historical and philosophical perspective, by calling the One limitless Clement anticipates 
the intuition of  Neoplatonism and can be considered to be a precursor of  Plotinus in his 
interpretation of  the One. Nevertheless, Clement’s logic in the interpretation of  the One is not quite 
the same as Plato’s, since on the basis of  the first hypothesis Clement departs from the logic of  
Plato, deriving the limitlessness of  the One from the notion that It has no parts and is indivisible. 
Clement also does not use Plato’s premise that limits are parts of  that whose limits they are 
(Parmenides 137c), and therefore says that the One is limitless not in the sense that it is impossible 
to reach its end, but as indivisible, that is, in a stronger sense. 
 
In his doctrine of  the Monad and the Son Clement continues to use the philosophical language 
which goes back to Plato’s Parmenides. According to Clement, the Son does not simply become one 
as one, nor many as a part, but becomes one like all. Thus, belief  in Him results to being monadic 
and unifying; lack of  believe to be divided into parts (Strom. 4, XXV, 156, 2; 157, 2). Here Clement 
uses the terminology and gives references to the first hypothesis (the One as one), the second 
hypothesis (the One as many) (Parmenides 143c), and the fourth and eighth hypotheses (Many as 
many) (Ibid., 158c,165bc). Accordingly, for Clement there are two grades of  infinity in God – 
corresponding to the monad and “the One”. Limitlessness corresponding to the Monad is 
limitlessness which Clement denies in respect to the One – limitlessness in the sense of  inability to 
reach its end (the topic of  ascend appears here; Strom. 5 XII 81.6). 
 
As to the concept of  multiplicity in the statement that the Son becomes One like all” (Strom. 4 
XXV 156.2), it is possible to understand this multiplicity either literally in the sense of  the second 
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hypothesis of  Plato’s Parmenides as multiplicity in general, or in the sense of  Son’s relationship with 
the world He created, or (and this solution seems to be the most correct) we can assume that 
Clement speaks about a monad-like quality as something which is acquired by the faithful who have 
believed in the Son. This phrase may be interpreted in the sense of  the existence of  the faithful in 
their unity with the Son, and of  the Son’s unity with the faithful. This understanding is confirmed by 
the passage from the Exhortation to the Gentiles 88 which discusses the Monad (the Son) in the 
context of  the ascent of  faithful to unity with the Son. In this way in Clement’s teaching the topic of  
ascent appears in the connections with the second hypotheses of  Plato’s Parmenides. 
 
 
Christopher C. Paone, Sacred Heart University, paonec@sacredheart.edu 
5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: “Diogenes as Kosmopolitēs” 
 
When Diogenes the Dog was asked where he was from, he replied that he was a citizen of  the world 
(kosmopolitēs) (D.L. 6.63, 72). But what does “citizen of  the world” mean for the Cynic philosopher, 
infamous for his biting wit and contempt for convention? Are there substantive philosophical 
commitments or argumentation supporting his self-identification as kosmopolitēs? Or, is this another 
among many of  his parodic jibes? 
 
There are generally two scholarly fronts on this question. On the first front, scholars are concerned 
with whether Diogenes’ world citizenship is negative or positive. If  his world citizenship is negative, 
then his self-identification is a rejection of  life in the typical Greek city, and of  the social and 
political duties attached to it, and nothing more than that. If  his world citizenship is positive, then 
the rejection of  the typical Greek city may also imply the character of  a life that bears with it other 
kinds of  duties, perhaps even of  the universalist character that modern conceptions of  
cosmopolitanism advocate. 
 
On the second front, scholars are concerned with the degree to which the evidence for Diogenes’ 
world citizenship is already re-interpreted by Stoic intermediaries in order to represent him as a 
forebear of  Stoicism. Since Zeno, the Stoa’s founder, was a pupil of  Diogenes’ follower Crates, 
Diogenes and his alleged teacher Antisthenes are central to the Stoic’s claim to Socratic succession. 
But Diogenes’ character and thought may have required some modification to fit the later Stoic 
understanding of  virtuous practice. Some Stoics, for example, describe Diogenes’ way of  life as a 
short cut to virtue (D.L. 7.121). 
 
The thesis defended in this paper is that Diogenes’ world citizenship is a positive claim supported by 
philosophical argument and that it may be distinguished from Stoic views of  world citizenship. The 
principal considerations in favor of  this thesis are a reevaluation of  the controversial syllogism 
concerning nomos reported by Diogenes Laërtius (D.L. 6.72) and a reinterpretation of  the syllogism 
in the context of  Diogenes’ philanthropic mission and as a paradigmatic example of  his moral 
imperative to re-stamp the currency (D.L. 6.20–1, 70–1). 
 
 
Surit Mishra, Hunter College, Surit.Mishra09@myhunter.cuny.edu 
5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Breaking the Hegemony: Nietzsche, Schurmann, and The Nay 
Science” 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche disdained Luther, the progenitor of  modernity, for hindering the rebirth of  the 
ancient tragic perspective. He framed modernity, a ‘secularized’ Lutheran Protestantism, as the polar 
opposite of  the tragic perspective (“Dionysus versus the Crucified”). He targeted this on an 
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institutional level in We Philologists, where he vociferously attacked his contemporaries for subsuming 
classical texts under modern concerns of  nationalism and progress, thereby trivializing their tragic 
essence. In the spirit of  Nietzsche’s project, Reiner Schurmann critiques modern philosophers for 
providing epistemic foundations for the modern self  and the state (“consoling the soul and 
consolidating the city”). Schurmann is especially critical of  Hegel for absolutizing the modern state 
and the modern self  through his historicist narrative of  self-consciousness. Such dubious 
philosophizing, which degrades thinking to legitimizing authority, counteracts and represses 
questions about the tragic fragility of  principled constructions. This paper will approach Vishwa 
Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee’s The Nay Science as a case study of  Schurmann’s and Nietzsche’s 
indictment of  modern scholarship. Its critical analysis of  the nineteenth-century German 
Indologists reveals that the Indologists affirmed the Lutheran paradigm — a paradigm, as Nietzsche 
argued, inextricably linked to the anti-tragic tendencies of  nationalism and historicism. By paving 
over the tragic message of  the Bhagavad Gītā and the Mbh, German Indology serves as a 
microcosm of  the epistemic issues that define and pervade modernity. 
 
 
David Cerequas, Hunter College, dcerequas@post.harvard.edu 
5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Psyche, Atman, and die Seele der Indologie” 
 
Circulating among the discourses that share an interest in the period it covers are variations on a 
narrative about the “Axial Age” (Achsenzeit). One recurring feature of  these stories is the notion of  a 
peculiar translatability between the Platonic psuchê the Vedantic ātman. Trust in the stability of  that 
notion established a ground from which to launch a long series of  colonialist treatises on the 
primacy and privilege of  ‘Western’ reason; postcolonial political tracts critiquing those views; 
counter-colonialist disquisitions reversing the priority of  cultures; and even, quite recently, attempts 
to defuse all sides of  the argument without abandoning—or questioning—the founding premise 
(Seaford 2016). Almost entirely absent from these discussions, however, is any acknowledgement of  
the necessary, anachronistic, and often parenthetical third term by which the equation of  psuchê and 
ātman was affected: soul or, more accurately, Seele. This essay undertakes a genealogy of  that 
translatability to explore the conditions of  its construction. Tracing the lines of  influence and 
inheritance, I locate a critical nexus at the Ursprung of  Indology and the theological and nationalistic 
interests informing its development. In the end we find that the common source for ātman and psuchê 
is neither Greek nor Indian but German, and its heritage gives us cause to reexamine our 
hermeneutic principles. 
 
 
Edward P. Butler, Independent Scholar, epb223@gmail.com 
5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Polytheism as Methodology in the Study of  Religions” 
 
Historical contingencies have resulted in a peculiar disciplinary organization of  the Western academy 
such that 'Theology', which on the analogy of  other similarly-named disciplines such as 'Biology', 
one might expect to study the diverse manifestations of  divinity in general, instead practices a 
methodological monotheism, presupposing not only that 'theos' is necessarily existentially singular, 
but also that it denotes primarily if  not exclusively the Christian's God. The study of  the Gods of  
other faiths qua Gods is taxonomically excluded, and the study of  these religions instead is relegated 
to the field of  Religious Studies, which, as an anthropological discipline, is assumed to practice 
methodological atheism and to study religions purely as forms of  historical human behavior. Two 
recent developments shed new light on this problematic. One is the emergence under the rubric of  
Religious Studies of  the field of  'Pagan Studies', which has been criticized for insufficient fidelity to 
the ideals of  anthropology by virtue of  positing a trans-historical integrity of  historically sundered 
and revived faiths directed at the same deities, and thus implicitly positing the existence of  those 
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deities. Another is the emergence of  Dharma Studies, dedicated to the study of  Indian religious 
traditions beyond the historicizing reductions of  anthropological methodology, which has been 
criticized for its 'insider' perspective, or as embodying a proselytizing methodology, albeit these 
criticisms may not even be mutually consistent. Both of  these new academic disciplines are born out 
of  the dilemma in the Western academy between the methodological monotheism of  Theology and 
the methodological atheism of  Religious Studies. The paper proposes resolving this dilemma 
through a turn toward methodological polytheism, either through a comprehensively reconceived 
Theology, or through a proliferation of  object-oriented regional studies on the model of  Dharma 
Studies. 
 
Jay R. Elliott, Bard College, jelliott@bard.edu 
6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle on the Voluntariness of  Vice” 
 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle puts forward two appealing but apparently inconsistent claims: 
first, that virtue and vice are “up to us” (III.5 1113b6-7); and second, that in order to become 
virtuous “we need to have been brought up in a certain way right from childhood” (II.3.1104b11). 
Aristotle wants to insist that vice is voluntary, since he believes that otherwise it will not be an 
appropriate object of  blame. The problem is that this insistence seems to be at odds with his 
emphasis on the importance of  upbringing. Vice will not be up to us, and so will not be 
blameworthy, if  it is simply the product of  a misguided upbringing. In response to this problem, 
Susan Sauvé Meyer has recently proposed that Aristotle does not intend to argue that virtue and vice 
are voluntary for everyone, but only for the members of  his audience, who have had a proper ethical 
upbringing. In her interpretation of  Aristotle, those who have been educated well but nonetheless 
become vicious are vicious voluntarily and so can be appropriately blamed. But in the case of  those 
who did not receive a proper education, vice will not be voluntary and so not an appropriate object 
of  blame. I argue that Sauvé Meyer's interpretation removes the apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's 
views, but at too great a cost. Aristotle wants to hold that voluntary vice is a possibility for people in 
general and not only for the members of  his audience. Sauvé Meyer goes wrong, I suggest, by 
assuming too close a fit between Aristotle's audience and his topic. In addressing his audience of  
well-brought up young men and future statesmen, he seeks to describe not only these prospective 
rulers themselves, but also those whom they will go on to rule, many of  whom have not had the 
advantages of  their education. Citing the precedent of  existing legislation, Aristotle aims to assure 
his audience that vice in general is voluntary and cannot be excused on the grounds that the vicious 
person is ignorant or unfortunate. I conclude that Aristotle scholars should continue to be puzzled 
about how he can hold together his insistence on the voluntariness of  vice with his emphasis on the 
essential role of  upbringing in the formation of  character. 
 
 
Carissa Phillips-Garrett, Rice University, cpg@rice.edu 
6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle on Blame and Moral Responsibility” 
 
One argument against the view that Aristotle’s account of  responsibility is moral in nature is that all 
voluntary agents are responsible on his account, which includes even very young children. But since 
young children cannot be blameworthy and morally responsible for their actions, blame must be 
instrumental and Aristotle’s account of  responsibility must be causal. Contrary to this view, however, 
I will argue that children are not blameworthy on Aristotle’s account on the grounds that 
voluntariness is a necessary condition for blameworthiness on Aristotle’s account, not a sufficient 
condition. For an agent to be blameworthiness, she must be an agent for whom choice or decision 
(prohairesis) is possible. Since bestial agents, children, and non-rational animals all fail to meet this 
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standard, they are not blameworthy for Aristotle. As a result, I conclude that objection does not 
show that Aristotelian responsibility is merely causal.   
 
 
Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University, Cremaldiam_at_appstate.edu 
6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle on Benefaction and Friendship in NE, 9.7” 
 
In Nicomachean Ethics 9.7, Aristotle explains why we benefit or “do good” (eu poiein) for others, a 
paradigmatic act of  friendship. This account is neglected, and wrongly so, since it suggests, contrary 
to the standard view, that the causal origins of  friendship cannot be comprehended entirely by 
appeal to rational and non-rational desire. 
 
The account opens with an aporia—namely, that benefactors love those that they have benefitted 
more than their beneficiaries love them in return. This is surprising, Aristotle notes, and requires 
explanation. Commentators have assumed that the benefactor’s greater love is the central puzzle 
regarding benefaction. Yet, as I argue, Aristotle is ultimately moved by a deeper puzzle about 
benefaction—a puzzle concerning the difficult labor in benefitting others. If  benefitting others is 
difficult work, as Aristotle owns, why does the benefactor undertake that work so assiduously and 
unfailingly, particularly if  the benefactor can expect no recompense or repayment in doing so? 
 
Appreciating that this is Aristotle’s puzzle guides us to a fuller understanding of  Aristotle’s 
explanation of  benefaction and its contribution to friendship. That explanation turns on an analogy 
between parents and benefactors. Aristotle notes that all living things are moved by self-love, or a 
desire that they “exist and live,” and that this self-love explains why animal parents persist in the 
difficult work of  giving birth to their young and sustaining them. The case of  the parent is 
instructive for benefaction, Aristotle suggests, since benefaction seems to be a kind of  reproduction. 
Just as self-love sustains the animal parent in the arduous labor of  reproducing and rearing children, 
so does self-love sustain the benefactor in the arduous labor of  assiduously benefitting others and, 
ultimately, friends. 
 
Yet this explanation of  benefaction is curious. It appeals to self-love—here, a desire to exist and 
live—that is shared among all living things. But such a desire seems to play a superfluous role in 
explanation of  benefaction, since the rational desire for friendship or the non-rational desire for the 
company of  others should be sufficient to account for our tendencies to persist through the hard 
work of  benefaction. In offering the explanation from self-love, Aristotle nevertheless suggests that 
some further element is required to account fully for the causal origins of  friendship. What more 
needs to be explained? 
 
Drawing inspiration from Diotima’s discussion of  reproduction in the Symposium, I suggest that self-
love is needed to account for the consistency and directionality of  our pursuit of  friendship. I close 
the paper by situating this explanation of  self-love’s role in friendship with respect to Aristotle’s allos 
autos thesis in NE 9.4 and his account of  self-love in NE 9.8. The upshot of  the paper is that self-
love plays an important role in friendship and that Aristotelian friendship has more exotic causal 
origins than has typically been thought. 
 
 
Giulio Di Basilio, University College Dublin, giulio.di.basilio@gmail.comk 
6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “The Definition of  Prohairesis (Decision) in Aristotle’s Ethics” 
 
At Nicomachean Ethics (EN) 1113a10-11 Aristotle defines Prohairesis (Decision) as “deliberative desire 
of  things that are in our power”. At first this looks as a well-formed definition meeting the relevant 
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Aristotelian standards (as far as this is possible in Ethics). A first problem to be dealt with, however, 
is the fact that if  this were the case (and Prohairesis were a kind of  desire) it should appear in 
Aristotle’s list of  different kinds of  desire; but this is never the case (see EE 1223a26-7; 1225b24ff; 
MM 1187b36-7). Furthermore, to make things worse, in EN VI 2 Prohairesis is puzzingly defined as 
both “desiderative intellect” and “deliberative desire”. I suggest that this wavering is no coincidence 
and that Prohairesis should not be conceived as a desire alongside with wish, spirit and appetite 
(contra Irwin, 1999, p. 322 and most recently Nielsen, forthcoming). Rather, I argue that Aristotle 
conceives of  Prohairesis in hylomorphistic terms, desire providing the matter whereas intellect the 
form, respectively. This sheds light on the obscure remark that follows the alleged definition at EN 
1113a10-11 where Prohairesis is said to be man. My interpretation follows Aspasius’ remarks on this 
issue and credit him with a plausible reading of  the matter at hand that contemporary interpreters, 
too, should look carefully at. 
 
 
Vishwa Adluri, Hunter College, vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu 
6B (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Hindu Studies in a Christian Secular Academy” 
 
The concept of  dharma is central to Hinduism, underpinning its ideas of  rebirth, existence, 
salvation, and even cosmogenesis. Yet this concept is seldom understood and frequently 
misrepresented. One of  the key sources of  difficulty is the confusion between substantive and 
normative senses of  dharma, and the tendency to represent dharma as merely a social construct. 
More importantly, scholars have viewed dharma on analogy with Judeo-Christian ideas of  the law, 
and drawn, from its seeming inability to provide justification, the negative conclusion that dharma is 
inefficacious in salvation. Yet this conclusion is premature, as this article will argue. I will focus on a 
recent interpretation of  dharma in the Mahābha ̄rata, Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of 
Suffering in the Mahābhārata (Hudson 2013) to show how Judeo-Christian ideas of  the law—more 
specifically, a Protestant critique of  Jewish law—stand at the background of  many contemporary 
accounts of  dharma. 
 
 
Joydeep Bagchee, Freie Universität Berlin, jbadchee@gmail.com 
6B (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Academic Philology, Anti-Semitism, and Indian Philosophy” 
 
German academic Indology significantly shaped the Western reception of  Indian philosophy (Adluri 
and Bagchee 2014). It established the key approaches to reading the Indian canon such as 
periodization, search for original texts, and focus on historical context, as well as the key themes in 
reading this canon (e.g., questions of  theism versus pantheism, whether Indian philosophy was 
rational or mystical, etc.). Many enduring misconceptions concerning Indian philosophy can be 
traced back to the work of  nineteenth-century German Indologists like Richard von Roth, Richard 
von Garbe, and Hermann Oldenberg. In this presentation, I trace the dominance of  the motif  of  
“priestly corruption” in their work. I show that this anti-Judaic motif  was a commonplace of  
Protestant theology (Gerdmar 2009). As theologically educated Protestants, the three scholars could 
not have been unaware of  the consequences of  claiming that the Brahmans had corrupted the texts. 
I will support this argument by reading their work alongside archival sources (letters, official 
correspondence, unpublished notes) that indicate the extent of  their anti-Semitic prejudice. I will 
also discuss how many of  the concerns they raised (e.g., the significance of  ritual in the Gītā) were 
germane only in the context of  Protestant critiques of  Judaism. I argue for reconsidering philology’s 
role in relation to ancient texts out of  an awareness of  its anti-Semitic uses (Kugel 1986; Sheehan 
2005). 
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Kevin Kambo, The Catholic University of  America, Kkambo3@gmail.com 
6C (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 506: “Moral Exemplarism in Plato's Symposium” 
 
It is here argued that the account of  the successful moral agent given in the Symposium, is part of  a 
morality of  inspiration, contrasted against a morality of  obligation or disqualification. The latter is 
understood as a moral account whose focus is on establishing thresholds for acceptable moral 
behaviour, chiefly by explaining what kinds of  actions are forbidden for the moral agent. Such a 
moral account—as found, for example, in forms of  deontology or consequentialism—often lacks 
motivational power. A remedy to this (potential) defect can be had in the moral vision offered in the 
Symposium. 
 
In the dialogue Plato weaves together different views of  love and portraits of  the characters that 
make such views possible (and even probable). Special attention is due to the speeches of  Socrates 
and Alicibiades, which provide a stereoscopic view of  the person of  Socrates and thereby deliver 
fuller experience of  Plato’s conception of  the good moral agent.  The ascent of  the soul in Socrates’ 
speech, it is claimed, describes the experience of  the elevation through contemplation, while 
Alcibiades testifies to the moral agency (the imagination, the disposition, the actions, etc.) that is the 
fruit of  that contemplation. Plato is thus concerned more with presenting and displaying a 
successful moral agent—one worthy of  admiration and imitation—than with proposing and 
defending a moral system. 
 
Also, in exploring Plato’s depiction of  Socrates as a moral exemplar, an attempt will be made to 
answer concerns that Plato’s theory of  love is impersonal or ultimately blind to individual persons by 
stressing that 1) by reading the last two speeches together and 2) by attending to the actions (and not 
just the words) of  Diotima and Socrates, the stated concerns are significantly attenuated. 
 
 
Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University, hhochsmann@gmail.com 
6C (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 506: “The Tripartite Soul in the Ascent of  Eros in the Symposium” 
 
The steep ascent of  eros in Diotima’s teaching in the Symposium begins with the love of  one 
beautiful individual, moving up to the contemplation of  the beauty of  ‘laws and institutions’ and 
culminates in the capacity to bring forth beauty which enables one, if  it is ever possible for a mortal 
approach ‘immortality’, to become ‘the friend of  god’.  The distinct and seemingly disjunctive stages 
of  eros in the Symposium can be interpreted as a continuum of  the scope and extent of  eros linking 
up the three parts of  the soul (the appetitive, the spirited and the rational). While there is no specific 
reference to the tripartite division of  the soul in the Symposium as in the Phaedrus, the Republic and the 
Timaeus, the stages of  eros can be elucidated as corresponding activities of  the tripartite soul. 
 
The expansion of  eros in Symposium presents a wider horizon of  anticipation for the harmony of  the 
soul when read in conjunction with the resurrection of  eros in the paideia of  the soul in the Laws 
and the demiourgos’ creation of  the cosmos in the Timaeus as beautiful order for souls to emulate 
and attain ‘immortality to the full extent it is possible for human nature’. 
 
 
Owen Goldin, Marquette University, Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu 
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Pistis in Aristotle” 
 
Within the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle argues that the first principles of  a science must be grasped 
with a higher level of  pistis than the propositions that are demonstrated on their basis. If  we 
interpret pistis as conviction or certainty, this is a perplexing claim, as it would seem that a conclusion 
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inferred on the basis of  certain principles, alone, would be likewise certain. How is the cognitive 
grasp off  a principle stronger or more secure than that of  a derivative conclusion? 
 
In this paper I shed light on this issue through an examination of  Aristotle’s use of  the term pistis, 
primarily within the Rhetoric. When employed in regard to a psychological state (in contrast to a logos 
that leads to this state) the term does not refer to an epistemological state of  certainty, as we 
understand it in light of  the sorts of  arguments entertained by the ancient skeptics and Descartes. 
Pistis is a psychological state of  reliance, providing a support for action. The rhetorician does not try 
to instill a belief  impervious to doubt, but to provide a basis that is considered reliable or secure 
enough for doing something – whether making a legal judgment (which ramifications for the parties 
to a case), a political decision, or verbal praise or blame.  Pistis is a crucial element in the psychology 
of  praxis; it is not, primarily, an epistemological matter. In the context of  science, too, pistis is 
reliance on demonstrative arguments as providing grounds for doing something, in this case, for 
making certain statements and offering certain arguments, in pedagogical or dialectical context. 
 
 
António Pedro Mesquita, University of  Lisbon, apmesquita@netcabo.pt 
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Aristotle on Dialectic and First Principles” 
 
Over time, several authors have defended that for Aristotle dialectic is a method of  discovery or 
establishment of  the principles of  science in general.  Four reasons speak, in my opinion, against 
this thesis. 
 
The first is that although for Aristotle each science has, besides the common principles it shares with 
other sciences, certain principles that are proper to it, dialectic is never seen by him as a method for 
discovering, establishing or even justifying proper principles of  particular sciences, but only as a 
method for discussing (and sometimes upholding) common principles. 
 
The second is that if  dialectic were a general method of  discovery or establishment of  the principles 
of  all sciences, it would have to discover or posit not only their common principles, but also those 
that are proper to each one. And, since the task of  discovering or positing the proper principles of  
each science belongs to the science to which the principles are proper, dialectic would become the 
science to which all principles are proper and therefore a “common” or “universal” science. But the 
fact is that Aristotle is adamant that there cannot be a common science and moreover that 
specifically dialectic is not such a common or universal science. 
 
The third reason has to do with the very special sense under which, according to Aristotle, a 
universal character can be attributed to dialectic. This sense is the following: dialectic, albeit not 
being a universal science, has nonetheless a universal scope insofar as it addresses matters about 
which everybody knows and on which everyone may give an opinion. Hence, it is only while it 
addresses issues that everyone has some knowledge of  and can speak about – that is to say, only 
when it addresses them at a level that everyone can access and in such a way that everyone can give 
their opinion – that dialectic has a universal character. Now, principles are by their very nature “more 
knowable in themselves than they are for us”; thus, it is not by discovering or establishing the 
principles of  science, which few people know about and no inexpert opinions count on, that 
dialectic is acknowledged by Aristotle as a comprehensive and transversal, all-encompassing (and, in 
this sense, universal) method. 
 
The fourth and last reason to contest that dialectic is a method of  discovery or establishment of  the 
first principles of  science in general is rather trivial. It is nevertheless important to recall it, given 
2016 SAGP/SSIPS Conference Abstracts, page 77 
 
that some advocates of  the thesis under analysis appear to sometimes forget it. Aristotle repeatedly 
mentions the process by which (proper) principles of  science are posited and this process is not 
dialectic, but rather (some kind of) experience. Regardless of  the way we wish to interpret this 
doctrine, what is a fact is that for Aristotle the discovering or establishing of  principles is not within 
the powers of  dialectic. 
 
In my paper I will at length expose these four arguments and, in a final more positive section, 
disclose and argue for my own view on the role of  dialectic in this matter, namely the defense of  
common principles against potential eristic attacks.  The conclusion will therefore not be that 
dialectic has no function as regards the principles of  science, but that its intervention is much more 
limited and modest than those campaigning for the thesis under analysis believe, as that function is 
primarily limited to common principles and only consists of  supporting and not of  discovering or 
establishing them. 
 
 
Sister Anna Wray, O. P., The Catholic University of  America, 07wray@cua.edu 
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Classifying the Indivisibles of  Aristotle's De Anima, III.6” 
 
This paper argues that the classification of  indivisibles (ἀ διαίρετα) in Aristotle’s De Anima III.6 must 
be interpreted as a specification of  the chapter’s initial contrast between infallible and fallible 
thinking, conducted in light of  III.4’s account of  the thinking of  singular composites and their 
forms (429b22-430a9). 
 
The opening lines of  III.6 distinguish the thinking of  indivisibles (τῶν ἀ διαιρέ των νό ησις) from 
thinking that involves some synthesis of  objects of  thought (σύ νθεσί ς τις ἤ δη νοημά των) (430a26-
28): in the former there is no falsity, while the latter is either false or true. The chapter concludes 
with the same distinction, only specified and stronger: thinking the ‘what it is’ in the sense of  
essence (τί  ἐ στι κατὰ  τὸ  τί  ἦ ν εἶ ναι) is true, while thinking something about something (τι κατά  
τινος) is not always true, but is in every case true or false (430b26-28, 30). In the lines between these 
two distinctions (430a28-b26), Aristotle offers a classification of  indivisible objects of  thought that 
some have regarded as disjointed both in itself  and with respect to the chapter of  which it is a part. 
What role did Aristotle intend this classification to play within the argument of  III.6? 
 
Recent Aristotelian commentary on III.6 has suffered from neglect of  this question. The 
interpretation commonly given to the passage implies that Aristotle is guilty of  both logical 
sloppiness and vain classification: (1) the proposed classes, failing to be mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive, do not account for all the things that can be thought; (2) the proposed classes 
merely display differences among what can be thought infallibly, rather than explaining what objects 
correspond to each of  the two kinds of  thinking mentioned at the chapter’s outset. Attempts to 
exonerate Aristotle from the latter charge vary. Sorabji, Polansky, and Berti read into III.6’s 
classification a discussion of  definitions and predications, taking these respectively as the objects of  
infallible and fallible thinking. Hicks, Ross, Hamlyn, and Shields, understanding III.6’s classification 
as an opposition between concepts and propositions, criticize the chapter’s initial distinction 
between kinds of  thinking: Aristotle should not have opposed what is not false to what is either false 
or true, but what is not yet true or false.  These additions and amendments are ad hoc and 
unnecessary, as exemplified by the interpretation of  Pritzl and, to a lesser extent, Aubenque and 
Biondi. This paper makes the case that the classification of  indivisibles in III.6 is logically exhaustive 
and crucially relevant to the chapter’s initial contrast between infallible and fallible thinking: 
Aristotle’s classification distinguishes between intellectual objects whose unity is received, on the one 
hand, and made, on the other hand, by the intellect (νοῦ ς). The classification exhausts the kind of  
objects that can be thought, and the objects whose unity is received correspond exactly to singular 
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composites and their forms, recently discussed in III.4. 
 
 
Daniel Regnier, St. Thomas College, Canada, dregnier@stmcollege.ca 
6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “The Arabic Plotinus on the Relationship Between Soul and 
Intellect” 
 
The texts of  the Arabic Plotinus often depart from their Plotinian source in rather subtle but 
significant ways. One topic to which the author of  the Arabic Plotinus devotes extensive attention is 
that concerning the relationship between soul and intellect. Crucial developments on this question 
going well beyond the texts of  Plotinus, are elaborated in the Theology of  Aristotle, the most 
significant part of  the Arabic Plotinus. These developments seem to be motivated by the fact that 
the author of  the Arabic Plotinus has concerns about epistemology and philosophy of  mind that do 
not correspond exactly to those of  Plotinus.  Furthermore, the author of  the Arabic Plotinus also 
seems to wish to situate the soul as self  clearly in relation to a creator God compatible with Islamic 
thought. In this paper I propose to identify and analyse the original philosophical contributions that 
the author of  the Arabic Plotinus makes concerning the relation of  soul to intellect. I will, finally, 
also suggest how these contributions might have been significant for subsequent philosophers of  
the Islamic world. 
 
 
Alfred Ivry, New York University, ai1@nyu.edu 
6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Maimonides’ Relation to Muslim Theology and Philosophy” 
 
Maimonides’ indebtedness to the Muslim philosophers who preceded him has been studied by 
Shlomo Pines in the introduction to his translation of  the Guide of  the Perplexed, as well as by myself  
in the Cambridge Companion to Maimonides. As much as he was attracted to the doctrines of  the 
philosophers, notably Alfarabi, Avicenna and Ibn Bājja, he was repelled by the world-view held by 
the mutakallimūn. Maimonides’ own theology nevertheless paralleled that of  the Kalām to a certain 
extent, even as he was determined to distinguish himself  from crucial metaphysical tenets held by 
the philosophers. 
 
This paper will test Maimonides’ avowals and disavowals in his capacity as a theologian and 
philosopher. His exoteric statements will be weighed against the esoteric meanings that can be 
elicited from them. Particular areas to be interrogated will be his position on creation, eternity, 
conjunction and immortality. 
 
 
Beau Shaw, Columbia University, Bcs2104@columbia.edu 
6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Esotericism and Egalitarianism in Strauss’s Farabi” 
 
This paper examines Leo Strauss’s interpretation of  Farabi’s esotericism in “Farabi’s Plato” and the 
“Introduction” to Persecution of  the Art of  Writing. I argue that Strauss’s interpretation of  Farabi’s 
esotericism is significantly different from the one usually attributed to him; and I argue that this 
esotericism carries egalitarian consequences, contrary to many critics of  Strauss, who believe that his 
view of  esotericism carries inegalitarian consequences. 
 
According to most commentators, Strauss views the esotericism practiced by ancient and medieval 
philosophers as a political technique whose purpose is the defense against persecution by non-
philosophers. I call this type of  esotericism “defensive esotericism.” I argue that, while Strauss 
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attributes this esotericism to Farabi, he also attributes to him what I call “aggressive esotericism.” 
This esotericism “replaces” the non-philosophers’ “accepted opinions,” which do not “point 
towards the truth,” with opinions which do “point towards the truth.” Strauss suggests that, for 
Farabi, this aggressive esotericism means to “destroy” the non-virtuous cities of  the non-
philosophers, and helps to bring about the “virtuous city” ruled by the philosophers. This aggressive 
esotericism is therefore significantly different from defensive esotericism. It does not react to 
persecution, but actively tries to change a political community; and its purpose is not to help 
philosophers escape persecution but to give them political power. 
 
I also consider why most commentators overlook this interpretation of  Farabi’s esotericism. I 
suggest that it is because Strauss esoterically conceals it in his texts on Farabi. He does this, 
specifically, in the “Introduction” to Persecution and the Art of  Writing. This “Introduction” is based on 
an earlier article, “Farabi’s Plato.” I show that, in the “Introduction,” Strauss makes a number of  
changes to “Farabi’s Plato,” which both conceal and point to Farabi’s aggressive esotericism. For 
example, Strauss omits the word “destruction,” which, in the earlier article, he consistently uses to 
describe the purpose of  Farabi’s esotericism. I suggest that Strauss esoterically conceals this 
aggressive esotericism because, in order to function, it must be kept secret. 
 
Finally, I consider whether Strauss’s interpretation of  Farabi’s esotericism leads to inegalitarian 
positions. This is the view taken by most commentators. They claim that, for Strauss, Farabi’s 
esotericism entails the unequal communication of  the truth—it communicates the truth only to 
philosophers not non-philosophers; and that it is based on the view that people are naturally unequal 
in respect to the ability to understand the truth. I argue that Strauss’s interpretation of  Farabi’s 
esotericism implies these inegalitarian positions only if  this esotericism is understood to be defensive 
esotericism. I suggest that, to the contrary, if  it is understood as aggressive esotericism, it does not 
imply these positions. Aggressive esotericism teaches the truth equally to philosophers and non-
philosophers; it replaces the non-philosophers’ accepted opinions which do not point to the truth 
with opinions which do. And, for this reason, it presupposes that non-philosophers are as naturally 
capable of  understanding the truth as are philosophers. 
 
 
Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University, dalmaini@stfx.ca 
6F (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 512: “Courage and Risk in Plato’s Laches” 
 
At 192e-193e the title character of  the Laches accepts the claim that any act of  courage entails a 
certain amount of  risk taking. But risk is something that technai are meant to do away with: the art of  
navigation, for example, is employed to reduce the risk of  a ship falling afoul of  a storm or 
foundering on rocks. The inclusion of  risk-taking in courage thus subtracts from our ability to 
conceive of  courage as a techne and this has serious ramifications. We cannot, for example, think of  
courage as a practical skill that has a particular body of  knowledge associated with it or as something 
that might be taught to others. Indeed it is debatable whether we can talk about courage intelligibly 
at all, if  we are to assume that it is not a techne. Given these problems, it is worthwhile considering if  
Laches is right about the relationship between risk and courage, and this paper will argue that Plato 
is using the character of  Laches to show that in fact risk should not be considered a proper part of  
courage. 
 
 
Ryan Drake, Fairfield University, rdrake@fairfield.edu 
6F (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 512: “Love and Compulsion in Plato's Protagoras” 
 
While the Protagoras begins with manifold references to eros, desire, and beauty, these philosophically 
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rich themes appear to give way, not long after Socrates and Protagoras begin to speak, wholly to the 
dramatic entanglement of  philosophy and sophistry; the unity of  the virtues, the proper mode of  
dialogue, and various Socratic paradoxes seem to dominate the theoretical terrain, all but pushing 
questions of  love out of  sight for the duration. 
 
However, in attending closely to the connection between the titular sophist and his would-be patron, 
Hippocrates, I wish to claim on the other hand that love – especially in its senses of  eros and philia – 
tells us something about the implications of  the sophist’s practice as well as the notion of  the 
political art on which that practice is founded. I argue that in the Protagoras sophistic eros is 
intimately bound up with force and violence, not just theoretically but as well in the sophist’s 
pedagogical bearing. Sophistry’s vaunted political education, on my reading, promotes prudent 
action on the part of  the wise individual where the dictates of  law are to be regarded as secondary 
to the individual’s power over others, and hence civic unity is secondary to the interests of  the clever 
political student. I claim, furthermore, that Socrates’ poetic interpretation of  the poem at the heart 
of  the dialogue, and particularly his brief  outline of  the behavior of  the truly educated citizen, 
provides a counter-image of  sophistic eros and sophistic education that does not reject but rather 
inverts or internalizes three central aspects of  sophistic practice: entrancing speech, self-
concealment, and compulsion. What Socrates reserves as an answer to Protagoras’ wisdom of  
individual prudence in the city is essentially the cultivation, through that inversion, of  power over 
oneself, where one forces oneself  to love (in the sense of  philia) and praise precisely those typically 
regarded as undeserving of  such treatment. In so doing, the educated citizen’s actions of  self-
development and self-mastery work at the same time to promote the coherence of  the community 
as such. This paper concludes with an analysis of  Socrates’ notion of  civic philia. 
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